Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA2199
2006-04-21 09:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER: YOUR APRIL VISIT TO ANKARA

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU VISIT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0394
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHAK #2199/01 1110912
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 210912Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5001
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002199 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU VISIT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR APRIL VISIT TO ANKARA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

Madam Secretary,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002199

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU VISIT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR APRIL VISIT TO ANKARA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

Madam Secretary,


1. (S) Thank you for coming to Turkey. The Mission and I
look forward to seeing you here. Your visit can help us
achieve three things.

-- First, we need to restore lost confidence --on both sides
-- about intent and capacity for genuine collaboration.
Announcing the start of a strategic dialogue will reinforce
that effort.

-- Second, we need a clearer common understanding on Iran
that will help us avoid Turkish wavering (or worse) and
ensure Ankara is with us when we need it.

-- Third, we need to help the Turks see a way forward on
Cyprus and the EU that welcomes UN technical work, activates
Turkish diplomacy and politicking in European capitals, and
shows more momentum on domestic accession issues.

You will hear, privately and publicly, a great deal of
frustration over PKK terrorism and impatience with US
inaction against PKK camps in northern Iraq. You will also
find anxiety about further regional instability that is
fueled by fears that Iraq will fragment, Palestine will
implode, and Iran and the West will collide militarily.
Despite these concerns and the fact that public sentiment
toward the US remains largely negative, this government is
rhetorically committed to working with us to find a new
paradigm for partnership. The test for both of us is whether
we can replace that rhetoric with reality.

Where We Find Ourselves
--------------


2. (S) You come to Turkey at a time when our relations should
be strong, but remain frayed. It's not for lack of trying.
The Turks were and are immensely grateful for your role in
getting the EU accession talks started last October. We have
restored bilateral dialogue through many senior level visits
over the past nine months. We have shifted our dialogue on
Iraq from one dominated by Turkish whining about the PKK and
Kirkuk to constructive collaboration politically and
logistically in support of our efforts there.


3. (S) The Hamas visit set this back more seriously than
Turkish officials are willing to admit. You know better than
we the bitterness toward Turkey that exists in some parts of

Congress and especially the American Jewish community. For
this and a variety of reasons, we still have a Turkey
problem. There are tactical problems on this or that issue,
but the fundamental problem is a continuing lack of
confidence ) on both sides.


4. (S) Left alone, the problems will get worse. None of the
regional challenges is getting any easier. Internally,
politicking has begun ahead of the presidential election in
May 2007 and parliamentary elections that must occur by
November 2007. Infighting among secularists, AKP Islamists
and nationalists is intensifying. Each side regards the US
as both a punching bag and a source of support. Though PM
Erdogan remains by far Turkey's most popular politician and
AK has no serious competitor, he and FM Gul -- in the face of
rising PKK violence, EU obstinacy on Cyprus, angst about Iraq
and Iran, and obvious tension over US-Turkish relations --
are vulnerable to nationalists and to the military.
Reverting to Turkish pugnacity, the predictable course of
action, will likely worsen matters for us here.

How We Can Use Your Visit
--------------


5. (S) Your visit can give public profile to the positives in
our relations and our collaboration on key global issues. It
is a step toward restoring confidence, Gul's reported theme
for your visit. Really restoring confidence requires action,
of course, and your talks here can help us better organize
Turkey for progress on those issues that can improve the
atmosphere and move away from the problems that are
undermining our ties. You will be investing in relationships
with Erdogan and Gul -- both of whom look set to be in
leadership for a while, share our goals in many areas, and
have influence and credibility in the region. The fact that
they want and need US support internationally and as they
look toward a crucial 18 months of domestic transition gives
us leverage.

Key Issues
--------------

ANKARA 00002199 002 OF 003




6. (S) Iran: Greg Schulte came here in February to share our
intelligence on Iran's nuclear efforts and consult on the way
forward. Gul told visiting Congressional staff last week
that Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations are the single most
important problem facing Europe and the Middle East, and he
emphasized the need for a united and decisive international
approach. In public and apparently in private, Ankara has
called on Tehran to cooperate with the IAEA, adopt full
transparency on its nuclear programs, and resume negotiations
with the EU-3. Gul should hear where you want to take the
Iran debate and how Turkey must be with us on this critical
threat to it and to our alliance -- through diplomacy now
and/or through any protective, preventive or other military
efforts that may be required in the future. You should also
tell him that Turkey must not break ranks and de-isolate
Tehran -- Ahmadinejad and Larijani visits here have been
mooted and shot down recently, but probably not killed.

7 (S) Cyprus/EU: Ankara feels cornered by the EU's
insistence that Turkey open its ports to Cypriot goods, its
incessant reform demands -- including on issues that seem
impossible to them (Cyprus, the Greek Patriarchate, Kurdish
rights),and the anti-Islamic/anti-Turkish sentiment in many
EU capitals. Erdogan and Gul need both support and tough
love. You should compliment Gul's Cyprus proposals of last
January and his EU-related reform package of several days
ago, and tell him the US will continue to push the EU to keep
the accession process on track. But the Turks should also be
told to respond positively to the UN-brokered technical talks
on Cyprus and to stop complaining about Kofi Annan and his
Cyprus representative, which only undermines their interest
in getting a UN process restarted. You should tell them that
senior Turkish officials need to spend a lot more time
courting European allies in the EU process ) they have only
the UK now. The appearance and reality of steady progress on
reform is also essential for keeping the EU bicycle aright.
The Halki Seminary and other Greek Patriarchate issues are
hard for Turkey, but progress would do wonders for Turkey's
image in Europe and the US and put beef in the "Dialogue of
Civilizations" bun.


8. (S) HAMAS: Erdogan and Gul are deeply defensive about the
HAMAS visit. They see a rejected and rejectionist HAMAS as
something that will aggravate instability, worsen the 'clash
of civilizations,' and bolster Iran's influence, which they
do not want. But Gul understands the need not to dig a
deeper hole for Turkey: with some prompting, he criticized
HAMAS' failure to condemn the Tel Aviv bombing. Gul will
probe for ways Turkey can be helpful and will want to
describe Abu Mazen's April 24-25 talks here. Consulting with
the Turks on how we see the Middle East developing in coming
months will be helpful. You should also restate your
disappointment that HAMAS came here, suggest that Turkey find
ways to call publicly for HAMAS to change, and urge that
there be no more surprises.


9. (S) Iraq and the PKK: The government and public here are
unnerved by recent developments in Iraq, signs of civil war
and fears of Iraq's breakup. Rising PKK violence aggravates
this. Gul wants a fresh sense of our Iraq game plan and what
we expect of Turkey. Besides this, you should reiterate our
commitment to helping with the PKK problem, note that we have
limits, and urge the government to stop painting itself in a
corner by incessantly calling for more that it knows we can
deliver. You should also encourage Erdogan and Gul to flesh
out a political vision on Turkey's Kurdish issue and draw
moderate Kurdish leaders into the system.


10. (S) Armenia: I understand that Gul has sent you a letter
on the annual Armenian genocide resolution. The Turks
realize that this always difficult issue is now harder
because of HAMAS. Erdogan hopes you will reaffirm the
Administration,s determination to pull out all stops to
prevent passage of genocide language. In addition, you
should commend Turkey's efforts to establish a
mutually-acceptable Turkish-Armenian mechanism to review the
history and begin laying the groundwork for reconciliation.
Opening the Armenian border, especially in the context of an
Armenian-Azeri peace deal, would be a huge step forward.


11. (S) Strategic Dialogue: As we complete this message, we
are still awaiting a response to the 'strategic partnership
framework' document that EUR presented to the Turks several
weeks ago. We are pressing the MFA to agree on a text that
can be part of your visit. Announcement by you and Gul that
we intend to set up a formal and regular senior-level
strategic dialogue consultative mechanism will signal
progress toward restoring confidence and strengthen our
ability to work the Turks in ways helpful to our goals in the
region and in Turkey itself.

ANKARA 00002199 003 OF 003



Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON