DAS BRYZA AND AMBASSADOR MEET WITH PM'S FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002048

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2021
TAGS: PREL IZ IR IS CY GR TU
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA AND AMBASSADOR MEET WITH PM'S FOREIGN
POLICY ADVISOR

(U) Classified by Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: EUR DAS Bryza met with PM Erdogan's senior
foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu April 5. On Iraq,
Davutoglu urged more ethnic diversity on the Iraqi NSC and
worried about what he sees as growing Iranian-backed Shia
power. He averred that Turkey does not want a nuclear-armed
Iran on its border but urged careful tactics toward Iran. He
opposed what he called an "economic boycott" of HAMAS and
said that Turkey could play an active role in the MEPP. End
Summary.

Iraq
--------------


2. (C) Davutoglu identified Iraq as the number one item on
Turkey,s foreign policy agenda. While Turkey sees the
situation as critical, he said, Turkey and the U.S. are in
synch on Iraq: it is essential that Iraq have a unitary
state, that its institutions take into account all in the
population. Davutoglu expressed concern about the NSC,
because its current 19 members include no Turkmen and no
Christian. The NSC will be instrumental in security issues
among Iraq's various communities, including regarding the
status of the multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk. Kirkuk is the
only truly multiethnic city (&colorful with minorities8
were his words); at this stage, he said, if there is a major
dispute there, without any Turkmen of Christian
representation on the NSC, civil war could result. Davutoglu
worried that it would be difficult to get the buy-in of these
segments of the population if they are disenfranchised in the
decision-making process. Davutoglu suggested increasing the
number of members in the NSC to 21, with the addition of one
Turkmen and one Christian. Davutoglu said he discussed this
concern with Iraqi Sunnis (not further identified) with whom
he met April 4 in Istanbul and they reacted favorably --
including because of the large Turkmen and Christian
populations in/around Kirkuk. In some instances, a Turkmen,
for example, could provide an ethnic buffer, for example
within the NSC, or deployed as police in Baghdad, including
because the Turkmen population straddles religious sectarian
lines. He stressed that Turkey has in mind no specific
individual and is really only concerned about the NSC's
ability and effectiveness.


3. (C) Davutoglu expressed concern that the Shia are pushing
Sunnis out of mixed neighborhoods and are aggravating both
terrorism and prospects for serious sectarian conflict. This
he linked to his concerns on Iran, which the Turks
increasingly see as holdingtoo much sway in Iraq. When
Jaaferi came to urkey, the Turks told him he could not/not
bethe PM of the Shi,ites; all Iraqis must feel he
represents them. Davutoglu claimed the PM and FM Gul have
limits on what they can say about Iraq; they are moving
gradually into election mode, and their room for maneuver on
a series of issues will be more and more constricted. If,
for example, violence flares next year and there are serious
ethnic/religious problems in Kirkuk, the Turkish public will
react harshly, the issue will become domestic political
fodder, and the politicians here will treat it as such.

Iran
--------------


4. (C) On Iran, Davutoglu claimed the GoT does not want any
nuclear armed states on its borders. For the first time, the
Shi,a are seeing themselves as ascendant in the region (he
worried about an emerging Shi,a mainstream belt stretching
from Iran to the Gulf). Nuclear capacity would give Iran and
its Shi'a allies a new status. He described Iran as
diplomatically very capable; it has a long tradition and
knows countries, weak points. Unlike the Iraqis, Iranians
have a strong state tradition. He worried that Iran could
create instability that would affect Iraq and the Caucasus.
Davutoglu said that tactically, Turkey had to be careful.
75,000 Turkish trucks transit Iran yearly to Central Asia;
absent a solution in Nagorno-Karabakh, it would be difficult
for Turkey to find another route. All three factors explain

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why Turkey has chosen to back the EU-3 and diplomacy.
Davutoglu believes the U.S. and Turkey need to apply pressure
wisely and coordinate better on Iran. The USG should accept
Turkey,s efforts at what he called &balancing statements8
) an effort to keep the Iranians in check while keeping a
careful rhetorical balance. Davutoglu complained that people
misinterpreted his concept of "strategic depth" as meaning
Turkey sought to deepen its relations only with its Muslim
neighbors. In reality, Turkey sought more constructive
relations with all its neighbors, 6 of which were Christian
(including countries across the Black Sea).

HAMAS/Palestine
--------------


5. (C) Davutoglu averred the Quartet made a mistake in
allowing Hamas to compete in the elections without first
securing Hamas' commitment to the Quartet's three conditions,
(e.g., recognize Israel, foreswear terrorism, and abide by
existing agreements). He claimed that during the HAMAS
visit, Turkish interlocutors stressed that HAMAS should play
according to the rules of civilized behavior and democracy.
Now, if the U.S. and EU give Hamas the cold shoulder, Hamas
will settle under Iran's wing; this is what Turkey seeks to
prevent, he said. Davutoglu said he is personally against
any "economic boycott" of Iran because it is always the
people who suffer, not the regime. Moreover, economic
sanctions would allow the Hamas regime simply to blame the
Americans and EU for Palestinians' suffering. Davutoglu said
Turkey wants to and can play a helpful role in the region:
Abbas has, he said, several times phoned Erdogan to ask for
Turkish help.


6. (C) Bryza recognized that Turkey might be able to play a
useful role with respect to Hamas, but that Secretary Rice
was deeply disappointed with the GOT's reception of the
recent Hamas delegation at such a high level, as Ambassador
Wilson had conveyed. Such questions of form were import.
Davutoglu conceded that the form of the Hamas visit was
"probably a mistake," but insisted Turkey could help moderate
Hamas' behavior.

Cyprus
--------------


7. (C) Davutoglu said he knows the USG is pursuing what he
termed &partial implementation8 of Turkey's commitment to
the EU to open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships ) perhaps
opening Famagusta and a port in Turkey. This would be fine,
he said, if Famagusta were opened under Turkish Cypriot
control, but under UN control it would be unacceptable
domestically because it would look to hardliners as if the
Turks had abdicated sovereignty. What, he asked
rhetorically, would Turkey get in return? Bryza noted Turkey
had already secured its 40-year quest to begin EU accession
negotiations. The U.S. was not trying to help Turkey help
itself to sustain its EU accession process. Davutoglu
responded that the EU process is being increasingly viewed in
Turkey as just a series of Turkish concessions, but Turkey
will continue to work it.

Bilateral Relations --------------


8. (C) On U.S.-Turkey relations, Davutoglu said that both
countries should focus on the 90% of agenda where we can
achieve success and agree, rather than on the 10% where there
are problems. He expressed a desire to re-think our joint
international agenda. The U.S.-Turkey strategic vision paper
now under discussion should not just be a list of issues, but
should provide a joint vision on key issues )- Central Asia,
the Balkans, the Caucasus, etc. -- that would shape our
future work together. Bryza welcomed this suggestion, and
looked forward to Turkey's new version of the draft.

Black Sea
--------------


9. (C) DAS Bryza explained that the U.S. sought cooperation

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on soft security, energy, and democracy in the Black Sea.
The U.S. appreciated Turkey's sensitivities regarding the
Montreaux Convention, and would not press for an expanded
NATO maritime presence in the Black Sea beyond that which had
naturally emerged by virtue of NATO membership for Turkey,
Bulgaria, and Romania. Bryza urged Turkey to work closely
with Romania and attend the June 5 Black Sea Forum summit in
Bucharest. Bryza suggested BSEC might improve regional
cooperation by developing a clearer set of priority projects.
Davutoglu agreed on both counts. Davutoglu said democracy
and the development of strong middle classes in countries
such as Ukraine and Georgia were key to their success.
Ambassador suggested using APEC as a model, with a better
format for cooperation in the Black Sea. Davutoglu said the
U.S. should seek to work with Russia -- not provoke it, but
also not let it get too strong.

Oil/Gas and Central Asia
--------------


10. (C) On oil/gas, DAS Bryza explained the BTC cost overrun
issue and urged a mutually acceptable settlement of claims.
Bryza suggested that Prime Minister Erdogan might ultimately
need to be involved, should BOTAS and the GOT decide to cover
some of the costs of the overrun. Davutoglu expressed hope
that Turkey and the U.S. could work together to develop a
trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. Turkey also
needs to work with Kazakhstan; he characterized Nazarbayev as
more visionary than Turkmenistani President Niyazov.
Davutoglu stressed the need for a joint approach to constrain
Russian/Chinese energy monopolies. If Turkmen gas Kazakh oil
and gas flow to Azerbaijan and onward to Europe, transit
states and Europe will be in a much better place, he said;
Russia and Gazprom will not have complete control.

Halki/Western Thrace Mufti
--------------


11. (C) DAS Bryza reminded Davutoglu of their conversation
last August over dinner in Istanbul, when Davutoglu suggested
that if the Greek Government allowed the Turkish minority in
Western Thrace to elect its mufti, it would be considerably
easier for the Turkish government to reopen the Ecumenical
Patriarch's religious school at Halki. Bryza explained that
during his discussions a few days earlier in Greece, he had
explored the possibility of separating the mufti's function
of civil judge from the mufti's function as a community and
religious leader. The Greek Government could appoint a
judge, while the Turkish community could select its own mufti
as community and religious leader. Davutoglu reacted
positively, though he said the mufti would have to be higher
up the scale of authority. Davutoglu said Turkey has no
linkage of Greek issues with Halki, but that movement on the
mufti issue and more opportunities in Western Thrace for
secondary schooling in Turkish would establish a better
climate for action by Ankara. Still, Davutoglu lamented that
reopening Halki in the context of this improved bilateral
climate with Greece would have been easier last summer,
before Turkey's election season began to heat up.


12. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON