Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA1877
2006-04-07 10:52:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

DAS BRYZA'S DISCUSSIONS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY ON

Tags:  PREL GG AR TU 
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VZCZCXRO5698
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHAK #1877/01 0971052
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 071052Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4612
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001877 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PREL GG AR TU
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S DISCUSSIONS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY ON
GEORGIA AND ARMENIA

REF: A. ANKARA 1557


B. ANKARA 1790

C. ANKARA 1651

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001877

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PREL GG AR TU
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S DISCUSSIONS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY ON
GEORGIA AND ARMENIA

REF: A. ANKARA 1557


B. ANKARA 1790

C. ANKARA 1651

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) MFA Caucasus Director General Resit Uman briefed DAS
Bryza April 4 on Turkey-Georgia relations, focusing on
President Sezer's March visit to Tbilisi (ref a). He said
Georgian MFA officials had told the Turks Georgia would
prefer a "5 plus 2" formula in order to internationalize
negotiations on the frozen conflicts. Bryza reported on
Friends of the Secretary General efforts to reinvigorate
talks on Abkhazia and promote economic contacts, as well as
efforts to promote South Ossetia talks. Uman said Turkey
supports intensified dialogue with Georgia but worries a MAP
would set Georgia on an irrevocable path toward NATO
membership, which might embolden Tbilisi (refs a and b).
Bryza countered that a NATO perspective should encourage
Georgia to behave more responsibly. On Armenia, Uman said
Ankara has received no response to the non-paper it presented
to Armenian officials on March 10 (ref c) and wondered if we
could help with Yerevan. End Summary.

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Adjara and Frozen Conflicts
--------------


2. (C) DG Uman briefed DAS Bryza on President Sezer's
mid-March visit to Tbilisi, highlighting President
Saakasvili's remark that "Georgia is a political and economic
extension of Turkey." Sezer had urged the Georgians to
reduce their anti-Russia rhetoric, expressed support for
Georgia's Euroatlantic integration, and offered Turkish help
- through its large Abkhazian diaspora - to mediate the
Abkhaz conflict. During Sezer's visit, Georgian officials
reportedly told the Turks they would prefer a "five plus two"
negotiating formula, similar to Transnistria talks, in order
to further internationalize the frozen conflicts. The GOT
remains concerned over Russia drawing parallels between
Kosovo final status and the frozen conflicts in Georgia.


3. (C) Uman said Sezer had asked the Georgians not to further
erode Adjara's autonomy. The GOT is concerned that gradual
loss of Adjaran autonomy, in disregard of the Treaty of Kars,
will set a negative example for other regional conflicts.

Bryza noted that U.S. and Turkish views are largely aligned
and that the U.S. has also raised these concerns in Tbilisi,
although the professed loss of Adjaran autonomy is not an
issue in Adjara itself. Still, the U.S. sees the situation
in Adjara as vastly improved from before and manageable.


4. (C) Bryza briefed Uman on U.S. efforts within the Friends
of the Secretary General (FSG) group to reinvigorate
negotiations on Abkhazia, counter Russian parallels to
Kosovo, and achieve gradual progress in Abkhazia while
enhancing its economic prospects. The U.S. appreciates
Turkey's readiness to ease Abkhazia's isolation and
facilitate talks, including with the help of Turkey's large
Abkhazian minority community. All this contributes to our
goal of building Abkhaz confidence in Georgia and its place
there.


5. (C) On South Ossetia, Bryza recounted how the U.S. has
encouraged Tbilisi to moderate its rhetoric towards Russia.
We need to find a better format for political negotiations
while still using the JCC to work on the first two elements
of the Georgia peace proposal (demilitarization/CBMs and
economic rehabilitation). We are looking forward to an OSCE
donor conference this spring and formation of working groups
to promote economic rehabilitation. Perhaps these working
groups could then provide an effective negotiating platform.

--------------
MAP for Georgia Needs Careful Thought
--------------


6. (C) Turning to Georgia's NATO aspirations, Uman

ANKARA 00001877 002 OF 002


acknowledged our demarche on intensified dialogue with
Georgia (ref b). He stated that Turkey views intensified
dialogue positively but remains cautious on Georgia's desire
for a Membership Action plan (MAP). Turkey views a MAP as an
important step, a practically irrevocable commitment to NATO
membership for Georgia. Turkey is not against a MAP but
believes it must be considered carefully in terms of
potential value added to the regional baance versus the
risks of irritating Russia and emboldening the Georgians to
act more aggressively towards Moscow. Uman suggested that
Ankara is not convinced Georgia sees a peaceful way out of
the deadlock.


7. (C) Bryza responded with the U.S. view that the prospect
of NATO membership will give Georgians hope and forestall the
possibility that Georgian frustration with Russia's
intractability over the frozen conflicts will degenerate into
serious military confrontation. If Georgia knows it has an
open door to NATO if it takes the right steps, both
internally and with regard to the conflicts on its territory,
then it will avoid a military approach. Bryza concluded that
Georgian behavior had grown more constructive after the EU
Presidency's February 21 statement supporting Tbilisi's
settlement efforts.

--------------
Armenia - No Answer to Turkish Proposal
--------------


8. (S) Uman briefed Bryza on the non-paper Turkey presented
to Armenian MFA officials in Vienna on March 10, seeking to
bridge differences between an earlier Turkish proposal for a
Joint Historical Commission to examine Armenian genocide
claims and Yerevan's counterproposal for an Intergovernmental
Commission to deal with all aspects of bilateral relations
(ref c). Uman said Armenian officials had promised a
response by late March, but Ankara had heard nothing so far.
He asked if the U.S. would be willing to press Yerevan for a
reaction to the Turkish paper. Bryza said the U.S. was
already doing so. Uman also re-stated the Foreign Ministry's
position that Turkey will not take a decision to open the
Turkey-Armenian border on the basis of progress on a
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement alone; this would also depend on
progress with bilateral issues.


9. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON