ANOTHER LOOK AT TURKEY'S BLACK SEA MARITIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001627

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016
TAGS: MARR PREL NATO MOPS TU US RO
SUBJECT: ANOTHER LOOK AT TURKEY'S BLACK SEA MARITIME
SECURITY POLICY

REF: A. 05 ANKARA 7592


B. ANKARA 273

C. BRUDER-BURGER EMAIL 3/15/06

D. ANKARA 1069

E. 05 ANKARA 5953

F. 05 ANKARA 4013

G. 05 ANKARA 3953

H. 05 ANKARA 3581

I. 05 ANKARA 2060

J. 05 ANKARA 1953

K. 05 ANKARA 802

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request -- please see para. 13.

Summary
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2. (C) Turkey welcomes U.S., NATO, EU and others' active
involvement in political and economic challenges facing the
greater Black Sea region, such as frozen conflicts and energy
flows. However, Turkey prefers that the Black Sea's littoral
states address maritime security on their own. GOT argues
that security risks in the Black Sea are manageable, and that
sudden U.S. or NATO participation would scuttle their efforts
to draw Russia into a cooperative security architecture with
the other littorals. A deliberate, go-slow approach in
seeking to assert a U.S./NATO role in Black Sea maritime
security is more likely to succeed. We request feedback on
the GOT's request to prevail upon Romania and Bulgaria to
join Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY. End summary.


3. (C) We understand that EUCOM, DoD, and State are all
working on various strategies or policies for the Black Sea
region. As Turkey is a key littoral, we will be providing
some thoughts septel for Washington's consideration. In the
meantime, however, we thought it important to clarify
Turkey's policy on Black Sea security matters. Refs E, F, H,
and I provide further background.

The Region Versus the Sea Itself
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4. (C) When discussing Black Sea policy, Turkish policymakers
make a significant distinction between maritime security
issues and broader regional considerations. Turkey welcomes
U.S., NATO, EU, and other nations' and organizations'
participation in dealing with key Black Sea regional
challenges such as frozen conflicts, energy flows, economic
development, and democratization (including those challenges
inherent in Russia's past domination of large chunks of the
region). Turkey does not object to U.S. basing in Romania or
U.S. support for Georgia, for example. And certainly Turkey
sees gas and oil pipeline and tanker security, resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, and interdicting terrorists and
WMDs as in its interests.


5. (C) It is true, however, that Turkey takes a somewhat more
restrictive position when it comes to Black Sea maritime
security. It is the GOT's stated preference that the
littoral states take the lead in maintaining a safe and
secure sea. Part of this, Turkish officials tell us, is
because Turkey has worked assiduously since the 1990s to draw
the other littorals -- especially Russia -- into cooperative
security structures in the Black Sea. It took a number of
years during the late 1990s for Ankara to convince Moscow to
participate in the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group
(better known as BLACKSEAFOR),which came into being in 2001
essentially as a confidence-building measure among the
littoral navies. While technically BLACKSEAFOR is an "on
call" force for OSCE and UN-mandated operations, its chief
naval activity has been biannual (formerly annual)
"activations," exercises of relatively low complexity or
interactivity. However, BLACKSEAFOR has also developed over
the years into both a political and military organization.
It holds annual naval staff talks and MFA
undersecretary-level meetings, as well as numerous meetings
of experts and mid-level officials.

Risks or Threats?

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6. (C) In early 2005, BLACKSEAFOR agreed on a rather vague
risk assessment (text Ref I). Turkish military and civilian
officials often point to this assessment to claim that there
are no risks in the Black Sea which the littorals cannot
handle themselves (i.e., there is no need for NATO to expand
Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE) into the Black Sea). A
popular line here is that "there are no threats in the Black
Sea, only risks." This rather naive (or disingenuous)
assessment has put Bucharest, a vocal champion of a
significant NATO presence in the Black Sea, on the defensive,
since it agreed to sign onto it. Turkish officials ask why
the Romanians are so eager for a greater NATO (read U.S.)
presence in the Black Sea if the littorals have all agreed
that the risks are not all that significant.


7. (C) Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH) is a maritime
interdiction operation (MIO) which commenced in March 2004.
Turkey carries out this MIO in its Exclusive Economic Zone
waters, though the extent and coverage of this operation is
not transparent. Turkish officials claim that OBSH is
essentially the same as OAE, although the Georgian DCM tells
us that the Turkish Navy turns a blind eye to Turkish
maritime smuggling into Abkhazia, and Bulgarian officials
report that extensive illicit activities continue in the
Black Sea. The Turkish Navy provides information obtained in
OBSH to NATO. In 2005, Turkey offered all the other
littorals to join OBSH. Russia has indicated it will accept;
we understand Russian vessels will probably commence
operations later this year. Ukraine and Georgia (though the
Georgians have no real navy) have expressed some interest,
and Romania and Bulgaria have not responded (they tell us
they are not interested).

Playing Footsie With Moscow?
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8. (C) Russia and Turkey, traditional rivals, maintain the
only large, capable navies among the littoral states.
Historically, Russia values its Black Sea ports and views the
Turkish Straits as a limiting factor on its ability to
project naval power southward. Now these same Straits have
taken on enormous political and economic importance for the
GOR, namely as the main sea route for oil from the Black Sea
to world markets. The average three million barrels of oil
that pass through the Straits each day account for 7% of
global tanker traffic. This -- along with significant
Russian tourist presence in Turkey's southern resorts and
other economic ties -- has resulted in a somewhat greater
harmony of interests between Moscow and Ankara. This harmony
is magnified somewhat by certain elements in the ruling AK
Party, such as the PM's adviser Ahmet Davutoglu, who seek to
foster stronger ties to Turkey's south, east, and north.


9. (C) With us, Turkish officials point to the positive
benefits of engaging the Russians. They say Russia is
essential to Turkey's desire to build a meaningful security
architecture which, ideally for the GOT, would involve all
the littoral states on an equal basis (and which would in
general remain a "littorals-only" club). Turkish naval brass
constantly refer to BLACKSEAFOR activations in which
Georgians and Ukrainians (activation commands rotate) got to
order their Russian colleagues around. And they refer to the
benefits of the mixed nature of the littoral states -- half
of whom are NATO Allies -- in building confidence and getting
the Russians to engage in cooperative security in the region.
They claim that their work to get Russia involved in
BLACKSEAFOR built the confidence Moscow needed to participate
in OAE in the Mediterranean.

Don't Lump Us Together
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10. (C) Turkish officials are angered when American academics
and others lump Turkey and Russia together as obstructionist
elements in the Black Sea region. It is true that they agree
that Black Sea maritime security should remain primarily a
littoral project, but Turkey is a NATO Ally, Russia isn't.
It's also true that Russia has agreed to join Operation BLACK
SEA HARMONY, which provides data to NATO. While it remains

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to be seen how much data Russia will share with NATO, not to
mention how genuine their patrolling will be when it comes to
Russian ships smuggling in the Black Sea, this is still a
positive step in drawing Russia into further cooperation with
the Alliance.

Montreux: Treaty as Holy Writ
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11. (C) Turkish officials also consistently emphasize the
Montreux Convention of 1936 as the centerpiece of maintaining
Black Sea security. The Convention restored Turkish
sovereignty and control of the Straits, and places limits on
non-littoral navy traffic transiting the Straits and
operating in the Black Sea. The U.S. is not a signatory to
Montreux, but we abide by the sometimes inconvenient
(sometimes onerous) conditions the Convention places on U.S.
Navy movements through the Straits. Senior U.S. military
officers have in the past chafed publicly at the restrictions
Montreux places on our Navy; Turkish officials are very
sensitive to such comments. While the prospect of moving
more or bigger ships through the Straits for longer stays in
the Black Sea is attractive, renegotiating the Convention
would open a Pandora's Box, allowing Russia to make mischief
and demand an element of control over the Straits, a
historical Russian dream (and clearly -- as GOT officials
often point out -- against our interests). We understand
from our military that we do not currently have the resources
available to place a large naval presence in the Black Sea.

Steady As She Goes
--------------


12. (C) At least in the maritime security arena, these
developments argue for maintaining a steady, go-slow approach
with regard to the Black Sea. We should continue to send the
message that we will engage in the Black Sea, be it
unilaterally or mulilaterally. (NOTE: The GOT has agreed to
a blateral Black Sea engagement opportunity planne for
April 14-17 with USS PORTER, which will lso make a port call
in Samsun on the Black Sea coast. END NOTE.). But at the
same time we should applaud Turkish leadership in the region
and the efforts of the littoral states to maintain security
and deal with threats to all our interests (terrorism,
smuggling, WMD proliferation, trafficking in persons, etc.).
And we should deliberately but consistently push Turkey to
include both NATO and American participation in collective
security -- be it as guests, observers, or in some other
status initially. It would be worth reminding Turkey that if
the security structures it has founded in the Black Sea
remain opaque to us, we will lack confidence in them.

Action Request
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13. (C) More immediately, we owe Ankara an answer on a
request they have made of us. During the Nov. 9-10 High
Level Defense Group meeting (ref a),EUCOM D/CDR Gen. Wald's
Jan. 17 visit (ref b),and the Ambassador's Feb. 1 call on
Turkish Naval Forces Commander ADM Karahanoglu, the Turkish
military has requested us to weigh in with Romania and
Bulgaria to persuade them to join Operation BLACK SEA
HARMONY. We note that (especially) Romania's reluctance to
join OBSH -- or even to communicate with the Turkish Navy
about suspicious shipping in its vicinity -- appear to have
increased tensions between these NATO Allies. Turkey is
beginning to reciprocate with a cautious attitude toward
Romanian initiatives in the region. One MFA official even
suggested Bucharest's policy toward Black Sea cooperation
could factor into the GOT response for CFE entitlements
headroom to permit our armor to operate on Romanian bases.
Such a development is not good for the region or for the
Alliance. We recommend advocating greater cooperation in the
region by the region.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

MCELDOWNEY