Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ANKARA1253
2006-03-10 13:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED'S MARCH 16-17 VISIT TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL IZ IR SY IS KWBG AR AJ TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4933
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1253 0691311
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101311Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3863
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001253 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR A/S FRIED AND EUR/SNEC MANN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR SY IS KWBG AR AJ TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED'S MARCH 16-17 VISIT TO
ANKARA

REF: ANKARA 1250

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001253

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR A/S FRIED AND EUR/SNEC MANN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR SY IS KWBG AR AJ TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED'S MARCH 16-17 VISIT TO
ANKARA

REF: ANKARA 1250

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) We look forward to your visit to Ankara, which is
very timely in view of events in the Caucasus. The Turkish
government has heard conflicting accounts of the Rambouillet
talks, is disappointed at the apparent lack of progress, and
is anxious to hear your and Steve Mann's views on the way
forward. Turkey has recently presented some ideas to Armenia
to try to break the logjam in bilateral relations (reftel).
At the working level, the GOT has made it clear that
substantial progress towards a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement is
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Turkey to
consider opening its border with Armenia, insisting that
progress must also be made on bilateral issues (genocide and
border recognition). FM Gul and possibly PM Erdogan display
more flexibility. Your interlocutors will also be interested
in U.S. thinking on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Other topics
of note are discussed below.


2. (C) Syria and Iran. FM Gul has reportedly given Bashar
Assad tough messages about the need for Syria to cooperate
with UNIIIC, prevent foreign fighters from entering Iraq, and
cease its support to Palestinian rejectionists. The GOT has
given Iran a strong message on the need to cooperate with the
IAEA and restore international trust. It has also reportedly
given Tehran clear messages on its involvement in Iraq and
attitude toward the Middle East peace process. Ankara did
not, however, take a very tough public line on Ahmedi-nejad's
anti-Israel rhetoric.


3. (C) Hamas. The GOT's reception of a Hamas delegation on
February 16 was awkward and amateurish. Turkish officials
assured us they impressed on Hamas the need to fulfill
Quartet conditions, but Turkish public statements during the
visit were less than forceful. Ankara subsequently reached
out to Israel. MFA U/S Tuygan will visit Israel soon and FM
Livni has reportedly accepted an invitation to visit Turkey
later this spring.


4. (C) Iraq. The GOT has been helpful in reaching out to
disaffected Sunnis and encouraging them to participate in the
political process. Turkey seeks to re-open its consulate in
Mosul and appreciates Mission Iraq and CENTCOM's recent help.
GOT Iraq Coordinator Celikkol visited Baghdad February 23-25
and met with a wide array of Iraqi political figures there.
PM Jafari visited Ankara immediately afterward and had useful
discussions on economic cooperation, including the
possibility of opening additional border crossings. The GOT
remains opposed to settling Kirkuk's status through a
referendum, arguing for a consensus solution instead. Ankara
looks forward to Makhmour's closure and the results of our
dialogue with the Europeans on PKK activities there, but it
always wants more action on the PKK than we can deliver.


5. (C) Turkish officials have made clear they have accepted
Muqtada al-Sadr's request to visit Ankara. The date and
level at which he would be received have not been decided.
We have expressed our strong misgivings about such a visit at
multiple levels of the government and have urged the GOT, if
it meets with Sadr, to do so at the lowest possible level
while delivering the unambiguous message that Sadr cannot
promote violence and participate in Iraqi politics at the
same time.


6. (C) Guatemala/Venezuela UNSC Candidacies. FM Gul told
Ambassador privately that Turkey will not support Venezuela's
bid. Turkish officials have told us that they are seeking
reciprocal support from Guatemala on Turkey's candidacy for
the 2009-2010 WE and Others UNSC seat. Although we're likely
to end up at the right place on this issue, the Turks should
hear from you on the importance Washington attaches to this.


7. (C) Cyprus. Turkey appreciates our support for FM Gul's
Cyprus proposals in January. It is awaiting the start of
UN-sponsored inter-communal technical talks -- as long as
they remain technical and do not touch on broader settlement
equities. Turkey should do everything it can to make sure
that Talat and his representatives are authorized to conclude
agreements with their Greek Cypriot counterparts during the
talks and are not seen as puppets constrained by Turkish
demands. Your interlocutors will greatly appreciate hearing
that the U.S. does not view the upcoming technical talks as a
substitute for an Annan Plan-based overall settlement.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON