TFLE01: JORDANIAN FM ON AL MINISTERIAL AND DRAFT

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005889

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS UN LE IS JO
SUBJECT: TFLE01: JORDANIAN FM ON AL MINISTERIAL AND DRAFT
UNSCR

REF: A. STATE 128442

B. STATE 128426

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. ( C ) Summary: Jordan welcomes the draft UNSCR, but FM
Khatib warns the Arab League ministers may feel a need to
endorse Siniora,s seven points without amendment. Khatib
plans to work for a communique that glosses over differences
between the draft UNSCR and the seven points. A UNSC vote
before the AL ministerial would simplify the situation. End
summary.


2. ( C ) Ambassador met August 6 with Foreign Minister
Abdelillah al-Khatib to present ref demarches on the upcoming
August 7 Arab League ministerial in Beirut and on the draft
UN Security Council resolution on Lebanon. PolCouns
(notetaker) accompanied.


3. ( C ) Khatib said there was little divergence between the
U.S. and Jordanian approaches. Jordan,s goal at the
ministerial would be to bolster the Siniora government and
Lebanese national unity; a split in the Siniora cabinet would
be &disastrous.8 Khatib expected to collaborate in this
effort with the Egyptians and Saudis; &Qatar and Syria are
the question.8 The Sudanese and Yemenis were another,
though lesser, concern.


4. ( C ) He agreed the draft UNSCR was &a good text8, but
expected the Arab League FMs to focus on elements that
allegedly diverge from Siniora,s seven points. He
understood some Arab governments saw divergence in the draft
UNSCR,s lack of:

-- an explicit call for Israeli withdrawal to the Blue Line

-- reference to interim UN &jurisdiction8 in the Shebaa
Farms area

-- operative reference to Lebanese prisoners.


5. ( C ) Ambassador countered that the draft opened a clear
path toward ending the violence and extending effective
Lebanese sovereignty to the Blue Line; the draft stated at
several points that the GOL should control Lebanese territory
and non-UN foreign forces should depart, language that
clearly contemplated Israeli withdrawal. The language on
Shebaa Farms went well beyond expectations. Khatib
concurred; Jordan welcomed the draft, and was making these
points with other Arabs. But he was worried about the
possibility for Syrian and Qatari mischief using these &weak
points.8

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Danger AL Might Embolden Qatar at UN
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6. ( C ) Khatib also worried that an AL ministerial that is
critical of the UNSCR draft may further embolden the Qataris
to break with consensus in the Security Council. The best
way to avoid this, he said, was for the GOL to tell the Arab
foreign Ministers that it was moving toward the draft UNSCR
language; in that case there would be little danger of the AL
ministers being &more Lebanese than the Lebanese.8 Khatib
wanted to avoid those sorts of problems and keep the language
of any Beirut declaration very general and positive, although
to include embrace of the seven points. It would further
simplify the situation if the UNSCR draft came to a vote
before the AL ministerial.

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AL Ministerial Logistics
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7. ( C) Khatib told Ambassador that the Egyptian and
Jordanian governments were each arranging ) with some
difficulty - for Israeli permission to send aircraft to
Beirut. All the Arab League FMs would be traveling to Beirut
via Cairo or Amman on one or the other of these flights. The
GOJ would transport the Iraqi FM and most of the Gulf
ministers; the others would fly to Beirut with the Egyptian
FM.

Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/
Hale