IRAQ: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD DISCUSSES MOD NEEDS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003375

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV MCAP PTER IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD DISCUSSES MOD NEEDS,
FUTURE WITH IRAQI GROUND FORCES COMMANDER

Classified By: DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, REASONS: 1.4
(B &D)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During a May 9 meeting in Amman with U.S. Ambassador
to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, Lt. General Abdel Al-Qadir, Iraqi
Ground Forces Commander, underlined the need for an
experienced professional as the next Iraqi Minister of
Defense. Al-Qadir negatively assessed the ability of the
Iraqi Army (IA) to function independently, particularly in
the area of logistics. While the Lt. General appeared
confident and informed discussing needed improvements within
the Iraqi Army and MOD, he was more hesitant and vague when
asked to prescribe a strategy to deal with insurgent groups
and militias. End Summary.


2. (C) During a May 9 meeting in Amman with U.S. Ambassador
to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, Lt. General Abdel Al-Qadir, the
Iraqi Ground Forces Commander, expressed consternation over
the state of the IA,s supply system, the drain from troops
assigned to personal security, and counter-productive overlap
between the Iraqi MOD and Joint Headquarters (JHQ). The Lt.
General assessed current MOD performance as "very bad." He
strongly criticized duplication of responsibilities between
the Ministry and the Army JHQ, citing this as a source of
considerable policy confusion. Al-Qadir also opined that at
least 30,000, and perhaps as many as 60,000, Iraqi soldiers
(out of the official strength of about 130,000) are providing
personal security to Iraqi government officials, and are
therefore unavailable to conduct counter-terrorist or other
field operations. Noting that these personal security troops
are a major drain on the MOD budget, Al-Qadir suggested
creating a separate organization outside MOD for protection
services.


3. (C) While noting improvements in IA command and control,
Al-Qadir portrayed the Army,s logistics system as woefully
inefficient, alleging that the IA "would collapse with a
week" if comprehensive U.S. and Coalition logistics support
(including fuel and food aid) were withdrawn. Al-Qadir
described fixing this logistics deficiency as the "biggest
problem" faced by the incoming Minister of Defense. The Lt.
General stated that the system of contracting support
services is not appropriate for the IA and leads to
corruption. He suggested instead that the IA become
self-sufficient, noting that some units in Al-Anbar already
are. In terms of materiale, Al-Qadir added that the Army
badly needs more Humvees, and would benefit greatly from
heavy equipment sufficient to outfit one mechanized battalion
per brigade.


4. (C) In addition to dealing with the diversion of troops
for personal security and rectifying the relationship between
MOD and the JHQ, the Ground Forces Commander noted the need
to improve intelligence gathering and evaluation
capabilities. However, he offered no specific suggestions on
how to accomplish this beyond reorganizing the MOD operations
center, which he sees as ineffective. The Lt. General also
noted that IA and other Iraqi Security Forces must begin to
conduct operations at night, when, in his opinion, forces
largely ignore the actions of insurgents and militias.


5. (C) Al-Qadir had much less to say in response to
Ambassador Khalilzad,s questions on the causes of the
current rash of sectarian killings, and possible remedial
security measures. He blamed ex-Ba,athists for carrying out
many of the killings. He also repeated "rumors" that several
Baghdad-area commanders have a secret agreement with the
Mahdi Army that restricts Iraqi military and police movements
in Mahdi Army-dominated areas. He called for stepped-up
joint operations against "terrorist strongholds" northwest of
Baghdad. While condemning the killings, he offered little
else in the way of comments or ideas concerning their cause,
or possible solutions.


6. (C) Al-Qadr urged that experienced professionals (not a
civilian) be appointed to head both the Ministry of Defense
and the Ministry of the Interior. In that context, he
stressed that the MOD needs to be headed by "someone who
knows the soldiers." He added that the next Minister of
Defense must be someone who is willing to resist
inappropriate (e.g, sectarian-motivated) guidance.


7. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Khalilzad.
HALE