Sandia Workshop Works to Lower Bioterrorism Risks,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002916

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO PTER XF JO
SUBJECT: Sandia Workshop Works to Lower Bioterrorism Risks,
Raise Awareness



1. Summary: An April 11-13 workshop sponsored by Sandia
National Lab gathered thirty Middle Eastern lab scientists
in Amman to discuss biosafety and biosecurity risks and risk
reduction strategies at health and agricultural biology
labs. Expert speakers outlined best practices for lowering
risk of spreading toxins and pathogens by either deliberate
theft for bioterrorism or by routine human error. End
summary.

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Biological Dangers Still on Page One
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2. With avian flu in today's headlines, and SARS and
anthrax still vivid memories, the timing for this workshop,
and its target audience, could not have been better. The
workshop covered both biosecurity and biosafety, and the
difference in the terms was one of the first topics of
discussion.

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Biosafety: Avoiding Spreading Disease by Mistake
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3. BACKGROUND: Biosafety is the use of appropriate
equipment, protective gear, materials and techniques to
prevent inadvertent spread of toxins and pathogens such as
viruses and bacteria from the laboratory to the public.
Several times during the SARS outbreak, lab researchers
infected themselves, and in some cases their colleagues,
health workers and family members, because of faulty lab
procedures. That occurred during a time of peak awareness
and scrutiny; mistakes are more likely to occur when the
pressure is off and people are paying less attention.

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Biosecurity: Keeping Dangerous Items Out of the Wrong Hands
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4. Biosecurity is a newer term, coined to describe the safe
management and physical protection of lab materials to
prevent theft and other deliberately malicious acts. This
is not a theoretical threat; recent examples include the
anthrax letters in the United States in 2001 and the use of
sarin in the Tokyo subway system. The origins of the
anthrax used in the famous "white powder" letters to
politicians and journalists are still not determined, but
that incident and the lack of management tools for
biohazardous materials was the impetus to create biosecurity
in American labs.

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Labs as a Source of Materials for Bioterrorists
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5. Unsecured labs working with biological pathogens
represent low-hanging fruit for bioterrorists. Biohazardous
materials in the lab are normally labeled and can be found
in suitable form and quantity for use in a bioterrorist
activity. The lab is thus an inviting target for theft or
other malicious acts. With the biohazardous substance in
hand, the would-be bioterrorist can inflict direct harm,
disrupt an economy, deny use of facilities, raise public
levels of anxiety, or threaten any of the above. END
BACKGROUND.

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Workshop Reviewed, Discussed Current Practices
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6. At the Amman workshop, biosecurity specialists from
Sandia, State, the UK's Ministry of Defense and the private
sector reviewed best practices for safe and secure
laboratory operations. Specialists also discussed laws and
regulations on management and transportation of toxins and
biohazardous substances. Much time was spent discussing
incident response: what to do if an accident, theft or
release occurs. Biohazardous substances include such
organisms as plague, ebola, botulism, smallpox, and HIV.
Not all substances in a lab are equally dangerous; part of a
biosafety/biosecurity program is to assess the risk at
individual sites and use the appropriate level of safety and
security on them.

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Opportunities, Desire for Further Activities
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7. In addition to classroom-style learning, the three-day
workshop included many opportunities for discussion. USG
participants summarized the discussions at the workshop as
being very candid. The quality of laboratory practices
varied widely. Participants frequently expressed their
appreciation for the discussions and their interest in
further training, visits to their labs, and consulting.
Some noted specific practices they learned during this
workshop as "take-home" lessons to apply at their own labs.
Others said they were "overwhelmed" with the amount of
information presented, and would need time to assimilate it
all.


8. Some participants noted the lack of policy-level
engagement on these issues, and were skeptical about what
could be changed in the absence of that engagement. All of
the participants, however, agreed that forming a regional
biosafety/biosecurity society, as either a stand-alone
organization or part of an already established one, was an
important step.

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Participants from 13 Countries
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9. Participants came from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, UAE,
Morocco, Libya, Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and Lebanon. Participants from the Palestinian
Authority were un-invited by the hosting organization the
Cooperative Monitoring Center - Amman at the request of
Sandia in keeping with current USG policy on contact with
the Palestinian Authority.


10. Comment: Given the relevance of the topic and the solid
foundation laid by this workshop, follow-up activities would
be productive. Support from within the region for these
activities is strong. Supporting development of a regional
biosafety association would be a good next step.


11. The U.S. delegation attending the workshop cleared this
message in substance.

HALE