FOREIGN FIGHTER DEMARCHE

S E C R E T AMMAN 002322

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

S/CT FOR WORMAN AND HAWTHORNE
NEA FOR OLSON AND EVANS
EB/ESC/TSF FOR SALOOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL ASEC CG XA XF XG XI JO
SUBJECT: FOREIGN FIGHTER DEMARCHE

REF: A. STATE 35709

B. AMMAN 2118

C. JICCENT 20150804

D. JICCENT 20070120

E. JICCENT 20051030

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Polcouns made Ref A points on foreign fighters in a
March 9 meeting with Dimai Haddad, head of Foreign Minister
Khatib's private office. Haddad said the GOJ views it as in
its own interest to stop any young men, Jordanian or foreign,
who fit the foreign fighter profile. He pointed to Jordan's
successes in prosecuting and preventing would-be jihadis from
crossing into Syria and Iraq. COMMENT: Haddad was referring
to several on-going prosecutions for recruiting fighters and
for border infiltration (ref B). END COMMENT. Post's
responses to ref A queries follow.

ENHANCED COLLECTION AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING


2. (S/NF) In July 2005, the Jordanian General Intelligence
Directorate (GID) formed a new branch in its Counterterrorism
Directorate to uncover and disrupt activity in Jordan that
supports the Iraqi insurgency. The new Iraqi Insurgency
Branch includes 11 staff officers; a lieutenant colonel who
formerly headed GID's Surveillance Unit leads it (ref C.)


3. (S/NF) Embassy Amman, through its SIMO and RSO offices,
enjoys an excellent relationship with GID and the Public
Security Directorate (PSD),and receives timely and relevant
intelligence information. The GID has a long history of
cooperating with the U.S. in counterterrorism efforts and has
arrested numerous suspected terrorist operatives.

BORDER SECURITY


4. (S/NF) Since the November 2005 hotel bombings and the
August 2005 Aqaba rocket attacks, Jordan has significantly
stepped up its efforts to prevent the movement of extremists
to and from Iraq and Syria. In late 2005, the GID deployed
its Alien Border Control System (ABCS) at Queen Alia
International Airport and several border checkpoints. Using
passport scanners, the ABCS compares identities against the
GID's no-travel lists. NOTE: The ABCS is also fully
operational at the Trebil/Karama border crossing with Iraq.
END NOTE. The GID is also working on integrating biometric
data into the ABCS system to assist in the rapid, positive
identification of individuals (refs C, D.)


5. (S/NF) GID asserts that its primary problem in securing
the Iraq-Jordan border is forged and/or fraudulent Iraqi
travel documents, and ineffective Iraqi screening at
Trebil/Karama, the only official border crossing between Iraq
and Jordan. GID assesses that approximately 4,000 Iraqis
attempt to enter Jordan each day; of these 1,000 - 1,300 are
denied entry.


6. (S) Jordan does not require Iraqis to obtain Jordanian
visas before presenting themselves at a Jordanian point of
entry. Applicants for entry must satisfy border officials
that they intend to enter for a bona fide temporary visit.
GOJ officials typically grant bearers of Iraqi passports
permission to enter Jordan for 15-day visits; however, many
of those allowed entry overstay. Jordanian border officials
tell the U.S. military,s Civil Affairs Liaison Team (CALT),
which is attached to Embassy Amman, that they often turn away
Iraqis bearing fake passports only to see the same Iraqis
bearing newly forged passports later the same day.

TRAVEL SCRUTINY


7. (C) Jordanian border officials tell CALT and emboffs that
they are not allowing travelers to cross into Iraq unless the
travelers can prove that they are either a Jordanian with
relatives in Iraq; associated with an NGO operating in Iraq;
or working for a company that transports goods into Iraq.
GID screens all those seeking entry into Iraq for links to
criminal activity or terrorism.
HALE