KAZAKHSTAN: UZBEK REFUGEES UNDER RENEWED PRESSURE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALMATY 000808

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE),PRM/ECA (R. OLSON),DRL/IRF
(N. HEWETT); DRL/PHD (C.KUCHTA-HELBLING)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF PTER KZ POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: UZBEK REFUGEES UNDER RENEWED PRESSURE?

REF: A. 05 ALMATY 4441

B. 05 ALMATY 4393

Classified By: DCM MARK ASQUINO FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: In a February 28 meeting in Almaty, imam
Abidkhan Nazarov of the Tukhtaboy mosque in Tashkent told
Poloff that he fears that Uzbek and Kazakhstani authorities
have recently intensified their efforts to locate him and his
followers in Kazakhstan. Nazarov voiced his concerns three
months after nine Uzbek UNHCR asylum seekers were arrested in
Kazakhstan and deported to Uzbekistan without due process
(reftels). Days before his conversation with Poloff, on
February 24, two of Nazarov's followers were detained in
Almaty and questioned about Nazarov's whereabouts. Nazarov
told Poloff that he believes that the Uzbek National Security
Service (SNB) is aware that Sweden has granted him refugee
status, and, in cooperation with the Kazakhstani National
Security Committee (KNB),has intensified efforts to locate
and abduct him before he relocates to Sweden.


2. (C) Summary (continued): Narashimha Rao, an Almaty-based
UNHCR protection officer, took a different view of the
February 24 detentions, telling Poloff that it didn't appear
that the men had been targeted as followers of Nazarov, and
that even once their identities were known, questioning on
the subject of Nazarov's whereabouts had been brief and
desultory. Rao told Poloff that, while he obviously could
not rule out the existence of an Uzbek-led campaign to locate
and abduct Nazarov, none of Nazarov's followers had
approached his office in recent days complaining of an
intensified campaign against them. Rao told Poloff that
Nazarov's travel documents should be ready "within two
weeks." End Summary.

Nazarov: Uzbeks Mounting a Last-Minute Campaign
-------------- --


3. (C) Poloff met outside the Embassy with imam Nazarov in
Almaty on February 28. The meeting followed email exchanges
with SCA/CEN on Nazarov's safety. A journalist familiar with
Nazarov's situation briefed the DCM and Poloff on Nazarov's
concerns, and set-up the meeting with Nazarov.


4. (C) Nazarov told Poloff that both the SNB and KNB were
aware that he had recently been granted refugee status by
Sweden, and that his departure from Kazakhstan was imminent.
As a consequence, he said, both had intensified a campaign to
locate his hiding place and deport him to Uzbekistan. (Note:
Nazarov has been in hiding in Almaty since fleeing Shymkent
in late December, following the "arrest" there of nine of his
followers.) As evidence of the campaign to locate him,
Nazarov explained that two of his followers had been detained
on February 24, ostensibly to answer questions about a murder
that had occurred in their neighborhood. Once they arrived
at the police station, however, the two men complained that
"the murder was never mentioned again." A KNB agent had been
called in, and the men were questioned repeatedly about
Nazarov's whereabouts. Nazarov alleged that the two men had
overheard the Kazakhstani police talking to Uzbek security
agents during the course of the questioning. Rao had finally
intervened, Nazarov said, and managed to convince the General
Prosecutor that it was illegal to detain the men further.
After nearly 24 hours in detention, the two men were released
on February 25.


5. (C) Nazarov told Poloff that he was confident that neither
the GOK nor the Uzbek authorities knew the location of his
hiding place -- if they did, he would already have been
abducted. While Nazarov was reasonably confident that he
could remain hidden until he and his family (a son, a
daughter-in-law, and three grandchildren) were given their
travel documents, he was concerned about his "more than 60"
followers, including women and children, who were seeking
refugee status from within Kazakhstan. Most were afraid to
go the UNHCR office, he said, for fear of being seen, and
thus their cases were moving slowly or not at all. Nazarov
also said that he feared that the Uzbeks might stage a
last-minute accident or explosion in Almaty, blame it on him,
and thus derail his planned departure from Kazakhstan.
Nazarov appealed to Poloff to use the Embassy's influence to
accelerate UNHCR processing of his followers' cases.

UNHCR: Detentions Not Clearly Related to Nazarov's Case
-------------- --------------


6. (C) On March 1, UNHCR's Rao told Poloff that he was not
convinced that the two men detained by police on February 24
had been targeted as follower's of Nazarov. Rao explained
that there had, in fact, been a murder in their neighborhood,
and that the police had detained "all the foreigners in the
area" for questioning. Nor had the men placed much emphasis
on the questions regarding Nazarov's whereabouts in their
subsequent debriefs with Rao. According to what the men had
told Rao, once the police had ascertained their identities
and asylum-seeker status, they had asked about Nazarov's
whereabouts -- but only briefly and without urgency. The KNB
agent, Rao admitted, had left the two men his card and
suggested that he would contact them again in the future to
discuss Nazarov further, but he had not been threatening.


7. (C) Rao told Poloff that he had kept the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs fully abreast of the status of Nazarov's
case, and that his MFA contacts knew that Nazarov had been
granted refugee status, and that his case was nearing a
conclusion. However, his GOK contacts had never pressured
him to reveal Nazarov's location. Rao reiterated that Nazarov
had not contacted Rao recently about heightened security
concerns. Rao noted that, in the past, he had secured a GOK
commitment to grant Nazarov uniformed security if he wished
-- an offer which Nazarov had not accepted. Rao acknowledged
that many of Nazarov's followers likely felt uneasy about
approaching UNHCR's office, but denied that their asylum
cases had been delayed as a consequence: bureaucracy, and
not a lack of contact with the applicants, was to blame for
the delays.


8. (C) Summing up his office's role in protecting Nazarov and
his followers from extra-legal abductions like those that
occurred in Shymkent in November, Rao said "my office can
only guarantee them legal protection. Nothing can protect
them from illegal actions."


9. (C) Comment. Due to Kazakhstan's deportation of nine
Uzbek refugees from Shymkent in November (Ref A) we fully
understand Nazarov's concern for his safety and that of his
followers. If, in fact, the SNB is actively looking for
Nazarov in Kazakhstan (a point which we considered unproved
but possible),it stands to reason that any pressure they
might be applying to his followers will diminish once he
relocates to Sweden. Thus, the weeks ahead are likely the
most critical. We will maintain our contact with Nazarov's
intermediaries, as well as with the local UNHCR office.
ORDWAY