Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALMATY3065
2006-08-28 11:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM MEETS WITH FOREIGN

Tags:  KZ PGOV PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2779
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #3065/01 2401138
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281138Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6738
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0138
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1274
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0371
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0686
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0194
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0249
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0417
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0086
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0216
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0350
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1627
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALMATY 003065 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: KZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM MEETS WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER TOKAYEV


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALMATY 003065

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: KZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM MEETS WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER TOKAYEV


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary. SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan
Feigenbaum and Ambassador Ordway held a wide-ranging
discussion with Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev in
Astana on August 25. Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan would
continue to press its bid for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship.
Feigenbaum responded that the United States does not and will
not support Kazakhstan for 2009. The meeting also covered a
range of bilateral and regional issues. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Kazakhstan to Continue Pursuing OSCE Chairmanship in 2009
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The heart of the meeting occurred in its final
minutes, when discussion turned to Kazakhstan,s bid to chair
the OSCE in 2009. Tokayev urged the United States to
acknowledge Kazakhstan,s progress in democratization,
especially relative to its neighbors in the Central Asian
region. He drew special attention to the State Committee for
Democratization, which he predicted would produce tangible
results. He noted Kazakhstan,s upcoming regional elections
and proposed expansion of the Parliament. These steps, said
Tokayev, constitute tangible evidence of the GOK,s
commitment to democratic reform. In light of such steps, he
expressed his hope that the United States would revisit its
position and support Kazakhstan,s 2009 bid as a signal that
the United States recognizes Kazakhstan,s progress toward
democracy. Tokayev said he understood U.S. reservations on
the matter, but it was important to focus on progress rather
than shortcomings. He added that, in his view, democratic
reform would become more difficult in Kazakhstan if the
United States did not support the 2009 bid. In the event,
domestic proponents of reform would be weakened politically.


3. (C) Feigenbaum responded that Tokayev,s remarks were
deeply disappointing. After the foreign minister,s July 6
meeting with Secretary Rice in Washington, there had been
considerable interest in the United States throughout July
and August as to whether and how Kazakhstan would resolve the

issue in a mutually agreeable way. Last week, Washington had
heard Tokayev,s clear message to Ambassador Ordway that
Kazakhstan would not, in fact, stand down. As a result, the
U.S. position had become even more firm: the United States
does not and will not support Kazakhstan,s bid to chair the
OSCE in 2009. Reiterating earlier USG messages, Feigenbaum
explained that Kazakhstan does not yet meet the OSCE,s
standards for a chairman in office.


4. (C) Following Tokayev,s July 6 meetings, Feigenbaum
continued, it was believed in Washington that the two
countries had reached an understanding that Kazakhstan would
defer its bid. In return, the United States would go out of
its way not to embarrass Kazakhstan, focusing instead on
affirmative steps that could be taken jointly to help
Kazakhstan pursue the chairmanship at a future date.
Kazakhstan,s position now put the U.S. into the unfortunate
position of having to discuss with other countries its
thoughts on Kazakhstan,s suitability for the OSCE
chairmanship ) precisely the position the United States had
tried to avoid in the spirit of partnership. Feigenbaum
added with regret that Kazakhstan,s position meant the two
countries would be working at cross-purposes on this issue in
the run-up to President Nazarbayev,s visit to Washington.


5. (C) Feigenbaum then reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to
democratic reform in Kazakhstan. He drew attention to the
list of ideas provided by the USG to assist Kazakhstan in its
reform process. He reiterated the U.S. commitment to an
affirmative conversation on democratization. The United
States, concluded Feigenbaum, still stands ready to assist
the GOK in that regard.


6. (C) Foreign Minister Tokayev responded that merely by
communicating its position to other OSCE countries, the U.S.
would, in effect, embarrass Kazakhstan, all the more so given
Nazarbayev,s visit in September. Still, he said, Kazakhstan

ALMATY 00003065 002 OF 004


would not withdraw its bid for 2009. By his vote count,
Kazakhstan had already secured the support of 70 percent of
OSCE members, including all of the CIS member-states. That
support from third countries, he said, gave Kazakhstan the
&political and moral right8 to press ahead. He added that
Washington was mistaken if his July visit had given it hope
that the GOK would defer its bid. He insisted he never
agreed to or even mentioned the possibility of withdrawing
Kazakhstan,s bid.


7. (C) Tokayev proposed the two countries focus on how to
minimize embarrassment. He noted that there was still time
to talk about the issue, and asked the U.S. not to go public
with its views. He added that talking to European
governments was tantamount to going public, as the U.S.
position would quickly find its way into the media. In
response, Feigenbaum reiterated his regret that the U.S. had
been forced into this position.

--------------
Assessing the Bilateral Relationship
--------------


8. (C) Until the exchange on Kazakhstan,s OSCE bid, the
meeting had been uncontroversial. Tokayev began by
emphasizing the importance of the upcoming Nazarbayev visit
to Washington. Feigenbaum noted ongoing USG planning.
Tokayev informed DAS Feigenbaum that a draft joint statement
had been sent to Kazakhstan,s Embassy in Washington. He
said he had directed Ambassador Saudabayev to work with all
relevant USG agencies to ensure that the document fully
reflects the robust nature of the bilateral relationship.


9. (C) He stated that all talks between the two presidents
must be positive. This would not be difficult, he suggested,
given what the two countries had accomplished together in the
past 2-3 years. Tokayev plainly stated his belief that there
were no negative aspects in the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship.
He thought it natural that on occasion difficult discussions
would arise between the two governments, offering human
rights and democratic reform as thematic examples. But in
his opinion, such conversations were necessary and useful to
Kazakhstan, and he encouraged the U.S. to continue to raise
such issues.


10. (C) Feigenbaum assured Tokayev that the U.S. also places
a great deal of importance on Nazarbayev,s visit. He noted
the robust nature of the bilateral relationship, which now
included security, economic, energy, and democracy baskets.
The United States and Kazakhstan have a genuinely
multidimensional relationship. He added that the chances of
success would be greatly increased if, in the run-up to the
visit, Kazakhstan could demonstrate a forward trajectory in
the area of democratic reform. He referred to a list of
tangible suggestions previously provided by the USG, adding
that the USG was looking for affirmative steps. At the same
time, Feigenbaum applauded the state of bilateral ties.
Feigenbaum noted that U.S.-Kazakhstan cooperation was not
only multidimensional but reached beyond the bilateral
context. Strong and growing U.S.-Kazakhstan ties benefited
the region and the world.

-------------- --------------
Kazakhstani PRT Participation in Afghanistan Likely, But Not
Assured
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Feigenbaum inquired about the possibility of
Kazakhstan,s participation in a PRT in Afghanistan. Tokayev
answered that the GOK was planning to send an interagency
fact-finding team, i.e., a survey team, to Afghanistan to
assess the security environment and weigh Afghan needs
against Kazakhstan,s operational capabilities. He added
that he had been working with Ambassador Ordway to move
through these early stages. Tokayev predicted that the
answer on Afghanistan would ultimately be positive.
Kazakhstan,s participation will further demonstrate the
strength of the bilateral relationship. But he warned that

ALMATY 00003065 003 OF 004


it was premature to say anything for certain on a PRT, as
Afghanistan was a difficult country in a difficult situation.
(Note: Tokayev added that President Putin had recently asked
him about the situation in Afghanistan. When Tokayev began
to say that democracy was on the rise there, Putin replied,
&Never talk to me about democracy in Afghanistan.8 End
note.).

--------------
U.S. Regional Presence and the SCO
--------------


12. (C) Tokayev then took a broader look at U.S. presence in
the region. He said that if regional actors were to welcome
the U.S. economic presence, they would have to acknowledge
the political and military aspects of U.S. policy as well.
He described the debate on this matter at the SCO,s June
Summit in China, where he said Kazakhstan had argued that
military operations in Afghanistan were still necessary and
enhanced Central Asia,s security. Feigenbaum asked how this
position had gone over with the other SCO members. Tokayev
laughed and said it had been very controversial.


13. (C) Feigenbaum asked for Tokayev,s view of the SCO,s
trajectory, noting the proliferation of multilateral
groupings in Central Asia and questioning whether the SCO,s
expanding agenda and membership would dilute the group.
Tokayev characterized the SCO as an organization still in
development. He noted that the geopolitical situation had
changed since its creation, thus it was natural that the
SCO,s agenda had evolved as well. Kazakhstan did not feel
the time was right to admit new members for three reasons: no
observer had formally accepted the guiding documents of the
SCO; the legal framework of the organization was
insufficiently developed for further expansion; and the GOK
did not want to inject controversial issues into the SCO,s
business (i.e., Kashmir if India and Pakistan joined, and
Iran,s anti-western policies if Iran joined).

-------------- --------------
Around the Horn: Tokayev,s Views on Iran, China, Uzbekistan
-------------- --------------


14. (C) Tokayev noted his contacts with Iran,s President
Ahmadinejad. Feigenbaum asked for Tokayev,s assessment of
the man. Tokayev did not answer directly, but opined that
Iranian society was moving toward westernization. He gave
his belief that young Iranians in particular desire more
freedom and an end to their country,s isolation. With
regard to Kazakhstan-Iran relations, Tokayev stated that
while economic ties were increasing, difficulties remain. He
mentioned that the two countries had explored the possibility
of a presidential visit, but it had been postponed due to
Iran,s unhelpful attitude toward the Caspian. Tokayev
characterized Caspian delimitation as a difficult issue that
would take years to resolve. Tokayev also predicted future
problems in Iran,s energy sector, as its oil and gas
infrastructure was becoming increasingly outdated.


15. (C) Tokayev characterized Kazakhstan-China relations as
very good. He noted an upcoming Nazarbayev to Beijing, and
possibly Hong Kong, in December, as well as President Hu,s
recent stop in Kazakhstan. He opined, however, that Chinese
companies were seeking access to Kazakhstan,s oil market on
political rather than purely economic grounds. As such, he
saw Chinese ownership of Kazakhstan,s energy sector as a
security issue and thought their share in the Kazakhstani
market should be capped at current levels.


16. (C) With regard to Uzbekistan, Tokayev saw its
participation in the Eurasian Economic Community and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization as positive in that
its absence had created a hole in these ostensibly
®ional8 organizations. When pressed by DAS Feigenbaum
and Ambassador Ordway about Uzbekistan,s policies on visas,
customs, and particularly on landmines, Tokayev admitted that
Uzbekistan,s membership has come with its share of
difficulties. But he suggested that Uzbekistan,s newfound

ALMATY 00003065 004 OF 004


interest in these organizations was a signal that Karimov may
be shifting his foreign policy in a positive direction.
ORDWAY