Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALMATY211
2006-01-23 08:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

SECRETARY JOHANNS' JANUARY 11, 2006 MEETING WITH

Tags:  ENRG EPET GA KZ OVIP POLITICAL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALMATY 000211 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR E:U/S SHINER; EB/ESC; EUR/SNEC (MANN); EUR/CACEN
(MUDGE)
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOR SECRETARY JOHANNS
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY FOR UNDERSECRETARY ADAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2015
TAGS: ENRG EPET GA KZ OVIP POLITICAL
SUBJECT: SECRETARY JOHANNS' JANUARY 11, 2006 MEETING WITH
GEORGIAN PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALMATY 000211

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR E:U/S SHINER; EB/ESC; EUR/SNEC (MANN); EUR/CACEN
(MUDGE)
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOR SECRETARY JOHANNS
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY FOR UNDERSECRETARY ADAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2015
TAGS: ENRG EPET GA KZ OVIP POLITICAL
SUBJECT: SECRETARY JOHANNS' JANUARY 11, 2006 MEETING WITH
GEORGIAN PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D)


1. (U) Participants in the January 11, 2006 meeting in
Astana, Kazakhstan:

U.S.
Secretary Mike Johanns

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Mrs. Stephanie Johanns
Ambassador John Ordway
Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and
Agricultural Affairs, Josette Shiner
Undersecretary of Treasury for International Affairs, Timothy
Adams
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, Matthew Bryza
Jim Loveland (Embassy Notetaker)

GEORGIA
President Mikhail Saakashvili
Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili


2. (C) Summary: Agriculture Secretary Johanns met with
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili on January 11 in
Astana, hours after attending the inauguration of Kazakhstani
President Nazarbayev. Secretary Johanns expressed U.S.
appreciation for the bilateral relationship and Saakashvili's
efforts on behalf of democracy. Saakashvili identified
energy as an urgent issue in the region. Reflecting on the
recent Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict, Saakashvili opined
that Russia had hoped Europe would blame Ukraine; thanks to
the forceful U.S. reaction, Putin's strategy had failed.
Saakashvili and the U.S. delegation agreed on the urgency of
dissuading President Niyazov from committing Turkmenistan's
gas supplies to Russia. In the longer run, new gas and oil
sources and transportation routes were needed to lessen
Western dependency on Russia. Saakashvili told the Secretary
that Georgia and Ukraine were spearheading an effort to issue
a seven-country "Energy Declaration" criticizing Russia's
non-market behavior and calling for a new "energy corridor."
Saakashvili asked the U.S. to use its G8 leverage to induce
Russia to seek peace in South Ossetia, and described a
well-funded Russian propaganda campaign to "discredit
democracy" in Georgia and Ukraine. The U.S. delegation
voiced support for the idea of an "Energy Declaration" and
agreed on the importance of diversifying European gas

supplies away from Gazprom's monopoly control. End summary.

Expressions of Mutual Appreciation
--------------


3. (C) Secretary Johanns opened the meeting by telling
Saakashvili that the U.S. appreciated its partnership and
"open, candid bilateral relationship" with Georgia. He
complimented Saakashvili on his January 9 editorial in the
Washington Post, calling it "a very thoughtful approach to
your future." Secretary Johanns also commended Saakashvili
for his government's "diplomatic approach" to Georgia's
conflict issues. For his part, Saakashvili told the
Secretary that "it was important to Nazarbayev" that

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Secretary Johanns had come to the inauguration. He then

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contrasted U.S. and Russian approaches to the region, telling
the Secretary that, with the U.S., "you get 'soft power.'" In
his visit to Georgia, President Bush had demonstrated a
"sophisticated knowledge of local issues...and had even
addressed the public in Georgian." Russia, by contrast,
"thought that being a superpower meant pushing someone."
Russia sees other countries in black and white, Saakashvili
continued, and divides the world into "their friends and
'America's stooges.'" He then laughed: "And we are the most
outspoken American stooges."

Reflecting on the Ukrainian-Russian Gas Dispute
-------------- --


4. (C) "Energy," Saakashvili began, "is THE issue in the
region," and the political dynamics of the area were best
seen as a conflict of interest between "energy deficit
countries and a country that wants to regain its superpower
status" -- by exercising its monopoly power over energy
supplies. Russia's recent doubling of Georgian gas prices
was one example of Russia's "outrageous behavior,"
Saakashvili explained, and just one aspect of the pressure
Russia was bringing to bear on Georgia for its democratic and
Western leanings.


5. (C) Asked by U/S Shiner whether he thought Putin had been
personally involved in the decision to cut off gas supplies
to Ukraine, Saakashvili replied that he was "100% percent
sure the decision had been made at the highest level."
Putin, he said, "thought Russia had enough leverage over the
Europeans to get them to blame Ukraine" for the disruption of
gas supplies. Given European "passivity," Putin might have
succeeded -- had it not been for the U.S. "Thanks to the
U.S. reaction, Putin got the opposite effect." Putin,
Saakashvili said, had been "taken aback by U.S. toughness."
While it was fair to say that Putin "miscalculated," Putin
"always does this. He doesn't have his own brakes...he can
only go back when he feels resistance." The U.S. reaction,
Saakashvili continued, had been "important" to Yushchenko.
"He felt flattered by the U.S. reaction."


6. (C) The Secretary asked Saakashvili to assess the
aftermath of the gas dispute: how much ill will had the
Russian's created? "The damage was huge," Saakashvili said.
"The Europeans are panicked. For the first time, they saw
the danger. Now, they are physically afraid."

Saving Turkmen Gas from the Russian Monopoly
--------------


7. (C) Saakashvili said that it was "very important" to
reduce Russia's monopoly control of oil and gas supplies.
Urgent action was needed with regard to Turkmenistan: having
failed to "blackmail Ukraine," Saakashvili warned, Putin was
now focused on getting Turkmenistan to commit its entire gas
reserves to the Gazprom network. "The Ukrainians are trying
to reach Niyazov today," Saakashvili told the delegation, in
order to dissuade him from concluding a deal with Russia.
Georgia, in turn, was trying to "convince the Ukrainians to
make Turkmenistan a good offer." DAS Bryza responded by
telling Shaakashvili that, while engaging Niyazov was
"difficult for us diplomatically," he was going to see
Niyazov on January 12 on this issue and at Georgian Prime
Minister Noghaideli's request.

Developing Supply and Transportation Alternatives
-------------- --------------


8. (C) In the medium term, Saakashvili continued, Georgia
needed to work with the U.S., its regional partners, and with
the Europeans, to develop alternate supply sources and routes
to get gas and oil to Europe. "We need to think about using
Turkmen and Azeri gas to enhance European security, and to
secure the independence of the new democracies -- Georgia and
Ukraine." Saakashvili suggested that the U.S. could help by
"inducing the Europeans to think of other options besides
Russia." Further, the U.S. should continue to facilitate
negotiations to ship Kazakhstani oil by means of the BTC
pipeline: "Nazarbayev has problems with the Azeris,"
Saakashvili said, "and the Azeris perceive Kazakhstan as a
competitor. But both will listen to you." Finally,
Saakashvili remarked that Nazarbayev had recently reiterated
Kazakhstan's interest in a "Caspian sea-bed pipeline."
(Note: Saakashvili did not specify whether Nazarbayev was
talking about an oil or gas pipeline. End note.)

Negotiating a Seven-Country "Energy Declaration"
-------------- ---


9. (C) Saakashvili informed Secretary Johanns that Georgia
was working with Ukraine and five other regional states
(Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, plus one
unspecified) on an "Energy Declaration," which would
criticize Russian behavior during the gas crisis and promote
the idea of "a new energy corridor." "Kazakhstan won't sign
at this stage," Saakashvili admitted, "but maybe later, after
others have agreed." Saakashvili said he was optimistic that
the Azeris would sign, but the "key" was Turkmenistan. "We
need to talk about prices, and what benefits this would bring
everyone," he concluded. Saakashvili added that he hoped the
declaration would be published "soon," ideally before a
February Energy Conference in Georgia brought together
representatives from GUAM, the EU, Turkey, the U.S., think
tanks, and oil corporations.


10. (C) Commenting on the initiative to develop a new "energy
corridor," Secretary Johanns told Saakashvili that "the
Seven-Country Declaration is positive. We will work with
you." U/S Shiner told Saakashvili that "Secretary Rice feels
that it is important that Europe focus attention on this
strategy." DAS Bryza noted that the issuance of the
Seven-Country Declaration could help the U.S. in its
discussions with Niyazov.

South Ossetia
--------------


11. (C) U/S Shiner asked Saakashvili how the U.S. should use
its G8 leverage on Russia. "Push them to do something on
South Ossetia," Saakashvili replied. "Russia holds the key.
They don't need South Ossetia -- only as a bargaining chip.
This is the last chance for Putin to look like a peacemaker."
Earlier, Saakashvili had explained that Russian actions were
undermining peace in the region: "South Ossetia gets gas for
free from Russia. Why would they be interested in peace?"
Furthermore, whereas Russia had recently banned imports of
"basically all food products" from Georgia, and precisely
during their harvest to inflict maximal harm, the ban did not
apply to South Ossetia. Finally, Saakashvili complained that
Georgia's border with Russia was "a smuggling paradise," and
Russian banks operating in South Ossetia laundered money and
otherwise abetted criminal behavior. "Even the most criminal
countries in the world don't act this openly," he complained.


Uzbekistan
--------------


12. (C) U/S Shiner asked Saakashvili for his thoughts on how
to moderate Uzbekistan. Saakashvili replied that Karimov was
afraid, and thus was clinging to his personal and political
relationship with Putin. "Putin and Karimov talked all the
time at the inauguration," he observed. Saakashvili noted
that Karimov's children were "wanted by the New Jersey
courts" and were safe only in Russia. In terms of
Uzbekistan's development, "I think we will see a hardening of
the regime...there are many Islamic extremists, and they are
not afraid to die."


Russian Propaganda to Discredit Democratization
-------------- --


13. (C) Saakashvili told Secretary Johanns that Russia was
using propaganda in both Georgia and Russia in an attempt to
"discredit democracy." In Georgia, he said, the Russians
were using the hike in gas prices to label his administration
as "incompetent on energy." Thanks in part to Kazakhstan's
intervention to help with gas distribution, however, the plan
was "backfiring." Russia, however, was also financing a
"huge propaganda campaign" against his government,
bankrolling internal opposition groups, including NGOs and
journalists. It was ironic, Saakashvili noted, that Russia
was using the same propaganda techniques that it accused the
West of using to instigate the "Rose Revolution."


14. (C) The Secretary concluded the meeting by reiterating
U.S. appreciation of Saakashvili's efforts on behalf of
democracy. Saakashvili responded by telling the Secretary
that the Georgians appreciated U.S. support. "America has
very committed friends in this region," he said.


15. (U) Secretary Johanns did not have the opportunity to
clear this cable.
ASQUINO