Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALMATY1922
2006-05-31 01:22:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: SECOND ROUND OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Tags:  PREL KNNP KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5368
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHTA #1922/01 1510122
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 310122Z MAY 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5540
INFO RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7588
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 2451
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ASTANA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2105
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0029
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ALMATY 001922 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE),ISN/CTR

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SECOND ROUND OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING
DISCUSSIONS

ALMATY 00001922 001.2 OF 007


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ALMATY 001922

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE),ISN/CTR

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KNNP KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SECOND ROUND OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING
DISCUSSIONS

ALMATY 00001922 001.2 OF 007



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Following up on their February meeting,
the U.S. outreach delegation, augmented by IAEA and European
Commission representatives, met in Astana May 25 with a
Kazakhstani delegation comprising 14 representatives from
seven ministries and organizations. The sides reached
provisional agreement on a document laying out the key steps
to improve Kazakhstan's anti-smuggling capabilities, as well
as a list of priority assistance projects derived from that
document. The MFA will vet the document and the project
list with two organizations that were absent from the
discussions before providing final agreement. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) RESULTS OF MEETING. The nuclear smuggling outreach
delegation met in Astana on May 25 with a Kazakhstani
delegation representing seven ministries and organizations.
(See para. 6 for a list of participants.) The meeting
focused on negotiating a joint document laying out the
priority needs for improving Kazakhstan's capabilities to
combat nuclear smuggling, including those areas where
existing efforts should be continued and new efforts
undertaken. The sides went through each section of the U.S.
draft in detail and made a number of changes to the language
of the document. The most significant substantive changes
involved removing specific mentions of Customs and border
guards in the section on corruption in favor of more general
language, and removing the section on revising Customs
procedures in response to input from the Kazakhstani side
that such revisions are already ongoing. The sides reached
provisional agreement on the document (text in para. 4),
with the Kazakhstani side saying they would need to have it
reviewed by the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC)
and the Ministry of Health (MOH, which has a significant
role in overseeing the use of radioactive materials in
medicine),which were not represented at the meeting, before
it could be considered finalized. Upon conclusion of the
joint document, the Kazakhstani side reviewed a U.S.-drafted
list of priority assistance projects for Kazakhstan, which
was derived from the joint text. The Kazakhstani side
suggested one additional project, assistance to support
"liquidation" of radioactive sources rather than their

extended secure storage. The U.S. side agreed to look into
the feasibility of this option, once the Kazakhstani side
provides additional information about the number and type of
sources they would propose to liquidate. Otherwise, the
project list was provisionally agreed, again with the
understanding that it would still need KAEC and MOH review.
(See para. 5 for the projects list.)


3. (SBU) NEXT STEPS. The U.S. side agreed to have the
Embassy translate the revised joint document and provide it
to the MFA, along with the English version that was provided
in the meeting, for review by the MOH and the KAEC. These
organizations will also review the project list. In
response to a question from the Kazakhstani side whether it
would be possible to add projects to this list, the U.S.
side emphasized that any additions should be consistent with
the already agreed joint document. Lastly, the Kazakhstani
side agreed to provide information on the number of
radioactive sources that it proposes to be liquidated. The
U.S. side agreed to review the feasibility of source
"liquidation", and if feasible, include this as a project to
be pitched to international donors. The U.S. side also
indicated that it would begin its outreach to international
donors as soon as the Kazakhstani side provides final
agreement on the joint document and projects list. Both
sides agreed to remain in communication regarding
commitments of assistance from international donors to
ensure that any such assistance is closely coordinated
between the relevant experts from the GOK, the U.S., and the
donors.


4. (SBU) Begin text of communique:

Communique of U.S. and Kazakhstani Delegations on Intentions
to Improve Kazakhstan's Capabilities to Combat Nuclear
Smuggling

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of
America and Kazakhstan met in Astana on February 24 and May
25, 2006, to discuss the capabilities of Kazakhstan to
combat the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials.
The U.S. delegation included representatives from the
Department of State, Department of Energy, Department of

ALMATY 00001922 002.2 OF 007


Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Intelligence Community, U.S. Embassy, International Atomic
Energy Agency, and European Commission. The Kazakhstani
delegation included representatives from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Industry
and Trade, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance,
National Security Committee, and Kazatomprom. As a result
of their discussions, the delegations reached a common
understanding on the need to continue existing efforts and
undertake additional efforts to improve Kazakhstan's anti-
smuggling capabilities, as described below.

PREVENTION

Physical Protection

Continue Existing Efforts:
--Complete discussions with the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) on the question of repatriating or downblending HEU
from research reactors and converting reactors to LEU where
technically feasible
--Finish implementing the plan for long-term storage of the
BN-350 spent fuel

Additional Efforts Needed:
--Begin long-term planning to maintain the integrity and
effectiveness of the security systems installed through
cooperation under the U.S.-Kazakhstan Material Protection,
Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Agreement
--Conduct periodic vulnerability assessments at facilities
with dangerous nuclear and radioactive materials to ensure
their security remains adequate as threats evolve

Regulatory Infrastructure

Continue Existing Efforts:
--Complete work between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee
(KAEC) to draft amendments to regulatory laws and then
examine implementing regulations for any needed revisions to
support the IAEA Code of Conduct
--Continue cooperation with the IAEA on development of rules
on security and classification of radioactive sources
--Continue progress in meeting the IAEA Model Project
milestones
--Continue improvement of systems of accounting and control
of nuclear materials

Additional Efforts Needed:
--Develop proposals to toughen sanctions for violators of
nuclear and radiological safety and security rules
--Adapt inspection procedures to verify radioactive sources
in the registry for the Ministry of Health, which conducts
many of these inspections. Additional training or support
for the Ministry of Health regional offices may be needed.

Securing Orphaned Sources

Continue Existing Efforts:
--Implement the Orphan Sources Recovery Strategy developed
by the Atomic Energy Committee and the Nuclear Technology
Safety Center
--Continue work with the DOE Search and Secure Program to
identify high-risk locations for orphan radioactive source
materials

Additional Efforts Needed:
--Work cooperatively to identify facilities and locations at
a high risk for the presence of orphan radioactive source
materials
--Conduct searches of these facilities and identify and
secure orphan sources that have been located

DETECTION

Border security

Continue Existing Efforts:
--Work jointly with the DOE Second Line of Defense (SLD)
team to determine equipment and establish priorities for
site installations at Kazakhstani points of entry
--Work jointly with the DOE/SLD team on training of Customs
and other officials on the operation and maintenance of

ALMATY 00001922 003.2 OF 007


radiation detection equipment installed at points of entry
and response to alarms
--Continue working with the EXBS program to conduct border
security enforcement training throughout the country and
deploy additional equipment
--Continue efforts to incorporate WMD detection and
interdiction into the standard training curriculum for
customs officers and border guards
--Continue working with the Department of Defense (DoD) on
the Caspian Sea Maritime Project conducted under the Weapons
of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative
Program

Additional Efforts Needed:
--Deploy equipment and conduct training at points of entry
identified by Kazakhstani Customs and DOE/SLD that are not
addressed by the SLD program, in close coordination with
Kazakhstani Customs and DOE to ensure compatibility of
equipment

RESPONSE

Prosecution

Continue Existing Efforts:
--Continue efforts to arrest and prosecute nuclear smugglers
to the full extent of the law, when such cases `rise

Aditional EfforTs Needed:
--Raise(aw!remes{$amongjudkcIal au|loRi|is gboet thedYfe%rs f~wb,ui 3qg\in,
nuclear smuggling and prosecuting smugglers
--Exchange operational data with the U.S., as appropriate
and through appropriate channels, on individuals or groups
involved in smuggling, methods used by smugglers, and any
connections with terrorism or organized crime
--Continue cooperation among the law enforcement and other
agencies responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in
Central Asian states
--Continue coordination among Central Asian states on border
security

Additional Efforts Needed:
--Kazakhstan could host international meetings and
conferences on combating nuclear smuggling. There have
already been a number of valuable conferences and workshops
regarding various elements of the fight against nuclear
smuggling in Central Asia, so any additional conference
should have a focus and expected outcomes that do not
duplicate previous conferences and workshops.
--Improve reporting to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database
Program
--Announce smuggling convictions in the press
--Share aggregate smuggling data with the U.S., including
the total number of smuggling cases detected, the number of
arrests, and the number of suspects convicted and jailed

CORRUPTION

Continue Existing Efforts:
--Continue U.S. outreach efforts with Kazakhstani agencies
on integrity awareness
--Continue work with OSCE and UNODC anti-corruption projects

Additional Efforts Needed:
--Develop specific plans to combat potential corruption,
possibly including:
-Incorporating anti-corruption/integrity awareness
training into standard training curricula
-Expanded use of automatic monitoring technologies,
such as radiation monitors that automatically transmit
alarms and anomalies to redundant and/or central locations.
This approach is being planned for SLD installations.


ALMATY 00001922 004.2 OF 007


The delegations anticipate that the results of their joint
efforts will contribute significantly to improvement in
Kazakhstan's ability to combat the smuggling of nuclear and
radioactive material.

Astana
May 25, 2006

End text of communique.


5. (SBU) Begin text of Possible Projects document (note
internal numbering)

Possible Assistance Projects to Address Kazakhstan's
Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear
Smuggling

Regulatory Infrastructure
Need:
In July 2005, the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC)
compiled a registry of more than 14,000 radioactive sources
currently in use in Kazakhstan, with assistance from the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This registry was
based primarily on compiling paper records and entering
those into a database. Many of these records are out-of-
date, so compiling an accurate list requires conducting
inspections to verify the contents of the registry. The
KAEC has already conducted a large number of these
inspections, but the Ministry of Health (MOH) has
jurisdiction for radioactive sources in use for medical
applications. The KAEC and MOH are working closely together
to address this problem. U.S. NRC only works with KAEC.

Possible Project:
A new project could help adapt inspection procedures
developed by the KAEC to verify radioactive sources in the
registry for the MOH, which conducts these inspections at
medical facilities. Conducting regular inspections to
update and maintain the radioactive source registry should
be integrated into the basic regulatory responsibilities of
the MOH. The MOH maintains regional offices throughout the
country that need additional training and support to
effectively conduct these inspections.

Securing Orphaned and Unregistered Sources
Need:
Kazakhstan continues to discover a significant number of
"orphaned" or abandoned sources. In addition, industrial,
medical, and other facilities may have disused radioactive
sources that remain unregistered and improperly secured.
These sources could be dangerous if smugglers discover them
before they are appropriately secured. The U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE),through its Search and Secure Program,
provided the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) with
equipment and training to identify facilities most likely to
have large numbers of disused radioactive sources, conduct
targeted searches, and safely dispose of the prioritized
vulnerable sources. DOE and KAEC identified four sites
likely to have disused sources. The first of these searches
recovered and secured a large number of sources. DOE is
planning to sponsor one additional Search and Secure
mission, but lacks the budgetary resources to support all
the needs in Kazakhstan.

Possible Project:
Additional project(s) are needed to fund missions to
proactively search, locate, characterize and secure orphan
radioactive sources at high-risk facilities in Kazakhstan.
This project would require that the GOK work cooperatively
with the project team to identify locations at high risk for
orphan sources through literature and record searches. The
project would then provide technical and financial (e.g.,
local salaries, transportation costs, per diem) assistance
to the GOK to competently search and clear this location(s)
of orphan radioactive source materials. A western nuclear
agency could also share valuable experience by helping the
KAEC conduct these searches. For interested donors without
existing implementing mechanisms for such assistance,
partnering with DOE and/or the IAEA could provide a
mechanism to support these activities in Kazakhstan.
Technical and financial support of search missions would
ensure that high-risk facilities are cleared of orphan
radioactive materials and are given a high priority.

ALMATY 00001922 005.2 OF 007



DETECTION

Border security
Need:
Kazakhstan is the ninth-largest country in the world in area
and the only Central Asia country bordering Russia. Its
extensive borders, limited radiation detection equipment at
border crossings, and limited training of border security
personnel in detecting nuclear and radioactive materials
presents a significant vulnerability. Several USG programs
are active in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan recently signed an Implementing Arrangement with
DOE on cooperation under the Second Line of Defense (SLD)
Program. A typical suite of equipment delivered by the SLD
program includes stationary radiation portal monitors,
handheld radiation detection equipment for secondary
inspections, and related communications equipment and
training. Portal monitors are generally linked to a central
alarm station to connect border personnel to technical
experts if needed and to reduce the opportunities for
corruption. The Export Control and Related Border Security
(EXBS) program has been working in Kazakhstan for more than
five years on improving all areas of the country's export
control system, including delivering nonproliferation-
related training and enforcement equipment. DoD is working
with Kazakhstan to improve maritime security in the Caspian
Sea.

Possible Projects:


1. Augment Ongoing Efforts to Improve Detection Capability
at Kazakhstan's International Borders
DOE/SLD is already working with Kazakhstani Customs to re-
validate sites (land border crossings, international
airports and seaports) that were identified several years
ago to be of mutual interest for the deployment of radiation
detection systems under the SLD program. In addition, the
EXBS program is conducting border security enforcement
training throughout the country and deploying additional
equipment, particularly along the Russian border.
Prospective international donors interested in supporting
deployment of radiation detection equipment at Kazakhstan's
international borders should work in close coordination with
Kazakhstani Customs and existing USG assistance providers to
ensure consistency in equipment and compatibility with
communications systems.


2. Improving Security at Green Borders, particularly on the
Russian Border
Many areas between established points of entry have little
or no security, which presents a significant vulnerability
that could be exploited by smugglers. The flat terrain
along the Russian border and established points-of-entry
that in some cases are more than 100km apart offer few
obstacles to illegal crossing. This also makes remote
monitoring of this border a possibility, but Kazakhstan does
not have the appropriate technology to make this a reality.
Roads are also limited in many of these areas, so four-wheel-
drive vehicles and snowmobiles are needed to adequately
patrol many areas of the border. Additional vehicles,
communications equipment, portable radiation detection
equipment, remote sensing equipment, and training would help
border guards better patrol these areas to prevent
smuggling.

RESPONSE

Prosecution
Need:
Though Kazakhstan has strong criminal laws on nuclear
smuggling and shown a willingness to prosecute offenders, in
a few cases involving small amounts of radioactive
materials, suspects were convicted and given suspended
sentences. While these incidents did not involve
proliferation-significant quantities of nuclear material,
they were typical of the opportunistic, profit-driven
smuggling incidents common in the region. Without effective
deterrence, these individuals or others could "graduate"
into more serious forms of smuggling. These cases
perpetuate the belief that smuggling nuclear and radioactive
materials can be very profitable and may encourage

ALMATY 00001922 006.2 OF 007


additional thefts of these materials. All criminals
involved in smuggling should receive significant jail time,
regardless of material actually smuggled.

Possible Project:
International experts could help educate judges and
prosecutors on the dangers of nuclear smuggling and
encourage stricter sentences, even for smugglers caught with
small amounts of radioactive material.

Sponsoring International Cooperation in Nuclear Forensics
Need:
The international nuclear forensics and attribution
community benefits from wide participation and especially
appreciates participation of States with significant
experience in this area. Kazakhstan is a state with
significant knowledge of nuclear chemistry, forensics, and
attribution, and it has very capable facilities to support
nuclear forensics and attribution investigations. In recent
years, Kazakhstan has not participated consistently in the
Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group
(ITWG),an important forum that hosts this discipline. The
ITWG meets yearly, encourages forensic scientists and law
enforcement bodies to participate, and conducts nuclear
forensic exercises using actual material. Consistent and
enduring participation would help ensure that all
international resources available are technically current
and practiced to support each other in the event of a
significant nuclear smuggling case or investigation.

Possible Project:
If resources are the primary issue regarding non-
participation, we envision that a donor country or the IAEA
could sponsor the time and travel for several Kazakhstani
scientists and law enforcement personnel to participate in
ITWG activities for the upcoming year. This would include
attendance at the ITWG-12 in the fall of 2006, participation
in the annual Exercise, and participation in ITWG Working
Groups. Based on U.S. experience, this effort would cost
approximately $50K for one year. Participation would
prevent a perceived stagnation and isolation of an otherwise
capable and necessary entity.

CORRUPTION

Need:
Though there has been some considerable improvement
recently, corruption in Kazakhstan remains a serious problem
and could undermine Kazakhstani and international efforts to
improve capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling.
Corruption among Customs officials and border guards is a
particular concern, since bribes could be paid to overlook
smuggling or avoid radiation detection equipment.

Possible Project:
Projects to address potential corruption among Customs
officials and border guards could include incorporating anti-
corruption/integrity awareness training into the standard
curriculum for these agencies, helping develop standardized
risk analysis models for determining what is searched,
automatic monitoring technologies, like radiation monitors
that report hits to headquarters, and increased pay for
border security personnel. It would be particularly useful
for a donor to help Kazakhstan integrate various anti-
corruption efforts and develop a comprehensive plan to
address corruption among Customs officials and border
guards.

End text of Possible Projects document.


6. (U) List of U.S. participants:
Michael F. Stafford, Head of Delegation, U.S. Department of
State
Brent M. Eastman, U.S. Department of State
Patrick Connors, U.S. Department of State
Natalie Hardwick, U.S. Department of State
Breanne Hite, U.S. Department of State
Deborah Mennuti, U.S. Embassy, Almaty
Andrew Offenbacher, EXBS Advisor, U.S. Embassy Almaty
Clyde Langley, Legal Attache, U.S. Embassy Almaty
Tracy Mustin, U.S. Department of Energy
Mark Cwynar, Department of Homeland Security


ALMATY 00001922 007.2 OF 007


IAEA:
Mark Aronoff, International Atomic Energy Agency

European Commission:
Regine Roy, European Commission

List of Kazakhstani participants:
Saveliyev, S.R., Head of Delegation, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Sarzhanov, K.A, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Smagulov, T.N., Ministry of Internal Affairs
Zhusupbekov, Ministry of Industry and Trade
Bekturov, T.D., Ministry of Defense
Mukybiev, M.N., Ministry of Defense
Vozhakova, A.G., Ministry of Finance (Customs)
Tashenova, A.K., Ministry of Finance (Customs)
Amirov, A.A., National Security Committee (Border Service)
Kurbanov, N.K., National Security Committee
Orynbasarov, A.A., National Security Committee
Amirov, B.K., Kazatomprom
Karabalayev, K.I., Kazatomprom
Gromov, Kazatomprom


ASQUINO