KAZAKHSTAN: INFORMATION MINISTER REPLACES MANAGERS AT NATIONAL TELEVISION STATIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ALMATY 001750

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN (JMUDGE),SCA/PPD (JBASEDOW),DRL/PHD
(CKUCHTA-HELBLING)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KPAO, KDEM, KZ
SUBJ: KAZAKHSTAN: INFORMATION MINISTER REPLACES MANAGERS
AT NATIONAL TELEVISION STATIONS

Ref: A) Almaty 485, B) Almaty 1144

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Plans by the Minister of Information to
improve the professionalism at one national television
station and to nationalize another partly owned by the
president's daughter have provoked a public feud. According
to some analysts, the change in management at the official
broadcaster was intended to snuff out the alleged influence
of radical Islamists and to consolidate control of
influential television media ahead of the 2012 presidential
elections. Others see the minister's moves as retaliation
for the daughter's articles questioning the official
versions of the deaths of oppositionists Sarsenbaiuly and
Nurkadilov. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) On April 18, Minister of Information and Culture
Yermukhambet Yertysbayev, until recently an advisor in the
Presidential Administration, dismissed Galym Dosken from his
position as chairman of official national broadcaster
"Kazakhstan 1" and appointed Nurtyleu Imangaliyev in his
place. More than 120 staff members resigned in protest, and
said they were not satisfied with the minister's public
explanation that the change was made to improve the level of
professionalism. Yertysbayev's public comments revealed
that changes at Khabar were also being planned: "My task is
to ensure a high quality state information policy, at least
at state TV channels like Kazakhstan 1, even if it means
restoring full control over Khabar to make sure there is no
manipulation." As for the employees who resigned, he said
the new management would not ask them to stay, and that
there were plenty of other journalists at the station.
(Note: The parent company, Kazakhstanskaya Tele Radio
Korporatsiya, has over 1,500 employees. End note.)

3. (U) Yertysbayev provided fuller explanations of his
intentions in interviews with the opposition newspapers
Respublika and Epokha. In the April 21 Respublika he
remarked, "Being located between Russia and China in the
Muslim world, Kazakhstan should control the electronic
media, in a good sense of this word. . . More than 82
foreign TV channels broadcast on the territory of
Kazakhstan. That's why my task is to defend the state
information policy, to enforce Article 20 of the
Constitution that guarantees freedom of speech, and to
protect the interests of all journalists."

4. (U) In his April 28 interview with Epokha, Yertysbayev
said he intended to restore the controlling interest of the
state in the second official channel, Khabar, which is
partly owned by the President's daughter, Dariga
Nazarbayeva. The first move may have been taken on May 5,
when Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Maulen
Ashimbayev was elected Chairman of the Khabar Agency's Board
of Directors at a special Khabar shareholders' meeting.

5. (U) In the same interview Yertysbayev also threatened to
revoke the broadcasting license of KTK TV, owned by
Nazarbayeva's husband First Deputy Foreign Minister Rakhat
Aliyev, for not broadcasting enough Kazakh language
programming as required by law, and for the manner in which
the station reported on the Sarsenbaiuly murder
investigation (Ref B). "Everything that KTK broadcasts is a
serious violation of the country's constitution, which
stipulates that citizens have the right to receive truthful
information. However, in this case [reporting on the
investigation] they did not receive it. They received lies,
a distortion of the truth." (Note: In February, KTK and
Karavan, the weekly tabloid owned by Aliyev, reported the
demands made by For a Just Kazakhstan (FJK) representatives
for the resignation of Senate speaker Nurtay Abykayev, and
FJK's appeals to the authorities to ensure the safety of
others arrested for the murder. End note.)

6. (U) Nazarbayeva's response to the information minister's
plans came on May 11 in a statement from the Congress of
Journalists, which she chairs. The statement called for

ALMATY 00001750 002 OF 002


Yertysbayev's resignation, alleging that he had used
authoritarian means in forcibly rotating personnel, and in
toughening the state information policy. In commenting on
the statement Nazarbayeva said, "My colleagues and I
initiated this statement about Yertysbayev's immediate
resignation because we believe that his activities in the
mass media are incompetent and getting worse."

7. (U) Yertysbayev responded publicly the next day, telling
journalists, "Kazakhstan's Congress of Journalists is
interfering with the work of the executive-administrative
bodies of power and is crudely violating the law and
constitution by attempting to influence the head of state."
He added, "I answer only to the head of state and in my 116
days in office, I have received no criticism from the
president, nor from the prime minister."

2012 Pre-Positioning or Payback for Criticizing Nazarbayev?
-------------- --------------

8. (SBU) In a conversation with emboff, opposition weekly
Aina Plyus editor-in-chief Yermurat Bapi said the management
reshuffling at Kazakhstan 1 and statements on the
nationalization of Khabar are part of a grand plan to take
the channels out of Almaty mayor Imangali Tasmagambetov's
control in advance of the 2012 presidential elections.
According to Bapi, Tasmagambetov has ties to a radical Sufi
sect of Islam, which he said 80% of the Kazakhstan 1
employees practiced, (including at a vacant studio on the
premises). The channel also broadcast programs about
Sufism. The tabloid style website Kompromat.kz, reportedly
owned by Aliyev, published similar allegations about a nexus
between Tasmagambetov, Sufism and Kazakhstan 1.

9. (SBU) Comment: Some political observers interpret the
move to nationalize Khabar and threats against KTK as
payback for Nazarbayeva's March 10 and March 17 articles in
Karavan. In those articles she called on the government to
arrest those who "really" had ordered Sarsenbaiuly's murder
and cast doubt on the official version of former
administration insider turned oppositionist Nurmanbek
Nurkadilov's suicide. Such open questioning of the official
versions of high profile cases may have crossed a "red
line," and provoked recrimination from the authorities. If
true, it is hard to imagine former presidential advisor
Yertysbayev taking such action against Nazarbayeva's and her
husband's media interests without the approval of the
President himself. End comment.

Ordway