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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALMATY1226
2006-04-05 13:05:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN'S REACTION TO NSG DISCUSSION OF INDIA

Tags:   PREL  ENRG  KSCA  PARM  KNNP  ETTC  IN  KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1226/01 0951305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051305Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4782
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0300
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2025
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
						UNCLAS ALMATY 001226 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE), ISN

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL ENRG KSCA PARM KNNP ETTC IN KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S REACTION TO NSG DISCUSSION OF INDIA
NUCLEAR INITIATIVE

REF: A) VIENNA 248, B) STATE 42857



1. (SBU) Summary: Kazakhstan is open to further discussion
of the India civil nuclear initiative, but is skeptical that
the Nuclear Suppliers' Group will be able to reach consensus
in the near future. India needs to provide much more
information about the nature of its obligations and what is
being done to meet them. The Kazakhstani delegation to the
recent NSG meeting came away with the impression that any
"exception" adopted by the NSG would apply only to the U.S.
and possibly a few other major suppliers, preventing
countries like Kazakhstan from cooperating with India. End
summary.



2. (SBU) In an April 4 meeting with POEC chief in Astana,
MFA security affairs deputy director Sergey Savelyev shared
Kazakhstan's impressions of the March 23 Consultative Group
(CG) discussion of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative. Savelyev, who attended the CG, said that he
found A/S Rademaker's presentation very informative and
thought-provoking. Noting the number of detailed questions
raised by Participating Governments (PGs), Savelyev said
that his own discussions "in the corridors" revealed
widespread concern about the possible impact of the
initiative on the existing nonproliferation legal framework
(including the 1995 RevCon conclusions), as well as the
likely reaction of the DPRK and Iran.



3. (SBU) Kazakhstan's approach was more "flexible" than that
of some other PGs, Savelyev said. It is open to further
discussion of the initiative. The Kazakhstani delegation
had raised a few key questions (Ref A); the main concern was
how the initiative would be perceived internationally. Due
to the number of questions raised at the CG, Savelyev
predicted that the NSG would not be able to achieve
consensus on the initiative in the near future (i.e. by the
upcoming Plenary Session in Rio). He thought the U.S. would
have to engage quite intensively with the most skeptical
delegations, such as China and the Nordics, before consensus
would be possible. Savelyev included Japan in the list of
countries opposed to the initiative. The challenge might
not be insurmountable, Savelyev said, but "much more
information is needed."



4. (SBU) Savelyev complained that the Indian plan for
separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs was
circulated too late to allow careful review during the CG.
Having now read the document carefully, he believes it lacks
sufficient detail regarding India's obligations. As an
example, he referred to the statement that India had adopted
export control rules/lists meeting NSG and MTCR
requirements. What information was available to
substantiate the claim? Had the rules/lists been shared
with the international community? Savelyev contrasted what
he termed the lack of transparency vis--vis India with
Kazakhstan's experience of developing its export controls in
close coordination with Western partners and maintaining a
continual dialogue.



5. (SBU) Savelyev asked for clarification of a comment by
A/S Rademaker during the CG which gave the impression that
only the U.S., and possibly other "major suppliers," would
be able to use the NSG exception to engage in civil nuclear
cooperation with India. Savelyev indicated that many
delegations had come away with this impression. Ireland had
openly voiced the concern that the U.S., Russia, and France
would dominate the market, he said.



6. (SBU) Savelyev also asked whether there was any truth to
reports that Pakistan had prepared documents regarding its
own adherence to NSG and MTCR rules in hopes of being
included in the initiative.



7. (SBU) Comment: When Kazakhstan talks about
"international perceptions" of the initiative, it is
undoubtedly referring to the positions of its powerful
neighbors Russia and China. The GOK is presumably under
pressure from Russia to support the initiative and from
China to oppose it. It is also a member of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), where it would face
criticism if it supported an initiative seen as harmful to
Pakistan's interests. As a firm supporter of the
international nonproliferation framework, which at the same

time possesses vast uranium reserves that it could
profitably export to India, Kazakhstan will likely remain on
the fence until the situation develops further. End
comment.

ORDWAY