Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALMATY1095
2006-03-28 13:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: OPPOSITION SKEPTICAL ON SARSENBAIULY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #1095/01 0871321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADAD475C MSI5089-695)
P 281321Z MAR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4651
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1534
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 001095 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NOTE BY CIB: DO NOT PROCESS PASS TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE

C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT

DEPT FOR EUR/SCA (J. MUDGE),DRL/PHD (C. KUCHTA-HELBLING)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: OPPOSITION SKEPTICAL ON SARSENBAIULY
INVESTIGATION, DEMOCRATIZATION COMMISSION

REF: A. ALMATY 1018


B. ALMATY 1017 (NODIS)

C. 3/28 ALMATY CABLE ON DEMONSTRATION

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 001095

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NOTE BY CIB: DO NOT PROCESS PASS TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE

C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT

DEPT FOR EUR/SCA (J. MUDGE),DRL/PHD (C. KUCHTA-HELBLING)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: OPPOSITION SKEPTICAL ON SARSENBAIULY
INVESTIGATION, DEMOCRATIZATION COMMISSION

REF: A. ALMATY 1018


B. ALMATY 1017 (NODIS)

C. 3/28 ALMATY CABLE ON DEMONSTRATION

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with the Ambassador,
leaders of True Ak Zhol and For a Just Kazakhstan expressed
impatience with the lack of official information on the
Sarsenbaiuly murder investigation and skepticism regarding
the official version of events. Although supportive of the
FBI's consultative role in the investigation as a way to
increase transparency and accountability, they expressed
concern that the U.S. could be associated with any GOK
efforts to cover up the truth. The Ambassador said that the
FBI, and the U.S., would not be associated with an
investigation that was not being conducted properly. The
opposition leaders explained that their organizations would
not participate in the first session of the State Commission
on Democratization on March 24 due to unresolved questions
about the Sarsenbaiuly murder and about the structure and
true purpose of the body. All expressed hope that true
dialogue with the Kazakhstani authorities would be possible,
whether through the Democratization Commission or in other
channels. End summary.


2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with True Ak Zhol co-chair Oraz
Zhandosov and "For a Just Kazakhstan" (FJK) general secretary
Tulegen Zhukeyev on March 20 in Almaty to discuss the
political environment in the wake of the Sarsenbaiuly murder.
He also met with FJK leader Zharmakhan Tuyakbay on March 22
in Almaty.

--------------
True Ak Zhol Registered
--------------


3. (SBU) Zhandosov informed the Ambassador that the Supreme
Court would consider True Ak Zhol's registration application
the following day. Not displaying great optimism, Zhandosov
speculated that the authorities had purposely dragged out the
process because they did not want to announce a decision
during the 40-day mourning period for Sarsenbaiuly. (Note:
The Ministry of Justice announced on March 21 that it had

registered the party, thereby putting an end to the appeals
process. Most political observers saw it as a political
decision intended as a gesture to the opposition in the wake
of the murder and subsequent arrests of opposition leaders.
End note.)


4. (SBU) Asked if the delay might have reflected the
authorities' desire to wait and see how the opposition would
reorganize in the wake of Galymzhan Zhakiyanov's release,
Zhukeyev minimized what he termed the Zhakiyanov factor. The
authorities were most concerned with the public reaction to
recent events, he said. Zhukeyev claimed that the March 18
FJK rally (Ref A) had attracted 5000-6000 participants and
had demonstrated that the opposition was strong but
responsible. (Note: The actual number of attendees was 2000
or less. End note.)

--------------
Sarsenbaiuly Murder Investigation
--------------


5. (C) Turning to the murder investigation, Zhandosov pointed
out that the Ministry of Internal Affairs had made no public
announcements for three weeks. He interpreted the official
silence as a sign the authorities were very worried, adding
that Nazarbayev probably regretted having publicly endorsed
the initial investigation results pointing toward Utembayev.
In response to Zhandosov's questions, the Ambassador
explained the FBI's consultative role in the investigation
and underscored the USG's strong desire to see the
investigation proceed to its logical end. He stressed that
we would not be associated with an investigation that was not
being conducted properly.


6. (C) Reiterating many of the questions post has heard from
others (Ref B),Zhandosov expressed skepticism that someone
as wealthy as Ibragimov -- who reportedly owns several houses
and luxury vehicles -- would commit murder for "only"
$30,000. Such a sum is "peanuts" in the Kazakhstani context,
according to Zhandosov; the real cost would be in the six
figures. The circle of those who could have ordered the hit
is small, he added, but declined to name any names.


7. (C) Zhukeyev commented that the opposition wants the
investigation to reveal the truth, not to implicate any


particular person. Having heard the Ambassador's explanation
of the FBI's role, he hoped and believed the U.S. was playing
a positive role. Zhukeyev advised the U.S. to ignore the
negative remarks of "genetically anti-American" groups like
Solidarity (Ref C) who claimed the FBI was an unwitting part
of a cover-up. "Sarsenbaiuly was a pragmatic, realistic,
and wise person who knew when to compromise," Zhukeyev said.
"In his memory," the opposition will also seek to be
pragmatic and wise. He expressed the hope that Nazarbayev,
who he said had changed and become very detached in recent
years, would once again become involved in the political
realm and carry out "deliberate" policies as he used to. If
the president is pragmatic and realistic, Zhukeyev said, we
are ready to work with him.


8. (C) Tuyakbay told the Ambassador that the ultimate impact
of the murder of Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly will depend on what
conclusions Nazarbayev draws from it. After placing his cell
phone on the other side of the room to avoid eavesdropping,
Tuyakbay said that Nazarbayev dreads learning the truth, as
any scenario will be damaging to him. Tuyakbay claimed that
the order had been given at the highest levels not to allow
the official investigation to proceed, because there is
concrete evidence of higher-level involvement. Tuyakbay said
that "intermediaries" had approached him and asked him to end
the activities of the public (i.e., non-governmental)
commission that is following the investigation. Pointing
upward in the Kazakhstani sign language for Nazarbayev,
Tuyakbay said that the message had been that "he" knows who
is responsible and plans to deal with the situation in his
own way. (Tuyakbay later indicated that the one
"responsible" is Nazarbayev's son-in-law, Rakhat Aliyev.) The
members of the public commission had looked at all available
evidence and were very skeptical that Utembayev had ordered
the killings, Tuyakbay added.


9. (C) Tuyakbay told the Ambassador that he was pleased that
the FBI was taking part in the investigation. He warned that
the USG could be held hostage to the decisions of others,
however. Tuyakbay also noted that as the former Procurator
General he knew how common it was to falsify evidence in
these types of investigations; it struck him as far too
"convenient" and likely a set-up that so much evidence had
been discovered so quickly.

--------------
State Commission on Democratization
--------------


10. (SBU) When asked about the State Commission on
Democratization, Zhandosov said the opposition did not see it
as a serious step forward, although it could be one small
part of a realistic overall approach to reform by the GOK.
The opposition expected President Nazarbayev to give a speech
outlining the limits of what he is ready to do now, rather
than launching an open dialogue. Zhandosov stressed that the
main long-term political question is the transfer of power.
Zhukeyev disagreed, saying that it was also important to
discuss such things as reforming parliament. He was
reserving judgment on the commission until after the first
session; he wanted to see if it was just "all speeches." If
the commission was "real," the opposition was ready to engage
in dialogue. Zhukeyev added that the murder and subsequent
protests had resulted in changes to the political reform
section of Nazarbayev's March 1 address to the nation.


11. (SBU) Tuyakbay informed the Ambassador that he did not
intend to participate in the Democratization Commission. No
one from the GOK had even contacted him about the event,
Tuyakbay added; a "strange telegram" had arrived that day
giving the time and place of the meeting, but containing no
details or rsvp information. FJK had decided not to
participate for a number of reasons, Tuyakbay explained.
First and foremost was the lack of results in the murder
investigation. They were also concerned about the format and
procedures. Would the opposition be a tiny minority? Would
they be given the opportunity to speak? Would Nazarbayev
participate?


12. (SBU) The likely shortcomings of the Democratization
Commission aside, Tuyakbay continued, the opposition must
find a way to establish "civilized relations" with the
government. Parliament is not a useful venue because it is
not capable or legitimate, he observed.

--------------
Comment
--------------


13. (C) Comment: Judging from the behavior of our usually
outspoken contacts, the Sarsenbaiuly murder has increased the
level of fear among the opposition to levels not seen in
recent years. That fear is only enhanced by a marked drop in
the amount of insider information from law enforcement
authorities that was previously flowing quietly to the
opposition. We know from the FBI's involvement in the
investigation that the Interior Ministry has dramatically
reduced the number of personnel with full knowledge of the
investigation, perhaps to as few as five officials. This is
almost certainly due to the fact that the investigation is
increasingly pointing to someone other than Utembayev as the
principal instigator of the murder. Assuming that sufficient
evidence is generated to implicate someone specific,
Nazarbayev will have no choice but to deal with the problem
head on, even if it is someone as closely identified with him
as Aliyev. The alternative -- to demonstrate
uncharacteristic weakness -- would diminish, if not
eliminate, his ability to rule the country. It remains an
open question as to whether Nazarbayev will allow the
investigation to proceed to its logical conclusion, or
terminate it and seek to deal with the culprit privately.
Our involvement significantly raises the potential domestic
and international costs of taking what otherwise might appear
to be the easier route of dealing with the problem
"off-line." In the meantime, we do not yet have any signals
that the investigation has been pulled back. Moreover,
Interior Minister Mukhamedzhanov's March 24 public statement
that "new circumstances have emerged" that will be announced
to the media suggests that the investigation will expand
beyond the 10 persons currently in custody. End comment.
ORDWAY