Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALMATY1
2006-01-02 05:13:00
UNCLASSIFIED
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES

Tags:  KZ NOTAG 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS ALMATY 000001 

SIPDIS


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

FOR S/ES-O/CMS, EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS:
SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES

REF: STATE 219189

UNCLAS ALMATY 000001

SIPDIS


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

FOR S/ES-O/CMS, EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS:
SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES

REF: STATE 219189


1. (SBU) Summary: The Embassy Almaty Emergency Action
Committee Pandemic Influenza (PI) Subcommittee has met to
develop tripwires and responses per Action Request in
Reftel. Participants in the PI Subcommittee include the
DCM and representatives from MED, CDC, ADM, CON, RSO,
USAID, PEACE CORPS, PAS AND DAO.


2. (SBU) Introduction:

-Host country medical facilities in the event of an
outbreak: For the purpose of planning for pandemic
influenza, post considers that Kazakhstan's medical
treatment facilities will not be available for use by
official Americans. This is due to anticipated heavy use
by host country citizens affected by the pandemic and a
standard of care in local facilities that falls so far
below that of the USA that its use should not be
considered.

-General assessment of host country's public health
system's ability to respond to an AI/PI outbreak: The KZ
medical, veterinary and wildlife sectors are capable of
detecting suspected disease based upon clinical signs and
history. However, the medical sector is not capable of
detecting a new strain of influenza by laboratory testing.
Current diagnostic procedures and equipment can detect
cases of influenza, but cannot differentiate particular
strains. Many of the GOK Ministries, including
Agriculture, Education and Science, and Health have
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) equipment; but PCR tests
specific to H5N1 are not yet approved by FDA or USDA (or
Kazakh entities) for diagnosis of disease in people or
animals. During the poultry outbreak in August 2005
(Golubovka village in Pavlodar oblast),the Kazak
Scientific Research Agricultural Institute in Otar
provided animal specimens; the Republican Sanitary
Epidemiological Service provided human specimens of
possible exposed individuals to the NAMRU-3 laboratory in
Cairo. CDC collected 175 specimens from individuals in
the village where H5N1 was identified. These specimens
were subsequently sent to CDC in Atlanta through an
agreement with the Government of Kazakhstan.

-Post's ability to shelter in place: Post has addressed
all items listed in REF, para 8 in preparing for pandemic
influenza. As such, post has determined that it can
shelter in place for a period of two to four weeks.


3. (SBU) Tripwires and responses:

Tripwire 1: Spike in number and broadening geographic
spread of animal-to-human transmission cases in
Kazakhstan.

Actions:
a. EAC Pandemic Influenza Subcommittee convenes to

confirm that the tripwire has been crossed.
b. Release warning announcement to Mission personnel and
warden message to American citizens.
c. Restrict mission personnel from travel to affected
geographic regions.
d. Have evacuation plans for both the well and ill.
e. Prepare talking points for domestic and international
press.
f. Provide detailed briefing to Embassy/Consulate staff.
g. Communicate pertinent information to the embassy
community by way of venues such as town hall meetings, the
embassy web site and newsletter articles.

Tripwire 2: Confirmed, sustained human-to-human
transmission anywhere in the world indicating a mutation
in the virus. This is particularly significant if there
are multiple, geographically diverse clusters, or if a
cluster occurs in a major transit hub.

Actions:
a. EAC Pandemic Influenza Subcommittee convenes to
confirm that the tripwire has been crossed.
b. Institute screening practices for all visitors to USG
facilities.
c. Mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any
flu symptoms or has a family member with flu symptoms.
This will be monitored by the Health Unit.
d. Issue public announcement to the American community.
e. Prepare talking points for domestic and international
press.
f. Department of State makes public announcement
regarding risks of travel to the region.
g. Restrict official and unofficial travel to affected
countries or areas.


Tripwire 3: Sustained human-to-human transmission in
Kazakhstan. This is particularly significant if there are
multiple, geographically diverse clusters, or if a cluster
occurs in an urban area and/or is not safely isolated.

Actions:
a. EAC Pandemic Influenza Subcommittee convenes to
confirm that the tripwire has been crossed.
b. Provide Mission briefings for American and LES staff
and dependents, by email or telephone.
c. Consular section to reduce operations to emergency
services only.
d. Coordinate with CA/OCS on issuance of guidance
(public announcement or travel warning) urging American
citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to Kazakhstan.
e. Consider authorized or ordered departure at the
discretion of the Chief of Mission and the EAC Implement
administrative leave for non-emergency FSNs.
f. If AD/OD is not permissible, instruct all non-
emergency American and LES staff to remain at home on
administrative leave.
g. Mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any
flu symptoms or has a family member with flu symptoms.
This will be monitored by the Health Unit.
h. Consider home quarantine of any staff and dependents
who have been in contact with a person confirmed to have
pandemic influenza infection and implement home
monitoring.
i. Limit venues of human to human contact (implement
social distancing),such as school closures and the
cancellation of community gatherings.
j. Consider delivery of groceries and other essentials
to quarantined residences.
k. Strong statement and enforcement that ill employees
must not come to work.
l. Divide MSG detachment into two separate and
independently quartered entities to help ensure continued
perimeter security and safeguarding of classified
materials.
m. Plan for home visits to sick individuals who receive
care under the Embassy Health Unit.
n. Restrict visitor access to Mission facilities.
Screening to consist of posters and written questionnaires
that deny entry to visitors with symptoms of influenza.
o. Public announcement to the American community. In
coordination with the department, prepare talking points
for domestic and international press.
p. Mission personnel restricted to essential in-country
travel only.
q. Deny country clearance for international visitors,
unless specifically cleared by the COM.
r. Post will make provisions for sheltering in place for
official visitors stranded at post.

Alternative Tripwire: A Mission employee or eligible
family member develops Avian Influenza, in the absence of
a broader outbreak per tripwires 1, 2, or 3 above.

Actions:
a. Treat the victim. Medevac if possible.
b. Disinfect victim's place of work.
c. Administer oseltamivir (Tamiflu) to close
contacts.


ORDWAY


NNNN