Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS936
2006-05-23 19:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:
MFA OFFICIAL'S OBSERVATIONS ON LIBYA AND THE HAMAS
how-toVZCZCXRO4781 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHAS #0936 1431914 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 231914Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1163 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000936
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM PARM LY IR PA
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL'S OBSERVATIONS ON LIBYA AND THE HAMAS
GOVERNMENT
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
LIBYA'S CHANGED BEHAVIOR; STILL MORE NEEDED
--------------------------------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000936
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM PARM LY IR PA
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL'S OBSERVATIONS ON LIBYA AND THE HAMAS
GOVERNMENT
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
LIBYA'S CHANGED BEHAVIOR; STILL MORE NEEDED
--------------
1. (C) In a May 22 meeting on other issues attended by
Ambassador and PolEc Chief, MFA Director General for Arab
Affairs Bouzaher gave the Algerian perspective on Libya and
dealing with the Hamas government in the Palestinian
territories. Ambassador briefed Bouzaher on the U.S.
decision to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya,
explaining that the U.S. had long made clear that a change of
Libyan behavior vis-a-vis the WMD, terrorism, and Pan Am 103
issues would open the door for a change of U.S. treatment of
Libya. Libya had addressed these concerns satisfactorily,
and we had responded by removing Libya from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism and by announcing the upgrading of our
relations to full Embassy status. The improvement in
U.S.-Libyan relations would hopefully send a strong message
to other countries -- North Korea, Syria, and Iran -- that
positive changes of behavior would be reciprocated.
2. (C) Bouzaher said the GOA had wanted Libya to renounce
its negative behavior and was glad that it had come around to
a more constructive role in the international community.
Regionally, however, Libya's behavior had been troublesome,
and Libya needed to do more to promote good relations between
neighbors. Bouzaher expressed particular concern over
Qadhafi's call for the establishment of a greater Sahara; his
efforts with the heads of transnational tribes in the region;
and his recent provocative appearance leading prayers in
Timbuktu. His meddling with the tribes had security
implications for Algeria, Chad, Mali, and other states in the
neighborhood. States could not adequately control all their
desert areas, and any inducements by Libya to reduce further
state control was counterproductive. With understatement,
Bouzaher also signaled that Qadhafi's dispatch of a special
envoy to Layoune (Western Sahara) to meet with Mohamed VI had
not been appreciated (given the territories' disputed
statues).
ALGERIA HAS NOT RECEIVED HAMAS
--------------
3. (C) Asked about Hamas, Bouzaher said he did not see much
flexibility in its position. Even so, he argued, Hamas
needed to be accepted as an interlocutor, even if not as a
partner. Hamas' assets were blocked and even some diplomatic
missions in the Palestinian territories were forced to close
due to stringent financial controls on money transfers. It
was important to work with Abu Mazen, and his Fatah faction
continued to wield considerable power in the security
services, observed Bouzaher. Ambassador responded that Hamas
had refused to accept the Quartet conditions, which were
nothing more than a request that Hamas abide by normal
international behavior of governments, accept the Road Map
and accept Israel's existence, as enshrined in the Arab
League's 2002 Beirut Declaration. These were not
unreasonable requirements, and Hamas, like other governments,
had to understand that negative behavior had consequences.
Bouzaher nonetheless argued that Hamas felt isolated and this
was a mistake. Speaking frankly, he said the U.S. and its
partners needed to talk with Hamas and look to the future.
Palestinian youth were increasingly frustrated, and this did
not bode well for prospects of a future peace with Israel.
He also said Algeria was disturbed by violence between Hamas
and Fatah elements.
4. (C) Bouzaher said members of the Arab League were not
receiving Hamas officials. Algeria certainly had not done
so, despite pressure from Hamas. Ambassador said this sent
an important message in itself. Bouzaher agreed, but felt
that ostracism alone would not lead to a change in Hamas'
position. There was a real need to relaunch the peace
process. Hamas could not achieve its aims through jihad; it
had to look to a negotiated settlement. Hamas was no longer
an opposition party and could not afford to behave as if it
were. If there was a silver lining, concluded Bouzaher, it
was that the debate on the Palestinian approach to peace was
good for Palestinian democracy.
ERDMAN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM PARM LY IR PA
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL'S OBSERVATIONS ON LIBYA AND THE HAMAS
GOVERNMENT
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
LIBYA'S CHANGED BEHAVIOR; STILL MORE NEEDED
--------------
1. (C) In a May 22 meeting on other issues attended by
Ambassador and PolEc Chief, MFA Director General for Arab
Affairs Bouzaher gave the Algerian perspective on Libya and
dealing with the Hamas government in the Palestinian
territories. Ambassador briefed Bouzaher on the U.S.
decision to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya,
explaining that the U.S. had long made clear that a change of
Libyan behavior vis-a-vis the WMD, terrorism, and Pan Am 103
issues would open the door for a change of U.S. treatment of
Libya. Libya had addressed these concerns satisfactorily,
and we had responded by removing Libya from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism and by announcing the upgrading of our
relations to full Embassy status. The improvement in
U.S.-Libyan relations would hopefully send a strong message
to other countries -- North Korea, Syria, and Iran -- that
positive changes of behavior would be reciprocated.
2. (C) Bouzaher said the GOA had wanted Libya to renounce
its negative behavior and was glad that it had come around to
a more constructive role in the international community.
Regionally, however, Libya's behavior had been troublesome,
and Libya needed to do more to promote good relations between
neighbors. Bouzaher expressed particular concern over
Qadhafi's call for the establishment of a greater Sahara; his
efforts with the heads of transnational tribes in the region;
and his recent provocative appearance leading prayers in
Timbuktu. His meddling with the tribes had security
implications for Algeria, Chad, Mali, and other states in the
neighborhood. States could not adequately control all their
desert areas, and any inducements by Libya to reduce further
state control was counterproductive. With understatement,
Bouzaher also signaled that Qadhafi's dispatch of a special
envoy to Layoune (Western Sahara) to meet with Mohamed VI had
not been appreciated (given the territories' disputed
statues).
ALGERIA HAS NOT RECEIVED HAMAS
--------------
3. (C) Asked about Hamas, Bouzaher said he did not see much
flexibility in its position. Even so, he argued, Hamas
needed to be accepted as an interlocutor, even if not as a
partner. Hamas' assets were blocked and even some diplomatic
missions in the Palestinian territories were forced to close
due to stringent financial controls on money transfers. It
was important to work with Abu Mazen, and his Fatah faction
continued to wield considerable power in the security
services, observed Bouzaher. Ambassador responded that Hamas
had refused to accept the Quartet conditions, which were
nothing more than a request that Hamas abide by normal
international behavior of governments, accept the Road Map
and accept Israel's existence, as enshrined in the Arab
League's 2002 Beirut Declaration. These were not
unreasonable requirements, and Hamas, like other governments,
had to understand that negative behavior had consequences.
Bouzaher nonetheless argued that Hamas felt isolated and this
was a mistake. Speaking frankly, he said the U.S. and its
partners needed to talk with Hamas and look to the future.
Palestinian youth were increasingly frustrated, and this did
not bode well for prospects of a future peace with Israel.
He also said Algeria was disturbed by violence between Hamas
and Fatah elements.
4. (C) Bouzaher said members of the Arab League were not
receiving Hamas officials. Algeria certainly had not done
so, despite pressure from Hamas. Ambassador said this sent
an important message in itself. Bouzaher agreed, but felt
that ostracism alone would not lead to a change in Hamas'
position. There was a real need to relaunch the peace
process. Hamas could not achieve its aims through jihad; it
had to look to a negotiated settlement. Hamas was no longer
an opposition party and could not afford to behave as if it
were. If there was a silver lining, concluded Bouzaher, it
was that the debate on the Palestinian approach to peace was
good for Palestinian democracy.
ERDMAN