RELEASED ISLAMIC LEADER ATTACKS GOA LEGITIMACY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000662

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM AG
SUBJECT: RELEASED ISLAMIC LEADER ATTACKS GOA LEGITIMACY,
WORRYING THE PUBLIC AND POSING HARD CHOICE FOR AUTHORITIES

REF: ALGIERS 565

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Since his March 6 release from prison pursuant to the
Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, Ali Belhadj,
co-founder of the now banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),
has blatantly defied the Charter's ban on those released
engaging in political activity. Belhadj's most direct
challenge came in an April 3 interview with the French daily
Le Monde. In that interview, he sharply attacked the
Algerian government, calling it illegitimate, labeling
President Bouteflika a mere tool of the armed forces, and
dismissing the referendum on the Charter as rigged and the
Charter itself as having "no constitutional legitimacy."
Belhadj also called for an Islamic Republic in Algeria,
clearly pushing the envelope and testing the limits of GOA
tolerance. Reaction to Belhadj's political broadside has
been muted from all sides, reflecting, we believe, not
apathy, but a sober appreciation of the stakes of mishandling
this challenge to a government and society emerging from a
decade of terrorism and religious civil war. The government
has gingerly repeated earlier warnings that the Charter
restrictions would be enforced but has so far avoided tougher
action, suggesting it wants to avoid making Belhadj a cause
celebre and boosting support for him as an authentic voice of
opposition. Politicos and political parties have similarly
low-keyed the issue in their public statements. And the
press, mindful of being used as a platform for transmitting
Belhadj's radical message, has consciously sought to keep the
public informed, while not dramatizing the story, not using
it to press its own criticisms of the government, and, with a
couple of exceptions, not even printing his picture.


2. (C) Privately, however, reaction among the middle
classes, and especially civil society, has been one of
deepening concern that the Charter, by permitting the release
of individuals with blood on their hands without requiring an
admission of responsibility or even a request for pardon, has
been a serious mistake and has given renewed confidence to
former FIS elements to press their radical agenda more
assertively. There is also concern that the government has
gotten itself into a difficult situation with the Charter,
risking building support for Islamists if they re-arrest
Belhadj, or completely undermining the Charter's ban on
political activity if they don't. Views among our contacts
vary widely as to how much resonance Belhadj's radical
Islamic message will have among Algeria's underclass
following over a decade of terrorism. Many say you can fool
the people once, but not twice. Others, including two former
ministers, think the FIS could win an election now if one
were held, given that the lower classes have still seen
little or no visible improvement in their living conditions.
Where everyone agrees is that the key to defusing the problem
is faster and more visible progress in addressing urgent
unemployment and housing grievances, which feed discontent
and receptivity to radical critiques. (End Summary and
Comment.)

BELHADJ BLASTS ILLEGITIMACY OF GOA IN LE MONDE INTERVIEW
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3. (U) In his deliberately provocative April 3 interview with
Le Monde, Belhadj launched a broadside attack against the
Algerian government and its leaders, in clear defiance of the
National Reconciliation Charter's ban on political activity
by those released under the terms of the Charter. "Nobody --
neither the president, nor the military decision-makers --
can forbid me from engaging in politics!", he declared. "The
government has been illegitimate ever since the 1992 coup
d'etat. Political pluralism does not exist and has never
existed in Algeria. How is it possible to argue the
contrary, when the choice of head of state is made by the
army chiefs?" He also lambasted the Charter as having no
institutional legitimacy: "How can people dare to talk about
national reconciliation when we have lived in a state of
emergency for the past 14 years? A real reconciliation must
be negotiated among all parties concerned....(here) it is
imposed by those responsible for the coup d'etat and them
alone. The oppressors portray themselves as victims." When
reminded by the interviewer that the Charter for Peace and
National Reconciliation was approved by a strong majority,

Belhadj responded that the vote was rigged and the government
scorned and betrayed the Algerian people.


4. (U) Asked if he was responsible for the national tragedy
of the 1990's, Belhadj said he could not reply "yes" or "no,"
adding that the Algerian judiciary needed to shed light on
the tragedy in order to determine everyone's responsibility.
He remarked that he continued to struggle for an Islamic
Algerian state, governed by the Qur'an. "Since we are a
Muslim people, there can be no inconsistencies as in the
West." Commenting on the conversion of Algerians to other
faiths, he said that those who convert Muslims are
"...interfering in the country's affairs. They are spies,
secret agents."

SIPDIS

MEDIA AND PUBLIC REACTION
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5. (SBU) The Algerian written press, having matured since the
1990's, has not tried to hype Belhadj's comments or, as in
the past, allowed itself to be used as a vehicle for
spreading his radical message or advancing its own criticisms
of the government. Instead, editorials and commentaries are
explicitly discussing the need to find the right balance
between informing the public and not being used by violent
extremists to undermine the state. Except in a few
instances, the newspapers have refrained from publishing his
picture. (Note: All Algerian broadcast media are owned and
operated by the GOA and have not covered Belhadj at all.)


6. (C) Public reaction and debate over the implications of
the Belhadj's broadside against the legitimacy of the current
authorities has been surprisingly muted. Government
statements have been limited to low-key declarations that the
Charter would be enforced; party officials have been quiet;
and civil society leaders have not spoken out publicly.
Beneath this muted reaction, however, there in fact has been
widespread anxiety over recent developments, the increasing
confidence of Islamists to push the political envelope,
renewed calls for resurrecting the banned FIS party, and the
government's under-reaction to blatant provocations. At a
recent lunch of senior civil society types, everyone one of
them privately expressed serious concern to the Ambassador
about Belhadj and other Islamists' increasing activism, the
government's slowness in opening up politically and
economically, and the dangers that Belhadj's radical message
could have some resonance among former FIS supporters who,
though not radical themselves, have not seen any real change
in their living conditions, despite the increasing wealth in
government coffers. While there have been widely varying
views among our contacts as to how much resonance a radical
Islamic message will have among Algeria's underclass
following more than a decade of terrorism, two former
ministers told the Ambassador this week that if an election
were held now and the FIS could run, it would win a majority
in a protest vote. Counterbalancing this, one of these
ministers professed himself optimistic that the situation
would sort itself out, and other contacts have maintained
that the Algerians, having been duped by the Islamist message
once before, would not fall for it a second time. The key to
defusing the problem, virtually all contacts have said, was
faster progress in addressing urgent unemployment and housing
needs, which fed discontent and receptivity to radical
arguments about the illegitimacy of the government.


GOA DILEMMA
--------------


7. (C) Despite its experience in countering terrorism and
combating extremist messages, the GOA faces a dilemma. In
late March, in response to public statements by other
prominent released prisoners, Prime Minster Ouyahia,
President Bouteflika and Interior Minister Zerhouni pointedly
reminded the nation that the Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation placed limits on the political activity of
those released under the terms of the Charter and would be
enforced. To date, the only public response to Belhadj's
defiant April 3 interview has been an April 8 statement by
Justice Minister Belaiz reminding that "all persons who
violate the law...Belhadj or others" will be held accountable
under the Charter's provisions. The lack of any overt move
to date against Belhadj suggests the GOA leadership is
weighing whether re-arresting Belhadj would help enforce the
ban on political activity by released terrorists, or only
make Belhadj a martyr, widening his support and compounding

the problem. While this could quickly change, for now the
GOA has opted for a cautious approach, issuing warnings but
taking no real action. The dilemma for the GOA, of course,
is that non-action in the face of deliberate defiance of the
Charter's provisions risks undermining its restrictive
provisions altogether, proving Belhadj right that the GOA
cannot forbid him from engaging in politics, and opening the
door to more radical discourse from those who see their
release, not as a pardon for terrorist acts, but as
vindication of the justice of their cause and as another
phase in the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic
Republic.

ERDMAN