Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS623
2006-04-04 17:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

POLISARIO "AMBASSADOR" COMMENTS ON NEGOTIATING

Tags:  PBTS PREL PGOV WI MO AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #0623/01 0941708
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041708Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0783
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8439
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1744
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1260
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0335
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0742
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1207
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5802
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000623 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV WI MO AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO "AMBASSADOR" COMMENTS ON NEGOTIATING
WITH MOROCCO


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000623

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV WI MO AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO "AMBASSADOR" COMMENTS ON NEGOTIATING
WITH MOROCCO


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Polisario "Ambassador" to Algeria Mohammed Beissat
discussed his views on possible negotiations with Morocco
over King Mohammed VI's autonomy plan in a prolonged April 1
conversation with DCM and Pol/Econ Chief. Reviewing the
history of Polisario-Moroccan direct negotiations since 1979,
Beissat expressed his skepticism about Moroccan intentions,
but he did not rule out a new round of talks "provided the
framework was appropriate." DCM urged that the Polisario not
pass up the opportunity to negotiate, and pressed Beissat on
the possibility of a referendum on autonomy. Beissat said
somewhat ambiguously he thought a referendum might be
acceptable if the Sahrawis in Tindouf were included in the
vote. It was not clear if he was referring to an
"autonomy-only" referendum. On a more negative note, he
dismissed King Mohammed as a "weak" leader who was unlikely
to be able to make peace. In response to DCM's comment that
the international community was not likely to pressure
Morocco, Beissat said he thought the real pressure on Morocco
would come from the young generation of Sahrawis inside the
Western Sahara, who, he asserted, had rejected Moroccan
attempts to impose a Moroccan identity on them. Time was not
on Morocco's side, he argued. End summary.

DISAPPOINTING HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOROCCO
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In a lengthy conversation April 1, Polisario
"Ambassador" to Algeria Mohammed Beissat, accompanied by
visiting Polisario Interests Section chief in Australia Kamel
Al-Fadil, discussed with DCM and Pol/Econ Chief the
possibility of Polisario engaging in a new round of direct
negotiations with Morocco over King Mohammed VI's autonomy
plan. DCM urged that Polisario not miss the opportunity to
negotiate once the Moroccan side was ready. Beissat did not
dismiss the possibility of negotiations, but said their
decision would depend on finding the appropriate "framework"

under UN auspices.


3. (C) Sketching in some detail the history of
Polisario-Moroccan direct talks, Beissat said they went back
to three- way talks including Mauritania held under AU
auspices in 1979. (Note: We do not vouch for the historical
accuracy of Beissat's presentation, which was clearly that of
an informed but highly partisan interlocutor.) When Morocco
walked out of those talks, Mauritania dropped its claim to
the southern portion of the Western Sahara and withdrew from
the conflict. A senior Polisario delegation next held direct
negotiations with King Hassan II in 1988, which made some
progress toward a ceasefire and generated the momentum that
allowed Morocco and Algeria to resume diplomatic relations.
Hassan had offered autonomy in 1988, suggesting all he needed
was to maintain Morocco's flag, stamps, and currency, but
Polisario had insisted on a referendum that would include
independence as a possible outcome, a position subsequently
accepted by Hassan and which formed the basis for the
ceasefire and the establishment of MINURSO.


4. (C) Beissat described a 1996 session with then Crown
Prince Mohammed and Minister of Interior Basri as very
disappointing, since Mohammed had refused to listen to a
Polisario presentation on independence, reportedly saying
that was not within his instructions from his father. The
appointment of James Baker as the UNSYG's personal
representative, the Houston talks, and Hassan's death had
followed. Beissat reiterated Polisario frustration over
Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan, noting that Baker had
intentionally adjusted the voter list and duration of the
transitional period in order to address Moroccan concerns,
and yet Morocco had still walked away from the concept of a
referendum, which had been the basis of the entire diplomatic
process since the 1991 ceasefire. This experience made the
Polisario very skeptical of the utility of negotiating with
Morocco since even if an agreement were reached, the
Moroccans could simply change their minds and the
international community would not impose any penalty on them.
Beissat praised Baker as a statesman of the first order, and
said the Polisario doubted any other UN representative could
be found who would have Baker's stature.

NO POLISARIO OBJECTION TO TERMINATING MINURSO
--------------


5. (C) DCM noted that both Morocco and Algeria had expressed
serious concern about the possibility that MINURSO's mission
could be terminated by the Security Council. Beissat said
Polisario saw little point to extending MINURSO since it
manifestly could not carry out its intended purpose of
preparing the ground for a referendum. Beissat agreed,
however, that removing MINURSO would make the resumption of
hostilities more likely, and he also agreed that MINURSO at
times played a helpful role as an observer. He complained
that MINURSO was powerless to protect the Sahrawi civilian
population under Moroccan occupation, noting that Moroccan
security forces prevented Sahrawis from visiting MINURSO
headquarters in Laayoune and that the Moroccans tortured
Sahrawis at a prison located only a few blocks from MINURSO
headquarters. Beissat expressed understanding for Ambassador
Bolton's questioning the utility of the UN continuing to fund
a peacekeeping operation that could not carry out its
mandate.

NOT RULING OUT AUTONOMY, BUT...
--------------


6. (C) Returning to the discussion of negotiations, DCM said
he would speak frankly. There was little to no chance that
the international community would pressure Morocco, and
rather than wait for something to change, the Polisario
should prepare to engage Morocco directly and without
preconditions on the basis of a Moroccan offer of autonomy.
Beissat said he thought nothing good would come of King
Mohammed's consultations with the Moroccan political parties,
since the outcome would be to narrow rather than widen the
scope of autonomy. In addition, the King appeared not to
intend to include the Sahrawis in Tindouf in a referendum.
Some Moroccan parties had even suggested that all Moroccan
citizens must have the right to vote in a referendum. This
showed Morocco's lack of seriousness, he said.


7. (C) DCM asked how Polisario would respond to a referendum
on autonomy that included Tindouf residents. Beissat said
the Polisario's bottom line was there had to be
self-determination. If the Sahrawis voted for autonomy in a
referendum, the Polisario would accept the outcome, even
though he personally would never go back to Western Sahara
under Moroccan sovereignty. (Comment: It is unclear whether
Beissat was speaking about a referendum in which autonomy was
one option or a confirmatory referendum on autonomy.) That
said, Beissat was skeptical King Mohammed was strong enough
to negotiate a settlement. Recalling the Polisario's meeting
with King Hassan in 1988, Beissat said they had told Hassan
that he was a strong man, and Hassan had said it took a
strong man to make peace as well as to make war. Beissat
said the real problem with King Mohammed was that he was weak.

TIME NOT ON MOROCCO'S SIDE
--------------


8. (C) Beissat, perhaps trying to appeal to American
interlocutors, said he was struck by television images of
Jalal Talabani serving as Iraq's President while Saddam was
on trial. International events were moving very fast, and
what seemed impossible today could become very real tomorrow.
Analyzing Morocco's internal situation, Beissat claimed
occupying the Western Sahara cost Morocco about $4 million a
day. Morocco's Islamist movement was getting stronger,
especially the banned Justice and Charity party, which did
not accept the legitimacy of the monarchy and was not
interested in Moroccan control of Western Sahara. Beissat
suggested that time was not necessarily on Morocco's side.
Internal pressures were building, especially from the young
Sahrawi population in the Western Sahara. Despite thirty
years of Moroccan efforts and pressure to Moroccanize the
Sahrawis, the high school students were the ones in the
streets protesting Moroccan occupation. Their parents may
have accepted Moroccan control, but the young people did not.

ERDMAN