Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS501
2006-03-21 07:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

NEA A/S WELCH'S MARCH 14 DISCUSSION OF HAMAS,

Tags:  PREL PARM IR IZ IS PA SU AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6196
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHAS #0501/01 0800739
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210739Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0599
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000501 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ALL NEAR EAST COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM IR IZ IS PA SU AG
SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH'S MARCH 14 DISCUSSION OF HAMAS,
SUDAN, IRAQ, AND IRAN WITH PM OUYAHIA


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000501

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ALL NEAR EAST COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM IR IZ IS PA SU AG
SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH'S MARCH 14 DISCUSSION OF HAMAS,
SUDAN, IRAQ, AND IRAN WITH PM OUYAHIA


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In their March 14 meeting, PM Ouyahia and NEA A/S
Welch primarily focused on the Palestinian issue and dealings
with Hamas. A/S Welch stressed that U.S. assistance to the
Palestinians would continue but not through government
channels so long as Hamas was in government and failed to
recognize Israel, renounce violence and terror, and observe
the Palestinian Authority's previous commitments. Ouyahia
said Algeria's own experience with Islamists taught it the
value of allowing conservative religious views to be
expressed in the governing process and told Welch that
Algeria would continue to funnel assistance through the
Palestinian Government. At the same time, Algeria would
continue to defend the peace process and encourage Hamas to
accept the realities of the present situation. Welch also
pointed out the growing threat posed by an Iran that was
increasingly inserting itself in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
Ouyahia said Algeria shared U.S. concerns about Iran's undue
influence in Iraq and that he had urged three recent Iranian
delegations to pursue responsible policies. On Iraq, Ouyahia
said Algeria remained supportive of the U.S. and the need to
look forward, not backward, so that the Iraqis could enjoy a
normal life. With respect to Sudan, Ouyahia told Welch the
GOA strongly supported the peace process on Darfur and that
it was incumbent on the international community to help the
African Union move forward there without embarrassing the
government in Khartoum. Septel to report discussion of
Western Sahara and bilateral issues. (End Summary.)


2. (C) In his March 14 meeting with Prime Minister Ouyahia,
NEA A/S David Welch, accompanied by Ambassador, NEA Staff
Assistant Donick and PolEc Chief, said it was good to be back
in Algeria after 17 years. A lot had happened, commented
Ouyahia, since then. As the State Department official

responsible for the Middle East and North Africa, Welch said
regional security, stability, and reform were his foremost
concern. He then asked his Algerian interlocutor for his
assessment of the upcoming Arab League summit in Khartoum.

GOA ASSESSMENT OF KHARTOUM MEETING
--------------


3. (C) Ouyahia said there would be three main issues for
discussion: the Middle East (Palestinian issue),Iraq, and
Sudan. Starting with the Palestinians, Ouyahia said Algeria
had enjoyed friendly relations with the PLO and Fatah for
many years. Bouteflika, for example, was one of the first
leaders to send a congratulatory message to Mahmoud Abbas
upon his election to the Presidency of the Palestinian
Authority. Ouyahia said although there were differences of
opinion between Algiers and Washington on the Palestinian
issue, both sides agreed the Palestinian people deserved a
peaceful settlement of the dispute. The message of the Arab
League summit in Beirut was an important one from the Arabs.
Algeria would continue to work toward peace in the spirit of
the Beirut declaration and would not turn its back on the new
Hamas government.


4. (C) Turning to Iraq's place on the Khartoum agenda,
Ouyahia noted that Algeria had supported the political
process as evidenced by its involvement in the national
dialogue meetings last year in Cairo. The GOA was concerned
that the Iraqi leadership was not cohesive; Iraq's
territorial integrity and the unity of its people was
important for Iraq's future. Algeria's position on
maintaining foreign troops in Iraq, noted Ouyahia, was not
far from U.S. statements on the need for troops. It was
important that we not look backward on Iraq; the future was
ahead of us and we must look in that direction toward a
return to normal life for the Iraqi people.


5. (C) On Sudan, Ouyahia said his government strongly
supported the peace process in that country, both the peace
agreement in the south and the current efforts in Darfur.
The Africans were not financially able to maintain the
necessary peacekeepers, but agreement with the Sudanese
authorities was needed before handing the responsibilities
over to the UN. Rule number one from his time in the UN,
said Ouyahia, was that no peacekeeping forces could be
deployed in a country that did not want their presence. The
objective between now and November should not be to harm the
Sudanese; there was a legitimate need to bring Sudan on board
to the process. President Bashir has made efforts. It was
important to bear in mind that the peace agreement in the
south created winners and losers in Sudan. Now, another

ALGIERS 00000501 002 OF 004


peace process was underway, and undermining the Sudanese
Government in front of its population was not helpful to that
process. It was incumbent upon the international community
to help the African Union move forward in Darfur without
creating additional complications.

WELCH PRESENTS U.S. VIEWS ON SUDAN AND IRAQ
--------------


6. (C) Welch said the U.S. was skeptical about the
commitment of the Sudanese Government to changing the
situation. In our view, said Welch, the AU force was not
fully capable. The U.S., therefore, supported a UN operation
which would bring more financial and practical support to the
endeavor. Welch underscored that the U.S. was not seeking to
insert American forces, UN troops, or NATO forces; a UN force
could attract other other troop contributions, however.
NATO's role would be limited to providing command lift,
logistical and other support. Darfur, continued Welch, was
an issue of great concern to President Bush.


7. (C) With respect to Iraq, Welch offered that there was a
"hard press" for formation of a new government. President
Talabani had called parliament into session. There was a
clear need for dialogue and a national consensus government
to bridge, not create, differences among Iraqis. The parties
needed to compromise at this dangerous time. Welch explained
the U.S. role as continuing to transfer authority to the
Iraqis, and only a strong Iraqi government could deal with
the security issues. By necessity, said Welch, such a
government would have to be non-sectarian. Welch thanked
Algeria for its helpful role, which was still needed, and
acknowledged that Algeria had paid a price for its policies,
having seen two of its diplomats murdered in Baghdad.

U.S. VIEWS ON DEALING WITH HAMAS
--------------


8. (C) Turning to Palestinian issues, A/S Welch noted that
like Algeria the U.S. had welcomed the Palestinians' holding
of democratic elections for the legislative branch. As in
any democratic election, there was always someone who wins
and loses. Welch explained that the U.S. had pushed for the
holding of the Palestinian elections after weighing various
factors. The U.S. advice to the Palestinians, when asked,
was to go forward with the elections as scheduled. Now that
Hamas had won the elections, the U.S. expected the new
Palestinian Government to 1) accept Israel's existence; 2)
renounce violence and terror; and 3) observe previous
agreements such as the Road Map, Oslo Accords and Arab League
summit declarations. While Hamas had won the legislative
elections, Abbas had a peace mandate of his own that must
also be respected.


9. (C) Welch said the U.S. would announce shortly a new
humanitarian assistance for the Palestinians, since we wanted
the world to know that we support, and will not punish, the
Palestinian people. The U.S. would not, however, provide
assistance to a Hamas government and thus the new initiative
would channel aid outside of government channels. Hamas,
noted Welch, was considered by many a terrorist group, and it
would be difficult at best to manage a relationship with it.
Noting Algeria's history of supporting the Palestinian
Authority (PA) and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),
Welch encouraged the GOA to make a distinction between the
political tracks of Hamas and the PA under Abbas, especially
in terms of channeling assistance.

ALGERIAN SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS WILL CONTINUE
-------------- --


10. (C) Ouyahia said Algeria supported the Beirut peace plan
as outlined by the participants in that Arab League summit
and acknowledged that dealing with Hamas as the leaders of
the Palestinians was a problem because of the linkage to the
peace process with Israel, a process which Algeria strongly
supported. Where our views may differ, said Ouyahia, was on
approach. Algeria had experience with Hamas in its own
territory. The current MSP political party in Algeria used
to be called Hamas. The Prime Minister said he had been
working with MSP since 1996 and noted that MSP has
participated in previous Algerian governments. While MSP
took views different from the government on many issues, its
participation in the political process was welcome because
its (moderate) Islamist tendencies and conservative views
needed a voice in the political process. Such participation
was new in Palestine and certainly complicated the situation
on the ground, commented Ouyahia, who said he understood that
the U.S. and some European countries were not ready to talk
with Hamas.

ALGIERS 00000501 003 OF 004




11. (C) Ouyahia continued by saying that just as the USG
position on dealing with Hamas reflected the views of the
American people, Algeria's position reflected Algerian
attitudes. The question of Palestine was a "sacred question"
for all Algerians, leaders and "the street" alike. The
Algerian street was not "boiling" as it was in the 1990s,
Ouyahia said, noting the relatively mild reaction to the
Danish cartoons in Algeria. Since the Palestinian Government
had not been formed, Ouyahia said Algeria did not yet know
who would take part, but for Algeria and Algerians support
would go first and foremost to the Palestinian people.
Algerian support of the Palestinians would continue, and
Algeria would make good on its obligations to the PA under
the Arab League. Aid would continue to pass through the Arab
League and the Palestinian Government.

ALGERIA WILL DEFEND THE PEACE PROCESS
--------------


12. (C) As far as receiving Hamas delegations, Ouyahia twice
said, "We will continue to defend the peace process." Arab
leaders, he added, would speak plainly to Hamas and infuse
their discussion with reality. It was not practical to
expect Hamas to wake up overnight and accept Israel, but
contacts with the rest of the world, Russia included, would
be helpful, in Algeria's view. In the same way, Ouyahia
understood the U.S. could not accept overnight to recognize
Hamas but assured Welch that Algeria supported President
Abbas and the peace process and would help to bring Hamas and
others on board. Remarking that Ouyahia, according to
Ambassador, appreciated directness, Welch predicted it would
be easier for the U.S. to accept to say "yes" to Hamas (i.e.
deal with it once it accepted Quartet conditions) than for
Arab states to tell Hamas "no." He underscored that Hamas'
acceptance of Palestinian commitments on the peace process
would be essential, and urged Algeria to take this message to
Hamas.


13. (C) Ouyahia felt Hamas would change its position slowly.
The Palestinian vote was a "sanction vote"; voters were
unhappy with what was being delivered to them. Ouyahia said
Algeria allowed the FIS to participate in the elections in
the early 1990s but did not let it take office. Several
years of fighting ensued, fueled in large part by the
impression of Algerians who voted for the FIS in a sanction
vote that a great injustice had prevailed. We share the U.S.
goal, said Ouyahia, of avoiding radicalism out of our own
experience.

OUYAHIA SAYS ALGERIA IS URGING IRAN TO ACT RESPONSIBLY
-------------- --------------


14. (C) Welch then pointed out the growing threat posed by
Iran, saying the U.S. was alarmed by the direction of the
government under the new Iranian president. The U.S. did not
expect "grand steps" in the UNSC. We aimed instead for a
presidential statement laying out the choices for the Iranian
regime to make. The U.S. was further concerned about the
destabilization underway by Iran in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
There was a need to deal with Iran's activities outside of
its borders. The SARG was weak and allowed it; Lebanon was
in no position to stop it. The U.S. would keep up the
pressure on Iran. Welch stressed that the U.S. was worried
about Iran's behavior. Although President Bush would not
take the language on a use of force option off the table, the
U.S. did not look to a military solution.


15. (C) In response, Ouyahia thanked Welch for his analysis
and said Algeria served on the board of the IAEA and, like
Iran, was an oil and gas producer. Algeria knew that its oil
and gas supplies would not last forever and predicted that in
30-50 years Algeria would be a net importer of energy.
Hence, Algeria supported the peaceful use of nuclear
technology while remaining firmly opposed to its use for
military purposes. Ouyahia added that three Iranian
delegations had met with him in the past month. He told them
that leadership required the exercise of responsibility and
urged Tehran to take steps to ensure that Iranian interests
would not be harmed. Algeria, he continued, was not
surprised to see the Iran dossier move to the UNSC. Algeria,
said Ouyahia, did not want to see the region enflamed and
shared U.S. concerns about Iran's undue influence in Iraq.


16. (C) Welch expressed optimism that the UNSC outcome on
Iran's nuclear weapons program would be good and noted that
the U.S. agreed that countries had the right to exploit
nuclear technology for peaceful aims. Unfortunately, Iran
abused that right and has been caught in a lie not of 18
minutes but of 18 years. The issue, said Welch, was how to

ALGIERS 00000501 004 OF 004


contain the problem. The recent meeting between Secretary
Rice and her Russian counterpart was productive. The U.S.
thought Iran had yet to produce a nuclear bomb and that there
was still time for the international community to act to
prevent the building of one.


17. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this message.
ERDMAN