HAMAS, IRAN, LEBANON, SYRIA, AND THE WESTERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000500

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ALL NEAR EAST COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM PBTS IR WI MO SY LE AG
SUBJECT: HAMAS, IRAN, LEBANON, SYRIA, AND THE WESTERN
SAHARA ON THE MENU FOR MFA SECRETARY GENERAL LAMAMRA'S
LUNCH WITH NEA A/S WELCH

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Over a March 14 working lunch with MFA Secretary
General Lamamra, NEA A/S Welch explained the U.S. view that
taking the Iran nuclear issue to the Security Council would
strengthen possibilities of resolving the problem through
diplomacy; urged Algeria to ensure assistance was channeled
to the Palestinian people and not to a Hamas-led government;
said the United States sought changed Syrian behavior, not a
change of regime; and argued that Hamas must go beyond
acceptance of Arab League summit resolutions to accept the
existence of Israel, renounce violence, and accept previous
Palestinian commitments. On the Western Sahara, Welch said
the U.S. supported a political solution within the framework
of the UN and favored greater Maghreb cooperation and
Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement. Lamamra reiterated that
Algeria did not want to see Iran or any other country violate
the NPT but was concerned that moving the Iran nuclear
dossier to the Security CouQil could provoke international
divisions and Iran's exit from the NPT. On Hamas, he argued
it would be a mistake to try to isolate a Hamas-led
government, signaled that Algerian assistance would continue,
and was confident Hamas would have to moderate its current
positions. On the Western Sahara, he said Moroccan
unilateral moves would automatically be rejected; saw
Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan as a missed
opportunity; stressed that the parties to the dispute were
Morocco and the Polisario; and dismissed both France and
Spain as either too biased or ambivalent to play a serious
role in resolving the dispute. (End Summary.)

GOA RESERVATIONS ON OUR APPROACH TO IRAN
--------------


2. (C) Over lunch with Secretary General Lamamra and other
MFA officials March 14, A/S Welch, accompanied by Ambassador,
DCM and PolEc Chief, expressed disappointment over Algeria's
abstention in the February 2 IAEA vote to send the Iran
nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council. Iran had pursued
an undeclared nuclear program for 18 years and, as a result,
had lost the confidence of the international community. The
U.S. believed taking the issue to the UNSC enhanced prospects
of resolving the dispute through diplomacy. While Iran
threatened to escalate the situation if the matter was turned
over to the UNSC, we believed the greater risk came from the
international community not standing firm on matters of
principle.


3. (C) Lamamra said Algeria supported the right to develop
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and did not want to see Iran
or anyone else violate the NPT. It abstained in the IAEA
vote because it worried that moving the issue to the Security
Council risked dividing the international community. Welch
noted there was, in the U.S. judgment, a solid majority of
the UNSC in favor of a presidential statement laying out what
was required of Iran. The U.S. chose this path precisely
because it wanted to seek consensus. Lamamra said any vote
of the UNSC on the issue implied a movement toward action
under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, something that Lamamra
reiterated would divide the international community. Welch
replied the real problem was that it was not at all clear the
Iranians really wanted a solution. Iran was hoping to defeat
the international community in a series of step-by-step
maneuvers aimed at buying Tehran time to develop a nuclear
weapon.


4. (C) Lamamra cautioned that Iran's withdrawal from the NPT
a la North Korea was a real concern. Welch countered that
Iran was not North Korea. The latter stayed inside itself
and did not seek to project its influence. Iran, in
contrast, sought to project its influence across the region
and constituted a greater danger to the Arabs than to the
U.S. Asked about the possibility of dialogue with Iran,
Welch said the U.S. did not see any moderate tendencies;
Lamamra commented that the U.S. had become the "hated actor"
in Iranian internal politics and that not all players in
Iranian politics were satisfied with the direction the new
president's policies were taking the country.



ISOLATING HAMAS WOULD BE A MISTAKE
--------------


5. (C) Turning to dealings with Hamas and the upcoming Arab
League summit in Khartoum, A/S Welch said the new Palestinian
Government should accept the results from Arab League summits
in Beirut, Tunis, and Algiers. However, Hamas needed to go
beyond that step, which was necessary but not sufficient.
Hamas also had to accept the existence of Israel, renounce
violence and terror, and accept inherited obligations such as
Oslo. Signing up to the Arab League decisions alone was not
enough. Lamamra argued that reducing assistance to the
Palestinians would lead to more, not less, terrorism. Any
time living standards diminished, terrorism increased. It
was important to recognize that Hamas had won the elections
democratically.


6. (C) Welch agreed that Hamas fairly won the elections and
that it was essential to support the Palestinian people.
There was a distinction, though, between support for the
government and support for the people themselves. The U.S.
would continue to support the Palestinian people, but it
would not channel aid through government channels so long as
Hamas refused to accept the pro-peace conditions of the
international community, the Quartet, and even Palestinian
President Mahmoud Abbas. Mahmoud Abbas was also duly elected
to his position and his mandate to work for a negotiated
peace also had to be respected. Lamamra argued it would be a
mistake to try to isolate a Hamas government and insisted
that Algeria would continue to provide assistance.


7. (C) Welch suggested that the GOA continue to give money
to the interim government. Once Hamas formed a new
government, however, if it did not respond satisfactorily on
Israel, violence, and in honoring Palestinian commitments,
then the GOA should direct its assistance directly to the
people, bypassing government channels. It would be easier to
get the U.S. to say "yes" (i.e. accept a Hamas that had
accepted the three conditions),Welch commented, than it
would be to get Hamas to say "yes" to the U.S. conditions,
which were also supported by Abbas and the Quartet. Lamamra
said it was clear that Israel existed, and no one understood
its existence better than the Palestinians, who lived with
Israel every day. Why not expect Hamas to come around to
stating the obvious? Welch said some believed Hamas was in
fact pursuing a much more radical agenda. In this view,
Hamas was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood and shared the
Brotherhood's agenda and tactics. It sought to take over
institutions step-by-step in a methodical effort that began
in Gaza, continued to the West Bank and diaspora, and was now
entering a new phase of conquest inside the Palestinian
Authority. Welch challenged Algeria to dissuade Hamas from
following that route. Lamamra said it was not in Algeria's
interests to let that happen.

U.S. VIEW ON SYRIA AND LEBANON
--------------


8. (C) Lamamra asked Welch for the U.S. view on Lebanon and
Syria. The A/S said the U.S. was being patient on
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559, insisting on Syrian
withdrawal but not wanting to create more divisions by
pushing for the immediate disarming of Hizballah. The first
step is the Presidency, and there was now a consensus in
Lebanon to change the President. The U.S. believed strongly
that Syria needed to understand that there was a price to be
paid for interference. Syria continued to use Hizballah as a
proxy to attack Israel in order to divert attention from its
own situation. Lahoud is Syria's agent. Washington wanted
to protect Lebanon but also convince Syria to change
behavior. We were not interested in regime change in
Damascus, even though President Asad was not showing
sufficient leadership and had underestimated the extent of
Arab and international concern about his policies. The U.S.
wanted the investigation into Hariri's murder to be credible;
it would "go where it goes." Welch observed that if the
Syrians had nothing to fear as they maintain, they should
cooperate fully with the investigation.

UNILATERAL MOVES ON WESTERN SAHARA WILL BE REJECTED
-------------- --------------




9. (C) Welch noted that Algeria was an important player in
the region, with an important voice, and that we hoped to see
improved relations between Algeria and Morocco and greater
cooperation throughout the Maghreb. On the Western Sahara,
Welch said the U.S. continued to support a political solutionQ the UN framework. There was no disposition in Washington
to insert ourselves in finding a solution. Baker was a
heavy-weight in the U.S. system, and we were all disappointed
that his efforts to resolve the issue of the Western Sahara
did not bear fruit. The U.S. continued to want increased
security and stability in the area and was urging Morocco to
develop its autonomy ideas. Better Moroccan-Algeria
bilateral relations in our view would improve the overall
environment for resolving the Western Sahara issue.


10. (C) Lamamra argued that Algeria had really hoped the
Baker Plan would succeed. He offered that the 1988
communiquQ issued by Morocco and Algeria announcing the
resumption of their diplomatic relations called for the
respect of previous agreements, further integration, and a
referendum for the Sahrawis living in the Western Sahara.
Under the Baker Plan, given the influx of Moroccans who would
have been able to vote, it was arithmetically possible for
Morocco to win the envisaged referendum. He also suggested
that it would have also been possible to extend the period of
autonomy under the Baker Plan. There was much opportunity
for forging a creative solution, stressed Lamamra. Morocco's
rejection of holding a referendum and of self-determination
did not help. Unilateral decisions of this nature would
automatically be rejected by the Polisario. It was important
that the UN remain fully involved in resolving the status of
the Western Sahara so as not to send the wrong message to
Morocco.


11. (C) Lamamra argued that recognition by 74 countries of
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was evidence that the
international community had grown tired of Morocco's
stalling. The enemy for Morocco was no longer the Polisario
on the other side of the berm; it was the Sahrawis
demonstrating against Moroccan occupation on the western side
of the berm. Lamamra said he hoped the UNHRC would be able
to visit the Moroccan side of the berm and observe the
situation. A/S Welch said the U.S. supported access for
human rights organizations. Asked for Algeria's assessment
of other key nations' roles on the Western Sahara, Lamamra
dismissed France as being completely in the Moroccan camp and
Spain as being only marginally less unreliable due to its
ambivalence and thQct that the Western Sahara was a
domestic issue in Spain.


12. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this message.

ERDMAN