Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS456
2006-03-18 08:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

DARFUR: BOUTEFLIKA TELLS NEA A/S WELCH ALGERIA

Tags:  PREL PHUM SU AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3966
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #0456/01 0770810
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180810Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0539
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000456 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM SU AG
SUBJECT: DARFUR: BOUTEFLIKA TELLS NEA A/S WELCH ALGERIA
READY TO WORK WITH U.S. FOR A SOLUTION


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000456

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM SU AG
SUBJECT: DARFUR: BOUTEFLIKA TELLS NEA A/S WELCH ALGERIA
READY TO WORK WITH U.S. FOR A SOLUTION


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Darfur was one of the main subjects covered in a
two-hour meeting March 14 between NEA Assistant Secretary
David Welch and President Bouteflika (other subjects reported
septels). A/S Welch stressed President Bush's personal
interest in Darfur and U.S. concern at the continued violence
and deteriorating humanitarian situation. We wanted to shift
the mission to a UN mandate with a role for Arab and Muslim
countries. The UN mandate would increase the mission's
financial resources and bring in other contributors. We were
not promoting NATO intervention, but rather NATO logistical
support and assistance. Bouteflika reviewed what he termed
Sudan's gradual progress, with Algerian encouragement, away
from sponsoring terrorism to becoming an Arab and African
country with its own problems. Bouteflika agreed that a
large part of the AU, including Algeria, now supported
re-hatting the peacekeeping mission; suggested it would work
best if Khartoum did not see the UN role as a U.S.
initiative; and offered Algeria's good offices to bring
President Bashir on board. A/S Welch said the U.S. was in
touch with Libya and Egypt as well, and was counting on
Bouteflika to help. Bouteflika assured Welch that he would
speak to Bashir and try to bring him around. End Summary.

GROWING CONCERN ABOUT DARFUR
--------------


2. (C) A/S Welch, accompanied by Ambassador and DCM, raised
the deteriorating situation in Darfur with President
Bouteflika, observing that the suffering of the Sudanese
people was on President Bush's mind. There appeared to be
some misunderstanding in the Arab world about U.S. intentions
in Darfur. We were not seeking to intervene, but we did not
think the AU could handle the mission on its own and we
doubted Khartoum intended to calm the situation. Shifting
the mandate to the UN would increase the financial resources
available as well as attracting other contributors. In
response to Bouteflika's question about the Arab role, Welch
said the U.S. wanted Muslim countries to contribute,
including Arabs. We were not looking for NATO to intervene
directly, but NATO could play a helpful supporting and
planning role. The U.S. wanted to end the violence while
preserving Sudan's sovereignty.


3. (C) Bouteflika said the AU was in charge of the Darfur
issue, but the AU lacked the means to maintain the mission.
If the AU could not handle the mission, there would have to
be a UN role. The AU had come close to a split over this and
had decided to give Sudan until the next AU summit in
September to settle the problem, but Bashir was being unwise
by playing to the street and seeking to present Darfur as a
confrontation with the U.S. Bashir, he said, would not be
able to content himself with the support of Libya against a
large part of the AU that wanted the UN involved. Bouteflika
recommended a step-by-step approach with the Sudanese,
working for UN involvement without letting Khartoum think of
the UN's role as a U.S. demand.

SUDAN NO LONGER A TERRORIST STATE
--------------


4. (C) Bouteflika recalled that when he first took office in
1999, Sudan was still supporting terrorism in Algeria. He
said he had asked President Bashir who made Sudan's policy,
him or Hassan Turabi? Algeria had worked with Bashir
gradually to end Turabi's influence, and had then promoted an
end to the conflict with the south by engaging Garang and
convincing Bashir that Garang was not a secessionist.
Bouteflika said he was willing to use Algeria's channels with
the Sudanese to help the U.S., but the U.S. must be clear
about its goals in Sudan. Bouteflika noted he had played a
similar role with Libya, and had managed to always be fair to
both the U.S. and the Libyans. If the U.S. wanted good
relations with Sudan, Algeria could help. Bashir, he
asserted, was essentially motivated by power, not ideology,
so it should be possible to make a deal with him.

WORKING WITH KEY ARABS
--------------


5. (C) A/S Welch said the U.S. was also in touch with Libya
and Egypt, which along with Algeria we considered to be the
key Arab voices on this issue. We were counting on Algeria
to help. Bouteflika said he would "speak frankly" to Bashir,
who believed that internationalizing Darfur would undermine
his regime. Bouteflika would try to try to create trust and

ALGIERS 00000456 002.2 OF 002


turn Bashir around. Sudan, he noted, was no longer an
exporter of terrorism, but rather an Afro-Arab state with its
own unique problems. Working together, it should be possible
to change Sudan's position.


6. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this message.


7. (U) Minimize considered.
ERDMAN