Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS455
2006-03-18 07:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

BOUTEFLIKA TELLS A/S WELCH KHARTOUM SUMMIT AND

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV KPAL AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #0455/01 0770741
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180741Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0536
INFO RUEHXX/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000455 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KPAL AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA TELLS A/S WELCH KHARTOUM SUMMIT AND
HAMAS SHOULD MOVE FROM "NO, NO, NO" TO "YES, YES, YES" ON
PEACE

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000455

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KPAL AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA TELLS A/S WELCH KHARTOUM SUMMIT AND
HAMAS SHOULD MOVE FROM "NO, NO, NO" TO "YES, YES, YES" ON
PEACE

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During a two-hour meeting March 14 with President
Bouteflika, NEA Assistant Secretary Welch raised Hamas,
noting that the international community had made clear to
Hamas what it needed to do. Arab support for that message,
including at the upcoming Khartoum Arab summit, would be
critical. Welch predicted that it would be difficult for
Hamas to change, and stressed that the Arabs should help us
put maximum pressure on Hamas while protecting the
Palestinian people. Bouteflika said that Fatah was Algeria's
historic Palestinian partner, Algeria was not enthusiastic
about radical Islamist parties. He therefore had put off
responding to a request by Hamas' leadership to visit
Algiers, though he was mulling the need for Arabs to send
Hamas a message. Yet Algeria supported democracy in the Arab
world, and respected the Palestinian people's choice.
Israel, Bouteflika insisted, had contributed to Hamas'
electoral victory by acting unilaterally, thereby undermining
Fatah, but Fatah was also to blame for its "management
scandals." Bouteflika said "radical parties" were better off
in the opposition. If Hamas wanted to be the governing
party, it would have to change its positions and accept the
2002 Beirut Arab peace plan. Recalling the historical
development of Arab policies, Bouteflika commented that he
had been part of the Arab generation that called for pushing
Israel into the sea in the 1960s, but the results had been a
disaster. Realpolitik demanded a two-state solution, and the
upcoming Khartoum summit would be an opportunity to
underscore the Arab world's consensus on the need for peace.
In response to A/S Welch's comment that he hoped this month's
Khartoum summit would not repeat the "three no's" (no peace,
no recognition, no negotiations) of the infamous 1967
Khartoum summit, Bouteflika recalled that he had represented
Algeria at Khartoum in 1967, pithily noting the 2006 summit
would hopefully move from "no, no, no" to "yes, yes, yes" on

peace with Israel.


2. (C) Turning to assistance, A/S Welch said the U.S. will
support the Palestinian people but without supporting Hamas,
and would like Algeria to do the same. Second, we would
maintain a distinction between Hamas and Abu Mazen, whom we
would continue to back. Bouteflika said if Algeria had to
choose, it would also support Abu Mazen, though he did not
commit to cutting off assistance to a Hamas-headed PA.
Commenting on the request to visit Algiers by Hamas'
leadership, A/S Welch observed that he was not sure exactly
what Hamas represented. Hamas leader Khalid Mishal had not
been elected to anything, and may be more focused on Islamist
goals than Palestinian interests. Bouteflika cautioned that
we should not say this publicly since it was important to
downplay religious conflicts in the aftermath of the Danish
cartoon controversy. Otherwise the U.S. risked giving
Al-Qaida more recruits. A/S Welch said he took the point,
adding that he expected Bouteflika would find it more
difficult to get Hamas to say yes than to get Washington to
say yes. Bouteflika concluded that religion can be dynamite
and must be treated extremely carefully. End Summary.

SENDING HAMAS A MESSAGE
--------------


3. (C) Visiting NEA Assistant Secretary C. David Welch,
accompanied by Ambassador and DCM, called on President
Bouteflika March 14 at the El Mouradia Palace (discussion of
Sudan, Iran, Iraq, Syria/Lebanon, and the Western Sahara
reported septel). A/S Welch began by noting Russian
President Putin's March 10 visit to Algiers, and said he
assumed Bouteflika and Putin had discussed the visit of a
Hamas delegation to Moscow. Recalling that the PLO had first
declared its willingness to accept Israel's existence at the
1988 Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers, Welch
commented that in some ways we were now facing a similar
moment. The international community had made clear to Hamas
that it must recognize Israel, end violence, and accept the
Palestinians' past agreements. This was not just rhetoric:
if Hamas said yes, it would change the situation totally.
But since it would not be easy for Hamas to say yes, this
would likely take some time. Until then, it was essential
for the international community, including the Arabs, to
maintain maximum pressure on Hamas while protecting the
Palestinian people. A/S Welch said his meeting with
Bouteflika was timely since he knew the issue would feature
prominently at the Khartoum Arab summit later this month.


4. (C) Bouteflika responded that Fatah was Algeria's
historic partner. Algeria was "not enthusiastic" about
radical Islamist parties and was "not eager" to have


relations with Hamas. He said a delegation of Hamas leaders
had requested to visit Algiers, but he was taking his time in
responding. That said, since Hamas had visited Muscat and
Riyadh, it was harder to say no to a visit to Algiers.
Despite its reservations about Hamas, Algeria supported
democratic elections in the Arab world and respected the
choice of the Palestinian people. Since Algeria based its
relations with other states on the principle of
non-interference in their internal affairs, it would continue
to provide assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

WOULD PREFER HAMAS IN OPPOSITION
--------------


5. (C) Bouteflika asked rhetorically why the Palestinians
had chosen Hamas. Israel, he said, had been too slow in
resolving the problem, and Israel's unilateral policies had
undermined Fatah. Israel's withdrawal from Gaza could have
been done in a way that left the impression of coordination
with Fatah, but instead it had destroyed Fatah's mystique and
exacerbated discontent over Fatah's "management scandals."
Palestinians had indeed voted to punish Fatah, but they had
also voted for Hamas in order to send a signal to the
international community that they were not "on their knees"
and were ready to continue to fight to end the occupation.


6. (C) Bouteflika said he would have preferred for Hamas to
remain in opposition to Fatah, where they could do or say as
they wished. There were two ways to handle Hamas: either
ignore them, which would not be good for the Palestinians, or
talk to them and tell them that if they wanted to maintain a
radical stance, they must be in the opposition. If, however,
they wanted to be in power, they would have to play by the
rules of the international system, or find themselves
isolated.

FROM THREE NO'S OF KHARTOUM TO THREE YESES
--------------


7. (C) Bouteflika said he wanted to review some history.
Algeria had never established any relations with Israel,
although Bouteflika had shaken Ehud Barak's hand at the
funeral of Hassan II. But Algeria considered its recognition
of a Palestinian state in 1988 as conveying de facto
recognition of Israel as well. Reflecting on his own
political evolution, Bouteflika admitted that he belonged to
the generation of Arab leaders who had called for pushing
Israel into the sea in the 1960s. "We know what came of
that," he commented. "It was a disaster." Today,
realpolitik required the existence of two states, and "thanks
to the U.S.," a Palestinian state was now a genuine
possibility. If Hamas wanted Algeria's assistance, it would
"have to help us help them." Although Fatah was Algeria's
historical ally, it had made too many mistakes. This was not
Abu Mazen's fault, however, and Bouteflika said he would tell
Hamas at the Khartoum summit that Abu Mazen was still the
Palestinian president. Not only Putin should send a message
to Hamas, they should hear it from Arab leaders as well.
Bouteflika reiterated that he did not like Hamas, but had to
respect the Palestinians' democratic choice. Referring to
his national reconciliation charter in Algeria, Bouteflika
said his approach was to bring in the moderate Islamists
while keeping the extremists away.


8. (C) A/S Welch agreed with Bouteflika's description of the
political situation, adding Bouteflika would likely find it
easier to bring America to say "yes" than to get Hamas to do
so. Recalling the process of convincing the PLO to accept
Israel's existence, Welch predicted that it will be even more
difficult for Hamas to change. A/S Welch said he hoped the
March 28-29 Khartoum summit would not produce more no's.
Bouteflika recalled that as Foreign Minister, he had
represented Algeria at the infamous 1967 Khartoum summit that
produced the Arabs' three no's (no peace, no recognition, no
negotiations). Now, however, the Arabs will say "yes, yes,
yes" by reiterating their support for the 2002 Beirut Arab
summit peace plan, which the Arabs had reaffirmed at the 2004
Tunis summit and the 2005 Algiers summit. Bouteflika assured
A/S Welch that he would do his utmost at Khartoum to see that
the Arabs reaffirmed their support for peace through
negotiations. Hamas must not be allowed to introduce any new
element into the Middle East equation.

SUPPORT PALESTINIANS, ABU MAZEN
--------------


9. (C) A/S Welch said the U.S. believed we must support the
Palestinian people. We would not punish them for their
democratic choice. We would do this without supporting
Hamas, however, and wanted Algeria to do the same. Welch
added that he also expected the U.S. would continue its


relationship with Abu Mazen. It was essential to maintain
the distinction between Abu Mazen and Hamas. Bouteflika said
if Algeria had to choose, it would choose Abu Mazen.


10. (C) A/S Welch noted that he still was not sure what
Hamas represented. If Khalid Mishal, who had not been
elected to anything, led a delegation to Algeria, Bouteflika
might find him more interested in Islamist goals than
Palestinian ones. Bouteflika advised Welch to downplay
religious conflict, commenting that in the aftermath of the
Danish cartoons, it was important not to exacerbate Muslim
sensitivities. Doing so would only provide Al Qaida with
more recruits. Bouteflika concluded that "religion can be
dynamite," and must be handled extremely carefully.


11. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this message.
ERDMAN