AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAMAS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000408

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IS AG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAMAS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
BEDJAOUI

REF: STATE 34709

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Ambassador drew on reftel points on the
Israeli-Palestinian situation in a March 5 meeting with
Foreign Minister Bedjaoui (discussion of Sudan, Western
Sahara, NDI visas reported septel). Ambassador stressed the
importance of the international community maintaining a
common position toward Hamas, adding that the Arab League
should send Hamas the same message. The Ambassador said a
two-state solution was the only way to achieve Palestinian
goals, but it was difficult to see how a two-state solution
could be achieved when one party did not recognize the
existence of the other. The U.S. would not abandon the
Palestinian people and would try to find a way to continue
humanitarian assistance, but we had to review our assistance
due to legal requirements not to provide aid to a terrorist
organization.


2. (C) Bedjaoui responded that the Palestinians were deeply
disappointed in the peace process, their situation had
deteriorated in the thirteen years since Oslo. Hamas was a
product of Israeli intransigence; Israel had lost the
opportunity to negotiate with Palestinian moderates.
Bedjaoui said he was nonetheless optimistic that Hamas would
change once it was in power. The Foreign Minister added that
the U.S. should not emphasize its view of Hamas as a
terrorist organization, since this implied that the majority
of Palestinians supported terrorism. Agreeing that both
sides had legitimate concerns, Bedjaoui noted Israel feared
destruction, but Palestinians were afraid they would lose all
of their land to settlements. Ambassador concluded that
violence strengthened hawks on both sides, making security
the key question rather than how to make peace. This worked
against Palestinian interests. Bedjaoui commented that the
Israelis and Palestinians should not be left to themselves,
they needed help to make peace. The U.S. should not cease
assistance to the PA, since Hamas would be obliged to change
its policies. End Summary.

ARAB LEAGUE SHOULD SEND MESSAGE TO HAMAS
--------------


3. (C) In a wide-ranging March 5 meeting with Foreign
Minister Mohammed Bedjaoui, Ambassador drew on reftel points
intended for the Arab League ministerial to underscore the
importance of the Arab League sending a message to Hamas that
it must accept the Quartet's three conditions of recognizing
Israel, ending violence, and accepting the PA's past
agreements. Ambassador stressed that the U.S. had left the
door open to Hamas if it changed its policies. The two-state
solution envisioned by President Bush was the only way for
the Palestinians to achieve their goals. But it was
difficult to see how there could be progress toward two
states if one party refused to accept the existence of the
other. It would not help the Palestinians if Hamas thought
it could maintain international support for the PA without
changing its position. Ambassador noted that some
Palestinian leaders were saying that the PA would go bankrupt
within a few months unless Hamas changed quickly.


4. (C) Bedjaoui observed that Hamas had come to power
democratically because the Palestinians were deeply
disappointed in the peace process. In the thirteen years
since the Oslo agreements, conditions in Palestine had
deteriorated. Hamas, he asserted, was the product of Israeli
intransigence. Israel had squandered its opportunity to
negotiate with Palestinian moderates. Nevertheless, Bedjaoui
said he was optimistic that the responsibilities of being in
power would force Hamas to change. Hamas would come around,
but it could take some time for them to do so. The five
weeks that Hamas had to form a government meant that the new
Palestinian government would be formed in synch with Israel's
elections. Ambassador responded that the Arab League and
Algeria could help expedite the process of change in Hamas'
position, since the PA's financial situation would become
desperate very quickly. Bedjaoui commented that as the new
rulers, Hamas was obliged to meet the expectations of the
international community.

OLMERT "MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION"
--------------


5. (C) Bedjaoui said he had seen Ehud Olmert at a Barcelona
Mediterranean Dialogue meeting in December, and Olmert had
made a good impression. Bedjaoui did not meet Olmert one on
one, but he watched the Israeli engage others. EU Commission
Foreign Affairs Chief Solana had also told the Arabs present

that Olmert was a reasonable person. People on both sides
needed to be able to change, Bedjaoui said. Ambassador and
Bedjaoui agreed that the role of women could be critical in
promoting peace.

ASSISTANCE DILEMMA
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador noted that the U.S. was well aware of the
humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people and, as
Secretary Rice has said, would not abandon them. We were

SIPDIS
required, however, to review our assistance to the PA because
U.S. law barred providing assistance to a terrorist
organization. Bedjaoui said this was a great dilemma. The
U.S. was a great country with a wonderful constitution. It
must not allow itself to treat an entire people as
terrorists. Bedjaoui commented that he had been pleased with
the U.S. reaction the first couple days after the Palestinian
election, but then noticed a change. It was a mistake to
stress publicly the U.S. view of Hamas as a terrorist
organization, since this was equivalent to saying that the
majority of Palestinians supported terrorism. Bedjaoui added
that he was glad the U.S. had not yet stopped its assistance.
Ambassador reminded that the U.S. had welcomed the fact that
the Palestinians had held a peaceful and free election and
saw the outcome essentially as a reaction to Fatah corruption
and incompentence. The same Palestinian people had also
given Mahmoud Abbas, running on a platform of peace and
negotiations with Israel, a solid majority. Thus, to meet
Palestinian aspirations, Hamas would have to change its
positions. If it did not, the Palestinian people would vote
them out of office.

MUTUAL FEARS OF DESTRUCTION
--------------


7. (C) Turning to Hamas' record of terrorism, Bedjaoui
suggested that Hamas had not killed women and children
because they were bloodthirsty, but because the negotiations
were blocked and settlements were expanding. Ambassador
responded that suicide bombings had undermined the peace
process by changing Israeli public opinion toward the
Palestinians whom they came to see as bent on Israel's
destruction. Violence had the effect of making security the
key issue instead of how to make peace. Bedjaoui said Israel
feared its destruction, but Palestinians feared the expansion
of settlements to the point that Palestine ceased to exist,
while many Arabs still believed Israel's goal was a Jewish
state stretching "from the Nile to the Euphrates." There was
an urgent need to build confidence between the parties. The
international community could not leave Israelis and
Palestinians to themselves, but must help them make peace.
Ambassador and Bedjaoui agreed that both sides had legitimate
concerns that needed to be addressed.
ERDMAN