SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S VISIT TO ALGIERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000401

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA A/S WELCH AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER AG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S VISIT TO ALGIERS

Classified By: DCM Marc Sievers, Reasons 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) Assistant Secretary Welch, Embassy Algiers and our
Algerian hosts very much look forward to welcoming you to
Algiers. President Bouteflika is interested in continuing
the dialogue you began in New York last September, and there
is indeed much to discuss. Prime Minister Ouyahia and
Foreign Minister Bedjaoui are also important interlocutors
with their own views to convey. The U.S.-Algerian bilateral
relationship continues to develop rapidly across the board,
as demonstrated by our recent senior USG visitors, including
Secretary Rumsfeld, FBI Director Mueller, U/S Dobriansky, and

SIPDIS
USEUCOM Commander Jones. Your visit comes at a particularly
appropriate time to engage with the Algerian leadership on
the broad range of NEA issues, as Algeria prepares to pass on
the Presidency of the Arab League, remains engaged in a
dialogue with Iran, and considers the implications of a new
approach to the Western Sahara.

BOUTEFLIKA VERY MUCH IN CHARGE
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2. (C) President Bouteflika has resumed his usual frenetic
pace, and while we still do not know the true state of his
health, he is fully engaged and in charge, as demonstrated by
the visits in the next two days of President Putin and South
Korean President Roh, as well as visits in the past several
weeks by Brazilian President Lula, the Portuguese Prime
Minister and UK Foreign Secretary Straw. In parallel to his
foreign affairs activism, since his December 31 return from
medical treatment and recouperation in France, Bouteflika has
overseen the implementation of his national reconciliation
plan, with the latest steps including the publication of the
implementing ordinances and initial releases of prisoners
held on terrorism charges. Bouteflika has taken a big risk
in implementing such a broad release of former terrorists,
with a total of about 2,600 slated to go free, but he appears
confident that his initiative will turn the page once and for
all on Algeria's national tragedy. While Algerian human
rights organizations and NGOs representing survivors of
terrorism have complained about Bouteflika's approach, our
sense is that the vast majority of Algerians remain hopeful
that Bouteflika's gamble will succeed.


3. (C) So far, there are not even hints of criticism from
the military leadership, which appears optimistic that they
will be able quickly to finish off any terrorists still in
the mountains once the six month period offered them to
surrendor has passed. (The military leadership is also no
doubt pleased by the fact that the implementing ordinances
for national reconciliation specifically preclude any legal
action against members of the security forces.) The Algerian
military's focus is increasingly shifting to the threats from
instability and lack of effective governance in the vast
desert of the Trans-Saharan region, and especially northern
Mali. The Algerian military's strategic conception of the
problem jibes closely with our own, opening new and promising
opportunities for U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism and military
to military cooperation.

MOROCCO AND WESTERN SAHARA
--------------


4. (C) Despite Ambassador Kherbi's predictable complaints to
you about Van Walsum's report to the Security Council, you
will likely find an openness in Algiers to new thinking about
the Western Sahara. Foreign Minister Bedjaoui told
Ambassador earlier this week that he thought the Polisario
leadership was "tired" and ready to engage in direct
negotiations with Morocco on autonomy. Bedjaoui also
suggested such talks might be more productive if held out of
the spotlight and away from the region, perhaps in Geneva or
New York. We do not know for certain if Bouteflika shares
Bedjaoui's analysis, but your visit will provide an excellent
opportunity to sound Bouteflika out. If Polisario-Morocco
negotiations get started, we expect Algeria would be prepared
to play a helpful supporting role, provided it is not cast as
a party to the dispute, but rather as a neighbor with
important interests at stake.


5. (C) There is considerable frustration here about what
they see as Morocco's walking away from a referendum as the
key element of the formula for resolving the Western Sahara,
and there is annoyance over Morocco's sour response to the
Lugar mission as well as to Rabat's tendency to blame all its
problems on Algeria. That said, however, there is no real
animosity toward Morocco among the Algerian leadership, even
if some elements of the Algerian media seem determined to fan
the flames. Last year's initially promising efforts to
improve Moroccan-Algerian relations collapsed in the summer,
but Bouteflika has been careful in his recent public remarks

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to avoid offending Morocco, and GOA officials frequently
opine that Algeria has no bilateral differences with Morocco
aside from the Western Sahara. They do, however, tend to see
the Moroccan border as a problem, since they claim smuggled
drugs and counterband now flow into Algeria from Morocco and
would increase in volume if Algeria officially reopened the
border before putting into place appropriate security
measures.

IRAQ AND IRAN
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6. (C) Although Algeria strongly opposed our decision to
invade Iraq, Algeria was generally helpful when it was on the
Security Council, supporting the transfer of sovereignty as
well as the need for MNF-I. As Arab League President,
Algeria backed the Iraqi national dialogue conference in
Cairo, and has been supportive of a follow-on meeting in
Baghdad. Prime Minister Ouyahia recently told CODEL Hoekstra
that the U.S. "should get out of Iraq militarily, but not
yet" since he thought a premature U.S. withdrawal would
result in civil war. The deaths of two Algerian diplomats who
were kidnapped in Baghdad last August remains a sensitive
issue, and while they maintain contacts with Iraq through
their ambassador resident in Amman, they apparently have
decided not to restaff their embassy in Baghdad until
security conditions improve. The GOA was an advocate of
Sunni empowerment and an Iraqi national unity government
before it became U.S. policy, and your interlocutors will be
very interested in your assessment of the situation.


7. (C) Algerians are well aware that Iran was a primary
outside supporter of terrorism in Algeria, at the peak of the
armed Islamist attempt to seize power in the early 1990s, a
particularly cruel twist since Algeria had maintained cordial
ties with Iran after the Islamic revolution. Algeria broke
relations with Iran at the time, and only restored them
during Bouteflika's first term. Along with the usual NAM
rhetorical attachment to redressing Western predominance and
Arab sensitivities about Israel's nuclear program, it may be
precisely their bitter experience with Iran's trouble-making
capacity that is making the Algerians so cautious about
dealing with the Iranian nuclear dossier in the Security
Council. They have cautioned us that if we move toward
imposing sanctions, Iran will respond through proxies to
escalate crises in Iraq and Lebanon. According to media
reports, Ahmadinejad sent Bouteflika a letter earlier this
week, and the two presidents met on the margins of the UNGA
in New York. Bouteflika, Ouyahia and Bedjaoui will all be
interested in engaging on how to handle Iran, but you are
likely to find them convinced that a slow and cautious
approach is the best way to proceed.

HAMAS AND SYRIA
--------------


8. (C) Algeria has long been a strong supporter of the
Palestinian cause and is one of the few Arab League members
consistently to deliver on its commitments of assistance to
the PA. The Algerians were as surprised as anyone by the
extent of Hamas' electoral victory, but they have since made
clear to us that they do not agree with our approach of
seeking to isolate Hamas until it meets the three conditions
set by the Quartet. Instead, they tend to argue that being
in power will force Hamas to moderate its position, and that
we should be patient. Algeria supports the road map and the
Beirut summit peace plan, but they often come across as blind
to Israel's security dilemmas, instead suggesting that Israel
has no reason to fear being destroyed. While Algerian
officials often say that Algeria sees all terrorism anywhere
in the world as a threat to Algeria, they make exceptions for
Hamas, PIJ, and Hizballah, which they regard as liberation
movements, not terrorists. Foreign Minister Bedjaoui even
told the Ambassador this week that the U.S. should avoid
publicly emphasizing its designation of Hamas as a terrorist
organization since this implied that the majority of
Palestinian voters were supporters of terrorism. We believe
it will be useful for you to explain our sense of where the
Israeli-Palestinian nexus is headed and the critical need for
pressure on Hamas to accept the Quartet's conditions.


9. (C) Lastly Syria: in his meeting with Senator Lugar last
August, Bouteflika claimed Bashar al-Asad was convinced the
U.S. was out to get him, and he offered Algerian good offices
if they could help reduce tensions between the U.S. and
Syria. He also urged the U.S. send Bashar a message to
reassure him that we did not seek to overthrow his regime.
Algeria nevertheless voted in the Security Council for Syria
to cooperate fully with the Mehlis investigation, and much of
the Algerian press has been highly critical of Syria's
behavior in Lebanon. Bouteflika in particular will be

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interested in hearing your views on Syria and Lebanon,
including your assessment of the internal political situation
in Syria.
ERDMAN