Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS340
2006-02-28 14:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

NEA/MAG DIRECTOR'S DISCUSSION OF SAHRAWI REFUGEES

Tags:  PREL PBTS PREF PHUM AG WI UN 
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RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0712
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000340 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CAIRO FOR REFUGEE COORDINATOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS PREF PHUM AG WI UN
SUBJECT: NEA/MAG DIRECTOR'S DISCUSSION OF SAHRAWI REFUGEES
WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS BOUGUERRA

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000340

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CAIRO FOR REFUGEE COORDINATOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS PREF PHUM AG WI UN
SUBJECT: NEA/MAG DIRECTOR'S DISCUSSION OF SAHRAWI REFUGEES
WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS BOUGUERRA

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) During visiting NEA/MAG Director Jordan's February 26
courtesy call on MFA Multilateral Relations Director General
Bouguerra, the latter engaged in spirited discussion of
UNHCR's unilateral decision to cut food assistance to Sahrawi
refugees and argued that a new census could not be carried
out because it touched directly the political issues at the
heart of the Western Sahara dispute. (Discussions on Iran's
nuclear program, a Security Council seat for Venezuela, and
Algeria's candidacy for the Peace Building Commission
reported septels).

DISAGREEMENT ON A CENSUS OF SAHRAWI REFUGEES
--------------


2. (C) Noting that Jordan had just returned from a visit to
the refugee camps near Tindouf, Bouguerra said that the
quantity of food aid for the refugees was insufficient and
that UNHCR's unilateral decision to reduce the provision of
assistance from 165,000 to 90,000 refugees was unfair and
unacceptable. In this regard, Bouguerra said Algeria had
received a UNHCR delegation a few days earlier and had used
this meeting to press Algerian concerns.


3. (C) Jordan and Ambassador said there needed to be a
census of Sahrawi refugees in order to establish the correct
level of food assistance. Ambassador said that in making the
case for assistance, governments had to have accurate and
credible figures they could provide to their legislative
bodies responsible for funding such programs. With refreshing
frankness, Bouguerra argued the issue was not simply
technical in nature. It was political and went to the heart
of the Western Sahara issue since it bore directly on the
question of self-determination and who could participate in a
self-determination vote. In this regard, the Western Sahara
refugee situation was unique and could not be compared to
other refugee situations. He argued that in conjunction with
the Baker Plan, the UN had estimated the number of Sahrawi

voters at 128,000. Why couldn't the UNHCR use "its own
figure" which, when combined with non-voting age Sahrawis,
brought it up to the 165,000 level that has been the figure
used up until recently? As for legislative bodies asking for
more precise numbers, the GOA's contacts with other
governments suggested somewhat lamely that no country has
been required to produce exact figures.


4. (C) Reflecting discussions he had during his visit to the
camps, Jordan said there was concern about the lack of
accountability for food donations and other resources at the
camps. Allegations of pilfering were common, and the stocks
at the warehouses were not well managed by the Red Crescent.
The lack of food stocks was precipitating a crisis since more
food was withdrawn each month than deposited. Stocks are
maintained for 90,000 refugees, according to Jordan, but the
withdrawals were based on the 165,000 refugee figure. The
solution, stressed Jordan, was a true census to resolve all
doubts about the number of refugees present. This was the
only refugee population in the world that refused a census.

SAHRAWI CASE UNIQUE IN GOA EYES
--------------


5. (C) Returning to his earlier argument, Bouguerra said the
Sahrawis were a unique case of decolonization in the world.
The refugee population, he explained, was also the core of
the electorate for any referendum on the future status of the
Western Sahara. Any registration of the population was thus
by definition political. UNHCR could not mix the politics of
a referendum, such as envisioned by the Baker Plan, with the
distribution of food. Refugee issues should not complicate a
political solution, even if such a solution was at an
impasse, declared Bouguerra.


6. (C) Jordan said the U.S. understood that the fate of the
Western Sahara was a sensitive political problem. For the
U.S., food distribution in the camps was a technical matter
that required resolution. The U.S. wanted to mobilize the
international community to meet the needs of the refugees,
especially after the recent flooding in the area. However, a

clear, precise figure of need was necessary for donating
partners. It was too important to the refugees to let these
issues remain unresolved. The question of a census would
continue to surface, stated Jordan. Even though for the U.S.
it was a technical issue, it called into question fundamental
political issues for the Sahrawis.

CENSUS REQUIRES A POLITICAL SOLUTION
--------------


7. (C) Bouguerra noted that holding a census was a political
question for the Algerians as well. A census required a
political solution. The question of identifying the
electoral care had to come ahead of extant refugee matters.
As the host country, Algeria gave more aid to the Sahrawis
than anyone, added Bouguerra. The unilateral cutback in
assistance, based on a population of only 90,000, would
increase the burden on Algeria. The World Food Program,
emphasized Bouguerra, had never told Algeria there was a food
distribution problem in the camps. "If these problems exist,
we should know," he added. It was important to separate
propaganda from the serious.


8. (C) Ambassador said the U.S. was very cognizant of the
humanitarian needs of the Sahrawis. The U.S. has been one of
the largest donors for a period of many years and would
continue to provide such humanitarian assistance. Ambassador
noted that the Department of State had approved his
recommendation to provide $ 50,000 in supplemental emergency
food assistance. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had also just
approved an additional request for $1.3 million to fund the
transportation of UN emergency relief items to the Sahrawi
refugees. Bouguerra thanked the Ambassador, noting the
dimensions of the catastrophe were large. Algeria
appreciated the assistance.


9. (U) William Jordan did not have the opportunity to clear
this message.

ERDMAN