Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS2050
2006-11-28 16:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:
FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN SAHRAWI REFUGEE CAMPS: A
how-toVZCZCXYZ0004 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHAS #2050/01 3321644 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 281644Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2433 INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1443 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8499 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5867 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2005 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1519 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0395 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6375 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2791 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0407 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0378
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 002050
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREF PHUM PBTS PREL AG
SUBJECT: FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN SAHRAWI REFUGEE CAMPS: A
DIRE SITUATION?
REF: ALGIERS 2025
Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 002050
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREF PHUM PBTS PREL AG
SUBJECT: FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN SAHRAWI REFUGEE CAMPS: A
DIRE SITUATION?
REF: ALGIERS 2025
Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) During a November 16-17 trip to the Tindouf region of
Algeria, visiting NEA/MAG Algeria desk officer and poloff met
with Sahrawi Red Crescent Society (SRCS) President Yahia
Bohubaini and with UN World Food Program (WFP) representative
Keddi Abdellah to discuss the status of food distribution in
the Sahrawi refugee camps. Both Bohubaini and Abdellah
painted a grim picture and said that reserve food stocks for
the refugees were depleted.
2. (C) Bohubaini led a tour of the virtually empty SRCS food
distribution center serving the camps around Tindouf. He
said the United Nations provided lentils, sugar, flour and
cooking oil to the refugees but cautioned that the quantities
supplied were at best sufficient for meeting "survival
needs." He asserted that many refugees were anemic and
malnourished. (In a separate meeting, Tindouf UNICEF director
Leila Bent-Mustapha echoed this concern as it applied to
children.)
3. (C) Bohubaini also shared with us the Polisario's version
of how this situation came to pass. According to Bohubaini,
WFP and UNHCR made the "unilateral" decision in August 2005
to reduce its estimate of refugees in need of feeding from
158,000 to 90,000, the latter figure representing the "most
vulnerable." The Polisario rejected this decision, and
Bohubaini continued to issue 158,000 rations, even though WFP
scaled back its aid. The rest of the rations came from the
normal reserve stock in the SRCS distribution center.
Starting in March 2006, however, WFP increased its aid to
125,000 rations per day, and Bohubaini scaled back the SRCS's
issuance of rations to match that number. In August, the WFP
decided to reduce its reserve stock to zero, planning to
replenish the stock fully at the initiation of a new
UNHCR/WFP food-supply program in January 2007.
4. (C) WFP representative Abdellah's assessment of the status
of food distribution paralleled Bohubaini's, though there
were some significant differences. Abdellah believed that
the SRCS continued to distribute food to all 158,000 refugees
that it claimed resided around Tindouf, thereby exacerbating
the problem of low food reserves. Because of the lack of
reserve stocks and sometimes tardy WFP deliveries, he said,
the WFP office in Tindouf dedicated the emergency money in
its budget to purchases of foodstuffs on the local market.
This was considerably more expensive and there were no
quality assurances. He further remarked that the Algerian
government refused to allow a census of the population in the
camps unless it was organized as part of a broader plan to
resolve the political status of the refugees. Abdellah noted
that the SRCS also received direct bilateral assistance that
was not under the control of WFP.
COMMENT
--------------
5. (C) It is clear that food distribution at Tindouf remains
troubled by confusion, poor management and possibly fraud.
The assessments by Bohubaini and Abdellah of the availability
of food stocks for refugees were grim but not alarming, since
neither suggested that starvation was a cause for concern.
While both maintain there is no reserve stock of WFP-funded
food in the SRCS distribution center, they acknowledge the
irregular receipt of bilateral food aid, albeit of
inconsistent quantity and nutritional value. Most striking
is the confusion between SRCS and WFP about the type and
quantity of food being distributed and the number of refugees
receiving it.
6. (C) Our conversations with WFP in Algiers confirm that
disagreement continues between WFP and UNHCR over the
appropriate population figure to use in discussing renewal of
the food-supply program for the Sahrawis. It appears clear
that a process of registration of the refugee population at
Tindouf is necessary to make the WFP program there both
accountable and effective. We recommend renewing the call to
register the inhabitants of the Tindouf camps to reduce waste
and possible fraud in the distribution of WFP food aid.
FORD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREF PHUM PBTS PREL AG
SUBJECT: FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN SAHRAWI REFUGEE CAMPS: A
DIRE SITUATION?
REF: ALGIERS 2025
Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) During a November 16-17 trip to the Tindouf region of
Algeria, visiting NEA/MAG Algeria desk officer and poloff met
with Sahrawi Red Crescent Society (SRCS) President Yahia
Bohubaini and with UN World Food Program (WFP) representative
Keddi Abdellah to discuss the status of food distribution in
the Sahrawi refugee camps. Both Bohubaini and Abdellah
painted a grim picture and said that reserve food stocks for
the refugees were depleted.
2. (C) Bohubaini led a tour of the virtually empty SRCS food
distribution center serving the camps around Tindouf. He
said the United Nations provided lentils, sugar, flour and
cooking oil to the refugees but cautioned that the quantities
supplied were at best sufficient for meeting "survival
needs." He asserted that many refugees were anemic and
malnourished. (In a separate meeting, Tindouf UNICEF director
Leila Bent-Mustapha echoed this concern as it applied to
children.)
3. (C) Bohubaini also shared with us the Polisario's version
of how this situation came to pass. According to Bohubaini,
WFP and UNHCR made the "unilateral" decision in August 2005
to reduce its estimate of refugees in need of feeding from
158,000 to 90,000, the latter figure representing the "most
vulnerable." The Polisario rejected this decision, and
Bohubaini continued to issue 158,000 rations, even though WFP
scaled back its aid. The rest of the rations came from the
normal reserve stock in the SRCS distribution center.
Starting in March 2006, however, WFP increased its aid to
125,000 rations per day, and Bohubaini scaled back the SRCS's
issuance of rations to match that number. In August, the WFP
decided to reduce its reserve stock to zero, planning to
replenish the stock fully at the initiation of a new
UNHCR/WFP food-supply program in January 2007.
4. (C) WFP representative Abdellah's assessment of the status
of food distribution paralleled Bohubaini's, though there
were some significant differences. Abdellah believed that
the SRCS continued to distribute food to all 158,000 refugees
that it claimed resided around Tindouf, thereby exacerbating
the problem of low food reserves. Because of the lack of
reserve stocks and sometimes tardy WFP deliveries, he said,
the WFP office in Tindouf dedicated the emergency money in
its budget to purchases of foodstuffs on the local market.
This was considerably more expensive and there were no
quality assurances. He further remarked that the Algerian
government refused to allow a census of the population in the
camps unless it was organized as part of a broader plan to
resolve the political status of the refugees. Abdellah noted
that the SRCS also received direct bilateral assistance that
was not under the control of WFP.
COMMENT
--------------
5. (C) It is clear that food distribution at Tindouf remains
troubled by confusion, poor management and possibly fraud.
The assessments by Bohubaini and Abdellah of the availability
of food stocks for refugees were grim but not alarming, since
neither suggested that starvation was a cause for concern.
While both maintain there is no reserve stock of WFP-funded
food in the SRCS distribution center, they acknowledge the
irregular receipt of bilateral food aid, albeit of
inconsistent quantity and nutritional value. Most striking
is the confusion between SRCS and WFP about the type and
quantity of food being distributed and the number of refugees
receiving it.
6. (C) Our conversations with WFP in Algiers confirm that
disagreement continues between WFP and UNHCR over the
appropriate population figure to use in discussing renewal of
the food-supply program for the Sahrawis. It appears clear
that a process of registration of the refugee population at
Tindouf is necessary to make the WFP program there both
accountable and effective. We recommend renewing the call to
register the inhabitants of the Tindouf camps to reduce waste
and possible fraud in the distribution of WFP food aid.
FORD