Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS1308
2006-07-16 05:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

INTERIOR MINISTER TELLS AMBASSADOR ALGERIAN

Tags:  PREL PTER PHUM KDEM AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #1308/01 1970543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160543Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1583
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6227
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1377
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1887
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1332
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2714
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001308 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM KDEM AG
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER TELLS AMBASSADOR ALGERIAN
POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT SUPPORTS A THIRD TERM FOR BOUTEFLIKA

REF: A. ALGIERS 1259


B. ALGIERS 1249

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001308

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM KDEM AG
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER TELLS AMBASSADOR ALGERIAN
POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT SUPPORTS A THIRD TERM FOR BOUTEFLIKA

REF: A. ALGIERS 1259


B. ALGIERS 1249

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) True to his hard-liner reputation, Interior Minister
Zerhouni told Ambassador during his July 10 farewell call
that Algerians supported reform but needed time to absorb and
adapt to economic and political change. Forcing the pace
could cause problems and set back the entire process.
Zerhouni also said he was "more or less" satisfied with the
implementation of the national reconciliation process;
claimed not very convincingly there had been no/no increase
in terrorist attacks, despite press reporting to the
contrary; and argued that President Bouteflika had
overwhelming support for a third term from the Algerian
people and the political class and that amending the
constitution was a practical way to accommodate this new
situation and permit a further consolidation of the reform
process. Zerhouni also claimed Islamist forces in Algeria
were now accepting republican values and that for most people
released under the National Reconciliation Charter, their
respecting the prohibition from engaging in political
activity was not simply a tactical retreat. In an extended
exchange on visas for NDI personnel, Zerhouni took a
predictably hard line, making clear he was part of the "cons"
in an ongoing internal debate over the NDI program in
Algeria.

ZERHOUNI: FASTER REFORM PACE
RISKS SETTING THE PROCESS BACK
--------------


2. (C) During Ambassador's July 10 farewell call, Interior
Minister Yazid Zerhouni thanked Ambassador for his work in
expanding U.S.-Algerian relations and asked if his views on
Algeria were different from when he arrived, following three
years in-country. Ambassador, who was accompanied by
Pol/Econ chief, said his views had not changed appreciably:
Algeria was on a good path toward democracy and open markets,
but there was still much that needed to be done to complete
this journey. At the same time, Ambassador added, he had

frankly hoped Algeria would have accelerated the pace of
reform. Faster progress was essential to growing the
economy, creating jobs, and alleviating unemployment.
Zerhouni, pushing back, argued that Algeria needed time to
absorb and adapt to economic and political change. Algeria
was actually going "a bit fast" on the reform front, he
argued unconvincingly, and forcing the pace risked
instability and setbacks for the reform process. The most
important thing was that Algerians had the "spirit of reform"
and supported reform efforts, provided the pace of reform was
within the limits of their society. Algeria knew from the
Eastern European experience that undertaking reforms too fast
could be a big mistake.

ZERHOUNI CLAIMS REFORMS MAY BE
SLOW BUT ARE NOT BEING BLOCKED
--------------


3. (C) Acknowledging that it was up to each country to decide
its reform pace, Ambassador again noted the link between
reforms and addressing economic and social grievances and
pointedly asked about blockages in the reform process.
Zerhouni responded with a straight face that while there was
hesitation and even slowness in the reform process, there was
not any "blockage." Ambassador replied that that had not
been his personal experience. Four days before a planned
announcement of a $1.7 humanitarian community center project
financed by the U.S. government and several U.S firms present
in Algeria in collaboration with the Wali of Ouargla, the
Wali had informed us, without further explanation, that he
had encountered "resistance" to the project and it thus could
not go forward. The problem had been resolved in the
meantime, Ambassador said, thanks in part to his expression
of concern to President Bouteflika in their farewell meeting,
but it was an example of certain groups were able to block
projects of benefit to the community and the country.

ZERHOUNI "MORE OR LESS" SATISFIED
WITH NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS
--------------



4. (C) Ambassador asked Zerhouni for his assessment of the
security situation in the context of the national
reconciliation process, noting his impression that there
seemed to be a a significant uptic in terrorist activity
(outside Algiers and major cities) in recent weeks. Zerhouni
claimed the national reconciliation process was going well in
terms of disarming and reintegrating former terrorists and he
was "more or less" satisfied with the process. To date, 200
had turned themselves in and the number was considerably
higher if one included family members (that were not
terrorist themselves, but part of the support network.)
There continued to be much suspicion and mistrust of the
armed Islamists and the government, and the offer of pardon
had created a lot of dissension among the terrorists
themselves. Asked how many terrorists were active, he said
only a few hundred remained -- which was significantly down
from the 27,000 armed Islamists fighting the government in

1996.

NO UPTIC IN TERRORIST ATTACKS,
ZERHOUNI CLAIMS UNCONVINCINGLY
--------------


5. (C) Notably without providing any details, Zerhouni
dismissed outright but not very convincingly the suggestion
that there had been an increase in terrorist attacks, either
in number or audacity. Despite recent attacks involving the
killing of five civilians on a beach two hours west of
Algiers, the killing of two shepherds, several kidnappings,
and several attacks in Tizi Ouzou and Jijel Wilayas, Zerhouni
dismissed this as misreporting by the press. He contended
that there had been no increase in the number of attacks or
victims compared to the previous year, while acknowledging
that cell-phone detonated explosives attacks in Boumerdes
were a new phenomenon and that there had been explosives
attacks against military units. Downplaying these attacks,
he said some of the attacks had been "diversionary" moves to
draw troops away from areas where they were moving in on
terrorist hide-outs. Zerhouni also argued that the resort to
bomb attacks was in fact a sign of the increasing weakness of
the terrorists; it was much easier to set a car bomb on a
timer than to undertake an armed attack on security forces.
Ambassador said that regardless of what was actually
happening on the ground, most Algerians he had spoken with
believed there had been an increase in terrorist violence
recently and were very concerned. Zerhouni did not disagree,
but blamed it on misleading press reports (without of course
acknowledging that greater government transparency in
providing accurate information would help address this
problem.)

POLITICAL CLASS AS WELL AS PEOPLE
SUPPORT THIRD TERM FOR BOUTEFLIKA
--------------


6. (C) Asked about the constitutional revision process,
Zerhouni said that the most important issue to be decided was
presidential term limits. There was broad support for a
third term for Bouteflika from both the political class and
from the Algerian people. The situation had improved
significantly during Bouteflika's first two terms and the
people wanted this improvement to continue under Bouteflika.
In addition, given Bouteflika's broad popularity, no serious
presidential contender from the political class was ready to
take him on. It therefore suited their needs for Bouteflika
to have a third term, during which they could prepare for an
eventual presidential contest with someone other than
Bouteflika as the candidate to beat. A third term would also
give more time for political and economic reforms to be
consolidated. A "point of no return" on reform was first
needed. Amending the constitution to permit a third term was
a practical response to this situation, he contended.

ISLAMISTS ARE NOW ACCEPTING
REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRATIC VALUES
--------------


7. (C) Asked if Islamist tendencies were on the rise and
whether the Algerian people had been "vaccinated" against a
return to armed Islamic violence, Zerhouni said the Islamists
were now accepting "republican Islamism" and understood they
had to accept republican ideas and express their views in a
democratic system. Ambassador noted that the release of
Islamist extremists under the National Reconciliation Charter
some months ago had initially led to some former terrorists

and radical leaders making public, political statements in
violation of the terms of the Charter., They had then
suddenly ceased making such statements, which the public had
found very worrisome. Ambassador asked if the Islamists'
change of heart was a tactical retreat or a genuine change of
heart. Zerhouni said there might be "some" for whom it was a
tactical retreat. But for most, it would be very difficult
to return to the hard life of the "maquis" (terrorist network
in rural and mountainous regions.) The Charter, he said, had
to be implemented as a whole; it was not divisible. Zerhouni
felt it would take time for fighters from the maquis to
digest their new, non-political status. The vast majority,
though, accepted the new environment as permanent.

ZERHOUNI ACKNOWLEDGES HIS SKEPTICISM NDI PROGRAMS
IN ALGERIA, NOTING ALGERIA IS DIFFERENT, DOESN'T NEED HELP
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Ambassador raised our concerns about the difficulties
NDI was having in obtaining visas for its own personnel as
well as for visiting experts and speakers. This was sending
a very confusing and negative signal regarding Algeria's
commitment to democratic development. The NDI program in
Algeria functioned completely a-politically. It worked with
almost all the parties and their deputies on practical ways
to strengthen parties, run campaigns, encourage women's
participation in the political process, etc. and it had won
praise from all of them as well as from Council of the Nation
(Senate) President Bensalah. We viewed the NDI program as
being in direct support of President Bouteflika's publicly
declared policy of working to build real democracy in
Algeria. The recurring problems over obtaining visas and
visa renewals every three months thus sent a very confusing
and negative signal to Washington, for whom democratic
development in the region was a very high priority.
Ambassador said a senior official (NEA DAS Gray) had raised
the visa issue with MFA SYG Lamamra during a recent visit and
had been told that an internal debate was underway within the
Algerian executive over this program. Ambassador suggested
to Zerhouni (as he had to the MFA) that instead of sending
repeated negative signals while the debate was under way,
since the NDI program and its director (Julie Denham) had
been working in the country for over four years now, why not
simply routinely grant the requested visas and visa renewals.



9. (C) Zerhouni confirmed there was an internal debate on
NDI's presence under way within the Administration, making no
effort to hide that he was among the skeptics as to whether
NDI should operate in Algeria. He claimed that he did not
know what NDI was really doing in Algeria. What were its
programs, he asked, noting that he "knew" about NDI's
programs in Latin American and East Europe some years ago and
that if that was what NDI was doing, Algeria did not need it.
In any case, he argued, Algeria was "different" and did not
need "lessons" from anyone in Europe or elsewhere, especially
when it came to organizing elections. Ambassador said he was
personally not familiar with NDI programs in Latin America in
years past, but assured that its activities in Algeria were
completely transparent and worked out jointly with the
political parties and local organizations. Ambassador said
we would be happy to share a list of planned NDI programs.
While Algeria had made progress toward democracy, it still
had a long way to go and could benefit from programs like
NDI's. Zerhouni acknowledged that Algeria had suffered
greatly from colonization and did in fact need to develop its
legal and democratic foundations. But, he repeated, Algeria
was different from other countries where NDI had experience
and NDI programmers in Washington did not have sufficient
expertise, appreciation, or understanding of other countries,
including Algeria. Following an additional exchange about
sending negative signals about Algeria's commitment to
democracy, Zerhouni said he highly respected former Secretary
Albright, the head of NDI, and insisted there was no negative
signal intentionally being sent to Washington on Algeria's
part concerning the NDI visa issue.


ERDMAN