ALGERIA REQUESTS U.S. ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001278

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MARR ML AG LY SU
SUBJECT: ALGERIA REQUESTS U.S. ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTING
MALI AGREEMENT

REF: A. ALGIERS 1243

B. BAMAKO 748

ALGIERS 00001278 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------


1. (C) MFA Director General for African Affairs Chergui
briefed Ambassador July 9 on the recent agreement Algeria
brokered between Malian authorities and Tuareg rebels in
northern Mali (reftels) and asked for a U.S. pledge of
financial assistance for the "Forum on Development" created
by the agreement. The GOA also requested that Embassy Bamako
help explain the benefits of the agreement to the people of
Mali and provide moral support for its implementation.
Ambassador, while making no promises of assistance, noted the
U.S. interest in keeping the Sahel region stable and free of
terrorism and undertook to inform Washington of the GOA
requests. Chergui also told Ambassador of GOA concerns that
Libya could hamper the implementation of the agreement,
leaving the clear impression that U.S. assistance in bringing
the Libyans on board would also be appreciated. Separately,
Chergui told Ambassador Algeria was continuing its efforts to
convince Sudan to accept conversion of the AMIS to a UN force
by the end of the year and expressed optimism that in the end
Sudanese President Bachir would accept UN forces for Darfur.
Post requests guidance from the Department on responding to
the GOA requests for assistance in implementing the Mali
agreement. (End Summary and Action Request.)


2. (C) MFA Director General for African Affairs Smail
Chergui convoked Ambassador July 9 for a briefing on the
recently signed peace agreement between the government of
Mali and the Tuareg rebels (see reftels). Chergui told
Ambassador, who was accompanied by PolEc Chief, that he had
been part of the Algerian team negotiating the agreement.
Chergui said the President of Mali had asked the GOA to
intervene, and the Tuareg rebels agreed to the GOA's
assistance by a referendum vote among the tribes. The GOA
told both parties it insisted on working through "the full
integrity of Mali institutions," a condition that both the
rebels and government accepted prior to Algeria's
involvement.

AGREEMENT CALLS FOR NEW TUAREG SECURITY UNIT IN NORTH MALI
-------------- --------------


3. (C) After Ambassador congratulated the GOA on its success
in brokering the agreement, Chergui said he wanted to draw
U.S. attention to the provisions for creating a special
Tuareg security unit because of its relevance to
counterterrorism efforts in the region. This new security
unit in the north of Mali would be composed mainly of the
Tuareg and would be similar to the arrangement Algeria had
negotiated in Niger some years ago. The security unit would
be subordinate to the Malian military, could be used to fight
terrorism as needed, and would have responsibilities for
patrolling, visitor protection, guarding public buildings,
and assisting the police. Chergui noted it was better to
employ the Tuareg in fighting terrorism than have them sit
around with no source of income and getting into trouble.
Ambassador observed that Niger seemed to have a more
disciplined fighting force against terrorism than Mali.
Chergui agreed, stressing that much work remained in order to
strengthen Mali's forces.


4. (C) Asked what arms the Tuareg would carry, Chergui said
"light arms, like police" and referred Ambassador to a copy
of the French-language agreement, which he handed Ambassador,
for more details. (Note: Embassy provided a copy of the
agreement to NEA/MAG.) Chergui said the central government
could use the new security forces as it wished. Chergui
suggested to Ambassador that the U.S. and Algeria, through
intelligence channels, should work cooperatively over time on
defining and enhancing Mali's cooperation against terrorism.

U.S. FINANCIAL AND MORAL ASSISTANCE VITAL
--------------


5. (C) In addition to the creation of the new security unit,
Chergui drew Ambassador's attention to the economic and
social areas of the agreement, which in part called for the
establishment of a fund to make payments to fighters leaving
the mountains, returning to their families, and turning in

ALGIERS 00001278 002.2 OF 003


weapons. As part of the emphasis on social and economic
development, Mali agreed to issue invitations within three
months to a "Forum on Development". Observing that there was
no running water, roads or sanitary structures to speak of in
Kidal, the focus of the conference would be on developing
this region, home to the Tuareg In the interest of "not
provoking jealousies" in other regions of Mali, Chergui
emphasized that the Forum would not be billed as assistance
to Kidal. Chergui concluded by telling Ambassador the GOA
"counted a lot" on the United States to help fund the
necessary development. Ambassador responded that the U.S.
already provided assistance to Mali and that any assistance
would need to be addressed through the budgetary process.
Chergui stressed that a U.S. pledge of assistance would help
make the Forum a success.


6. (C) Noting that press coverage in Mali of the new
agreement had not been good, Chergui also asked that the U.S.
Embassy in Bamako help explain the agreement to the people of
Mali. "Anything you could do would help." Chergui hoped the
U.S. Ambassador to Mali would "diffuse the same message as
the President (of Mali) and help calm the waters." Chergui
explained that the social pact of 1992 in Mali contained many
elements that the central government had failed to implement
due to lack of financial means. It was because of this lack
of attention that some Tuareg went to the mountains.
Thankfully, the number of casualties was limited, and the
movement to the mountains merely brought attention to the
situation and facilitated intervention. Ambassador said he
could make no promises but would convey the GOA request to
Washington. It was in our mutual interest to maintain calm
in the Sahel, deny sanctuary to terrorists, and work together
to strengthen the abilities of Sahelian governments and
militaries to exercise more effective control over their
territories.

GOA CONCERNED THAT LIBYA COULD BE UNHELPFUL
--------------


7. (C) Chergui, stressing the sensitivity of his next point,
expressed concern that Libya could complicate the
implementation of the agreement in Mali. Libya had closed
its consulate, and the Tuareg tribes did not have a favorable
opinion of Qadhafi's "Greater Sahara Initiative." The tribes
themselves told Qadhafi in person of their opposition to it.
Qadhafi's behavior in Timbuktu a couple of months ago --
keeping people waiting for him and then starting a planned
ceremony before the President of Mali had arrived -- had also
left bad feelings, which continued even today. Ambassador
asked if the unrest among northern Mali Tuaregs had spilled
over into Tuaregs in Algeria. Chergui claimed it had not but
added that Algeria was closing its eyes and allowing the
transportation of most goods to the tribal areas across its
border with Mali. This gesture of goodwill was aimed at
bringing peace to the area and reflected Algeria's good
neighbor policy toward Mali and its inhabitants. Chergui
stressed that Algeria's cooperation in these areas, at the
request of the government in Bamako, was being kept quiet.

AGREEMENT MUST SUCCEED
--------------


8. (C) Chergui said the agreement between the Tuareg rebels
and Government of Mali was signed in Algiers in order to
avoid the perception of a national pact that would lead to
animosity between other regions of Mali and the central
government. The Tuareg also did not want to travel to
Bamako. Holding the signing ceremony in Algiers, where
fanfare was kept to a minimum, was a compromise acceptable to
both parties. It went without saying that Algeria needed to
make the agreement succeed, and Chergui welcomed U.S.
assistance to this end.

ALGERIA WORKING TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON SUDAN ON DARFUR
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Ambassador took advantage of his meeting with Chergui
to request the GOA's assessment of the transition to UN
peacekeepers in Darfur. Chergui noted that the Peace and
Security Council of Africa would meet in the coming days and
that a conference of donors was scheduled for later this
month in Brussels. Chergui said the Sudanese President
wanted to make the AMIS stronger, but this was not
sustainable over the longer term because the resources "were
just not there." If support for AMIS was secured into
December, the rehatting of the AMIS to a UN force would be

ALGIERS 00001278 003.2 OF 003


considerably easier. Asked if the upcoming meetings aimed to
provide Khartoum a face-saving way to agree to the rehatting,
Chergui responded in the affirmative. Chergui observed that
the AMIS could not continue to operate without money. By the
end of the year, it would be clear to everyone, including
Bachir, that the African Union could no longer handle the
operation on its own, and the pressure on Sudan to accept the
UN force would be substantial. Algeria would continue to
work toward this end.


ERDMAN