Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06AITTAIPEI889
2006-03-17 09:14:00
UNCLASSIFIED
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S STRATEGY AND THE NUC/NUG

Tags:  PREL TA KPAO TW 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0889/01 0760914
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170914Z MAR 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9152
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4887
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6083
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000889 

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DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A


TAGS: PREL TA KPAO TW
SUBJECT: CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S STRATEGY AND THE NUC/NUG

REF: TAIPEI 744

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000889

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A


TAGS: PREL TA KPAO TW
SUBJECT: CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S STRATEGY AND THE NUC/NUG

REF: TAIPEI 744


1. Summary: This cable is one of two looking at the local media and
commentators' take on Taiwan's current political environment. This
one focuses on reactions to Chen's announcement in his January 29
Lunar New Year's Day speech that he "is seriously considering [the
options] to abolish the National Unification Council (NUC) and
National Unification Guidelines (NUG)." The earlier cable (reftel)
focused on Ma Ying-jeou's recent discourse. This cable is an
analysis by one of AIT's senior local employees in the Press Section
of Taiwan media commentary over the last month. End summary.


2. The controversy over whether President Chen might abolish the NUC
and NUG set off a political firestorm domestically, across the
Taiwan Strait, and between Taiwan and the United States. One of the
many reasons given by Chen's aides to explain his move was that it
was aimed primarily at rebutting KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's comment
in an interview with "Newsweek" last December, in which Ma revealed
that the KMT's ultimate goal is to seek "eventual unification with
China." Deputy Editor-in-Chief Tsou Jiing-wen of Taiwan's biggest
daily, the pro-independence "Liberty Times," described Chen's
motives vividly in a February 17 front-page story entitled "[The
Decision to] Abolish the National Unification Council and National
Unification Guidelines Will Be Moved Ahead and Made Within
February." According to the article, last December's 3-in-1
elections in Taiwan marked an important watershed for Chen.


3. "Ma's unification comment worried Chen deeply," Tsou wrote.
"Chen was concerned that Ma's comment would mislead on the direction
of Taiwan's public opinion and slowly dissipate the Taiwan-centered
consciousness formed and consolidated over the past six years.
Likewise, Chen believes that such a development will confuse the
international community and lead it to believe that once Ma wins the
presidential elections in 2008, both sides of the Taiwan Strait will
move gradually from the moderate route of maintaining the status quo
to eventual unification," Tsou added. Chen thus decided that as a
national leader, he needed to come out to correct the distorted
situation and consolidate the people's democratic right to freedom

of choice. Most DPP members agreed that Chen's preemptive approach
has reaped the results he desired to achieve. They believe that the
heated island-wide discussions over the past few weeks sparked by
Chen's proposal have again put Taiwan-centered values back in a
clear and new light; even Ma was forced to modify his unification
comment by announcing in a KMT advertisement that Taiwan
independence is included as a possible option for Taiwan people to
decide their future.


4. The pan-Blue camp, however, viewed Chen's motives differently.
KMT Legislator Sun Ta-chien said on a TV talk show that Chen has at
least three strategic schemes in mind behind his move. First, the
proposal could serve as a smoke screen for Chen to divert the media
and Taiwan people's attention away from the DPP's corrupt image and
various scandals. Second, Chen wants to garner relevant resources
in an attempt to replace former President Lee Teng-hui as the
paramount leader of the pan-Green camp. [NOTE: Lee proclaimed the
"special state-to-state relationship" doctrine in 1999, one year
before he stepped down, in an apparent attempt to consolidate his
post-presidential leadership of pro-independence. End NOTE.] Third,
Sun argued, Chen wants to play the martyr to show the Taiwan people
how strenuously he has been trying to fight the overwhelming
pressure from both Washington and Beijing in an attempt to win back
the support of deep-Green followers. Some analysts also speculated
that Chen wants to use this move to keep incumbent Premier Su
Tseng-chang, his potential competitor in the last two years of his

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presidency and the most promising DPP candidate for the 2008
presidential election, on a short leash. It is generally believed
by pan-Blue-inclined commentators that Chen's strategy is to
position himself on the high ground of Taiwan independence, which
would assist him in avoiding criticism of his political ethics and
capabilities by those within his party.


5. Pro-Green academic commentators, on the other hand, believe
Chen's decision to do away with the NUC and NUG was aimed at
establishing a legacy for his eight-year presidency. Lo Chih-cheng,
Director of the Taipei-based Institute for National Policy Research
(INPR),said at an academic forum that "Chen is seeking to leave his
mark on the state of cross-Strait relations after his eight-year
term, and that if he cannot push for Taiwan's independence as he
wants to, at least he can rule out the possibility of unification."
Chao Chien-min, Chairman of National Chengchi University's Sun
Yat-sen Graduate Institute of Social Sciences of Humanities, said
"Chen's cross-Strait policy has shifted from a middle-of-the-road
position back to a more radical stand for reasons including his
quest to leave a presidential legacy, and his wish to gain control
of the issues platform to consolidate his power to eradicate a 'lame
duck image,' following a series of political defeats of his DPP
administration." Chen's core aides emphasized that the abolition of
the NUC and NUG, a card hidden in Chen's sleeve all the time, could
be accomplished by Chen quickly because it is within his power to do
so. Chen allowed the topic to brew for a period of time because he
wanted Taiwan and the international society to understand that
"people's power and decision" is the most essential safety mechanism
for the island. This is also one of the mantras of "justification"
the Chen Shui-bian administration has been chanting to convince
Washington, Chen's core aides added.


6. Jaw Shao-kang, a well-known pro-Blue TV/radio commentator, said
Chen has shown that he can succeed with his plan if he remains firm
and unbending, as evidenced by his determination in holding Taiwan's
first-ever defensive referendum in March 2004 in the face of
overwhelming pressure from Washington.


7. Most commentators had speculated that Chen would choose to
announce his decision to abolish the NUC and NUG on February 28,
when the local stock market would be closed for the national holiday
in commemoration of the 1947 February 28 Incident; the announcement
would thus have a smaller impact on Taiwan's stock trading. Chen
did, as expected, announce following a National Security Council on
February 27 that the NUC would "cease to function" and the NUG
"would cease to apply." Despite the repercussions caused by the
wording with regard to the NUC and NUG, both pro-Blue and pro-Green
commentators said they believe that Chen's announcement has shown
the world that Taiwan's leader can not only participate in, but can
also dominate, the process that defines the status quo in the Taiwan
Strait. Moreover, as journalist Hsiao Hsu-tsen pointed out in a
news analysis in the "China Times," Chen has directly challenged
Taiwan's Constitution in terms of unification with China and has
successfully made the unification/independence argument a major
topic for the campaigning of the presidential election in 2008.


8. Most critics assess that 2006 will not be a calm year for
cross-Strait relations as a number of major cross-Strait events are
due to occur, including: the first anniversary of China's passage of
the "Anti-Secession Law" (March 14); the 10th anniversary of the
1996 Taiwan Strait crisis (March 8-23); the first anniversary of
Taiwan's major demonstration in protest of China's passage of the
"Anti-Secession Law" (March 26); the DPP's grand debates on the
party's cross-Strait policy slated for March and April; the meeting
between U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu
Jintao in April; large-scale U.S. military exercises in the Pacific
this summer; and the DPP's plan to introduce a draft constitution
for Taiwan in June.

KEEGAN