Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA96
2006-01-11 12:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA: POST DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ET 
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P 111249Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8601
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
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RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 ADDIS ABABA 000096 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR G, DRL, S/P, R, AND AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: POST DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY

REF: STATE 191395

Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 ADDIS ABABA 000096

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR G, DRL, S/P, R, AND AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: POST DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY

REF: STATE 191395

Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Ethiopia's May 2005 national elections
delivered a shock to the country's nascent democratic system
for which no one was prepared. Opposition parties'
unexpectedly strong showing frightened the GOE into rolling
back some elements of what had been an unprecedented
democratic opening during the campaign. The results also
emboldened the inexperienced CUD opposition leaders to issue
a premature declaration of victory from which it proved
impossible for them to walk back. With most of the CUD
leadership now in prison and the GOE struggling to control
popular resentment in urban areas, the environment for
promoting democracy has grown more challenging. Nonetheless,
the election results themselves and the process of political
dialogue that post has promoted continue to offer
opportunities. Our key objectives include lowering tensions,
improving human rights, broadening representation and
participation in Parliament, boosting the credibility and
capacity of the National Electoral Board, and increasing
access to the media as well as the quality of public
information. Our strategy must be a mixture of cooperation
and pressure with both the GOE and leading opposition
organizations in order to overcome Ethiopia's culture of
political confrontation and build one based on
consensus-building through compromise. End Summary.


2. (C) Ethiopia is a country with 3,000 years of recorded
history -- and practically no history of genuine democracy.
Millennia of sometimes enlightened, sometimes bloody monarchy
came to an end in 1974 when the Derg imposed a brutal,
Marxist military government. The DERG were in turn forced
out of power after a 17-year armed struggle by the Tigrayan
People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF went on to form
the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
coalition, along with affiliated parties the TPLF helped
organize along ethnic lines. The EPRDF and its principal
leader, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, have ruled this

geographically and ethnically diverse nation since 1991.
While EPRDF leaders originally espoused a Marxist outlook,
once in power the EPRDF begtan laying the foundations for
multi-party democracy, along with an approach to governance
known as ethnic federalism. Under the latter arrangement,
Ethiopia's provincial boundaries were redrawn to reflect
ethnic majorities in each area, and a regional councils were
given new additional authority for local decision-making.
National elections in 1995 and 2000 failed to establish a
true multi-party system however, as alleged EPRDF harassment
and strong-arm tactics prompted most potential opposition
parties and candidates to boycott the polls. In early 2005,
Ethiopia's 547-seat Lower House contained just 12 opposition
MPs.


3. (C) In late 2004, the campaign for 2005 national elections
began in an atmosphere of unprecedented openness. The GOE
engaged in less harassment of opponents than in previous
campaigns, and permitted a revolutionary series of candid
debates on key issues that was broadcast live throughout the
country. Many disparate opposition parties came together in
two large coalitions, the larger Coalition for Unity and
Democracy (CUD) and the smaller United Ethiopian Democratic
Front (UEDF),and both coalitions conducted energetic and
effective campaigns. GOE electoral authorities at the NEB
worked closely with international technical experts and
permitted international observers, including the Carter
Center and European Union Observer Mission (EOM). Polling
day on May 15 was also largely free of major irregularities
until initial returns began to show a surprisingly strong
showing by the opposition. At that point, international
observers reported that significant irregularities began to
occur in the counting process. The opposition at first cried
foul, then claimed victory, and finally launched a barrage of
specific challenges to the announced results. With the help
of international mediation, the GOE established a new process
for resolving electoral complaints whose results ultimately
failed to satisfy either opposition supporters or
international observers. In August, after three months of
political wrangling and demonstrations, the GOE announced
final election results in which the opposition was awarded
over 170 seats. The major opposition coalitions continued to
claim they had won the election; the Carter Center estimated
privately that opposition parties may have been cheated out
of 30-50 additional seats, still far short of a majority.


4. (C) Charge Huddleston and the EU Troika Ambassadors

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facilitated a dialogue between the GOE and opposition leaders
in late September and early October designed to address
concerns about Ethiopia's democratic institutions and
persuade reluctant opposition leaders to join the new
Parliament and regional councils. Major issues in the
dialogue included the GOE's imposition of more restrictive
rules for debate in Parliament following the elections, lack
of opposition access to state media (the only broadcast
media) and the NEB's alleged lack of independence. The GOE
made some promises in each area, but refused to allow
discussion of changes to the NEB board. The dialogue
ultimately broke down over this issue. UEDF leaders decided
that enough progress had been made to justify entering
Parliament, but CUD leaders chose to boycott Parliament as
well as the Addis Ababa Regional Council, which they would
have controlled. The CUD decided in late October to continue
pressing its reform agenda through civil disobedience, but
the situation quickly deteriorated into violent protests that
swept the country. The GOE quelled the unrest, but killed at
least 40 people and imprisoned over 20,000 people in the
process. Among those imprisoned were 25 senior officials of
the CUD as well as other party leaders around the country.
These incidents further increased political tensions and
deepened popular animosity toward the GOE, particularly in
urban areas.


5. (C) Below are key elements of post's strategy for
promoting democracy in Ethiopia, keyed to specific taskings
in reftel.

-------------- --------------
Democratic Deficits and Near-term Benchmarks for Improvement
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Identify the key areas of democratic deficit and the
3-5 most important desired outcomes over the next 6-8 months:

Most democratic institutions in Ethiopian are weak and
subject to political manipulation, and therefore inspire
little public confidence. This lack of confidence in public
institutions -- including the National Electoral Board,
Parliament and the judicial system -- recently prompted key
actors, from political parties to voters themselves, to look
for solutions on the streets, rather than through the
established political process. Post urged opposition leaders
to accept substantial gains made in the imperfect 2005
electoral process and build on them, while at the same time
taking their specific grievances to court. Key party leaders
and the majority of their constituents instead chose a
strategy of confrontation with GOE authorities.

Other areas of democratic deficit are the lack of private
broadcast media, new (often informal) restrictions on private
print media, restrictions on peaceful political activity and
harassment of opposition political organizations, and
inadequate respect for the rule of law as seen in arbitrary
arrests and detention.

Most important desired outcomes over the next 6-8 months:

1) At least 80 percent of elected Coalition for Unity and
Democracy MPs take seats in Parliament and the Addis Ababa
Regional Council;

2) Parliamentary rules revised to offer opposition parties
more opportunities to participate in legislative debate;

3) Appointment of a more independent National Electoral Board
and more effective preparation for local elections in 2006/7;

4) Revision of the media law, increased space for private
media and opposition access to state media;

5) Release of all those detained following November 2005
demonstrations except in those cases where the GOE can
credibly prove criminal acts.

--------------
Six-Month Strategy for Democracy Promotion
--------------


7. (C) What is post's six-month strategy for achieving the
above outcomes?
1) We will continue to promote political dialogue, compromise
and reconciliation through diplomatic contacts and pressure
on the GOE and key opposition leaders. The dialogue will
focus on specific steps to strengthen Ethiopian democratic

ADDIS ABAB 00000096 003 OF 007


institutions and reinforce all parties' commitments to a
successful multi-party system. We will call on intervention
by senior USG officials and other international leaders at
appropriate times to advance the process, both through
private contacts and public statements.

2) We will also seek to build a vocal and powerful
constituency for dialogue -- and opposition participation in
the democratic process -- through contacts with civil society
leaders as well as messages to the general public. We have
begun an initiative to involve influential, independent
leaders from a variety of sectors in a focused dialogue to
build national consensus on Ethiopia's medium- and long-term
path to democracy and development that we are calling
"Envisioning Ethiopia 2020."

3) We will work with other donors in the Development
Assistance Group (DAG) to introduce specific governance
indicators in Ethiopia's next five-year sustainable
development plan, known locally as the Plan for Accelerated
and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). Such
indicators, which will include human rights and democracy
benchmarks, have not been incorporated previously in the
donors' matrix for evaluating GOE performance. Negotiating
them will be difficult, but will they will assist us in
applying steady, low-profile but effective pressure on the
GOE for democratic opening.

4) We will maintain calls for the release of CUD leaders, NGO
leaders, journalists and others detained in connection with
recent political violence. We will work with other donor
governments and technical organizations like the ICRC and
Prison Fellowship to monitor both judicial procedures and
detainee welfare.

5) We will measure Parliament using the Prime Minister's
yardstick. PM Meles said publicly and privately that the GOE
would revise Parliamentary rules if it could be demonstrated
that opposition parties faced a more restrictive environment
than their counterparts did in developed democracies
including Canada, the UK, Germany and India. Post is
cooperating with other donors on a study comparing Ethiopia's
Parliamentary environment with those the PM indicated. With
the study in hand, we will seek to hold the PM to his word
using a calibrated mix of private and public pressure. We
will also cooperate with other donor governments in providing
assistance to Parliament in partnership with a multi-party
steering committee. Such activities will include orientation
for new members, training for women Parliamentarians and
seminars designed to foster a more open, respectful and
cooperative institutional culture. Finally, we will also
seek to increase public access to and confidence in
Parliament through a series of targeted programs.

6) We will similarly engage with the NEB, along with other
donors, to address the organization's technical and political
weaknesses. The Carter Center report, and those of other
international electoral observer missions, will provide
useful analyses for this exercise. We will seek to organize
a high-profile seminar involving representatives from
exemplary African or other electoral authorities. We will
also push the ruling and opposition parties toward a
consultative process on the selection of a new, impartial NEB
Board; the GOE says a new board will be chosen by May 2006.

7) Through the above-mentioned political dialogues and at
other opportunities, we will seek to create space for more
independent, professional and ethical media as well as fair
access for opposition parties and other non-government
viewpoints on state media. Achieving GOE approval for
private broadcast media will be one key goal, as will
supporting the GOE's stated objective of a code of conduct --
one that will still allow media organizations essential
freedoms. The GOE has already agreed to donor assistance in
developing a new media law and code of conduct, which the GOE
has promised will reflect international standards. We will
employ PD programming to train journalists and highlight best
practices.

8) We will encourage both the GOE and the outlawed Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) to resume discussions aimed at
reincorporating the OLF in the legal, democratic system. The
OLF continues to enjoy significant support in the vast,
populos region of Oromia. Its participation in peaceful
political activity and future elections would contribute to a
more representative and legitimate democracy in Ethiopia.


ADDIS ABAB 00000096 004 OF 007


9) Though Ethiopia has not yet come close to qualifying for
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) resources, we will seek to
engage the GOE in detailed discussions on this process that
will make clear the potential rewards for a dramatic
improvement in governance and development policies more
generally.

--------------
Resources and Engagement from Washington
--------------


8. (C) Post's existing USAID budget for democracy and
governance gives us some important tools to work with, as
well as programs already in progress that we can adapt to our
new circumstances. We also cooperate closely with other
large donor countries and institutions in the Development
Assistance Group (DAG) as well as the Ambassadors' Donors
Group. Where we may need additional assistance, however, is
in increasing resources available for public affairs
programming.


9. (C) High-level Department engagement will also be
extremely valuable. A visit from the Secretary, for example,
would allow us to amplify our message and maximize our
leverage. (A visit to Addis would also allow the Secretary
to engage with leaders at the African Union and showcase our
extensive support to this important continental institution.)
The Secretary could recognize our long-standing and
generally successful partnership with the GOE on fighting
terrorism, poverty and HIV/AIDS, while at the same time
pushing for progress on our democracy agenda. Post plans to
inaugurate an American Corner at Addis Ababa's brand new
National Library and Archives on March 7, which would offer a
visiting Department principal to speak to Ethiopians about
the importance of the free flow of information and education
for democracy and development.


10. (C) We would also like to continue to count on periodic
interventions from senior Department officials, including AF
A/S Frazer and U/S Burns, to keep our political talks on
course.

--------------
Major Impediments to Democratic Progress
--------------


11. (C) The greatest obstacle to democratic progress in
Ethiopia is probably the country's undemocratic history and
political culture. Though the enormous turnout in this
year's national elections demonstrated a real thirst for
democracy among this country's 75 million people, there is
practically no tradition of consensus-building and compromise
at the national level (though village elders have long
practiced these skills at the local level.) Political forces
are either in power, or they are not. Political changes has
invariably come in violent waves, usually accompanied by
killings and purges of previous authorities.


12. (C) Many voters in rural areas, unfamiliar with disputed
elections or power-sharing, reportedly concluded from
vociferous opposition attacks during the 2005 electoral
campaign that the GOE was seriously weakened. Post-election
euphoria only reinforced these hopes and created unreasonable
expectations, which in turn prompted CUD leaders to pursue a
maximalist, confrontational strategy to force immediate,
dramatic changes in the GOE. The EPRDF, on the other hand,
was caught off-guard by the strength of anti-government
sentiment and was utterly unprepared for giving up power.
The Meles government's response was to clamp down suddenly
and harshly on the democratic opening it had begun. The
EPRDF now faces a scenario in which its popular support has
likely dwindled further following killings and mass arrests,
so any step towards a more open political system may be seen
by its hard-core supporters as a step toward an exit from
power.


13. (C) Growing ethnic tensions also pose a serious obstacle
to reforming democratic institutions. The EPRDF regime has
long-standing alliances with ethnically-based parties in
nearly all of Ethiopia's diverse regions, but few of these
political organizations formed by the EPRDF enjoy genuine
majority support in their home areas. After 15 years in
power, the EPRDF depends more than ever on a cadre of
Tigrayan officials and supporters that it has deployed
throughout the national and regional governments, as well as
in the Armed Forces. This reliance on a narrow ethnic base
for most sensitive positions has alienated many members of

ADDIS ABAB 00000096 005 OF 007


other large ethnic groups like Amharas and Oromos, and has
created the impression among many that a democratic transfer
of power could lead to the settling of scores against
Tigrayans. This perception is likely to make the current
government less willing to loosen controls over electoral or
political systems, and more likely to use dirty tricks to
undermine serious rivals for power.

-------------- --------------
Other Influential Actors: EU, World Bank, African Union
-------------- --------------


14. (C) PM Meles has told the Charge and others on several
occasions that Ethiopia's march toward democracy must take
place on its own terms -- and will not be dictated by
foreigners. The EU Observation Mission's report and other
international criticism since the May 2005 election have only
hardened this posture. Nevertheless, PM Meles remains
sensitive to the deterioration of his government's formerly
positive international reputation, particularly in Europe,
the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, within Africa. In
addition, Ethiopia remains highly dependent on external
assistance to pursue its development strategy and to manage
chronic balance of payments and budget deficits. While the
GOE (probably rightly) believes it will escape large-scale
cuts in humanitarian assistance, PM Meles and his cabinet are
likely to be concerned about reductions in other assistance
flows, particularly those received in the form of direct
budget support (DBS). The World Bank, Britain, and the EU
are the largest sources of DBS and therefore wield
significant influence over the GOE.


15. (C) The African Union can also exercise some moral
suasion over the GOE, particularly given that the
organization makes its home in Addis. The AU has so far gone
relatively easy on the EPRDF government in public, though AU
Chairman Konare has reportedly been tougher in private. Some
rumors have suggested that the AU might abandon Addis if
there is a significant deterioration in the democratic
climate, though this would be a dramatic and difficult step.


16. (C) Russia and China are both major players in Ethiopia;
the former supplies large quantities of military equipment
and training, while the latter has helped Ethiopia through
aid and assistance to build up the country's infrastructure.
Neither Russia nor China look likely to apply pressure or
offer inducements for greater democratization, however.
Indeed, some have speculated that China might make up some of
the difference in reduced aid levels if Western donors assume
a more critical position on Ethiopia.

--------------
Democracy Promotion the Government Supports
--------------


17. (C) To its credit, the EPRDF government put in place a
constitution and many other institutional underpinnings of
modern democracy during its 14 years in power. During this
year's national election campaign, the GOE allowed
unprecedented freedom for political activity, including a
series of lively debates transmitted live on radio and
television. Most observers believe that the EPRDF expected
the opposition to win far fewer seats than it did in
Parliament; some have suggested that the ruling party would
never have embarked on this democratic opening if they
believed they could lose power. Post continues to believe,
however, that PM Meles is genuinely committed to deepening
Ethiopian democracy but was unprepared for the speed with
which change came. The PM has indicated to the Charge that
he wishes to resume and accelerate democratic reforms, but
clearly wishes to control the velocity and the direction of
democratic change.


18. (C) The GOE has accepted some key elements of
democratization while opposing others. Performance in many
areas has been mixed. For example:

-- Independent political parties have been allowed to operate
and claimed substantial numbers of seats in national and
regional assemblies, but GOE security forces and ruling party
militia have engaged in systematic harassment of opposition
parties.

-- Until the November 2005 demonstrations, Ethiopia boasted
an impressive array of independent -- and generally
pro-opposition -- newspapers. Many of the newspapers urged
opposition leaders to take a hard line with the GOE and

ADDIS ABAB 00000096 006 OF 007


supported public demonstrations. Several editors have now
been charged with treason and their papers blocked from
publishing. Nonetheless, several independent papers continue
to publish. The GOE has promised in principle to approve
licenses for independent broadcast media, but has not
approved any as yet. State media allowed opposition parties
limited access during the election, but have reverted to
government propaganda in the wake of the disputed election
results.

-- The GOE has permitted many civil society organizations
(CSOs) to operate, but has selectively cracked down on some.
Leaders of two such organization are now under arrest in
connection with the November 2005 demonstrations. Others,
including some independent human rights organizations
continue to operate. The GOE allowed international election
observer missions from the U.S., EU and AU to monitor the May
2005 polls, but initially denied domestic observer missions
the same privilege. The GOE also expelled National
Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican
Institute (IRI) personnel during this year's election
campaign. Building the capacity of political parties or NGOs
will thus be very difficult for outside actors.

-- Freedom of expression, particularly, through public
demonstrations, has been especially controversial in recent
months. Hundreds of thousands of opposition supporters were
permitted to gather in Addis Ababa's main square prior to the
May elections. Since that time, however, fearing that such
gatherings would get out of control, the GOE has equated
large public demonstrations with subversion. Demonstrations
in June and November 2005 did indeed cost at least 40 lives
each and led to thousands of arrests.

-- The GOE has agreed to accept capacity-building assistance
from international donors including the U.S. to strengthen
the capacity of Parliament, the media and the NEB. Some
activities have already begun. The challenge will be to
deliver such assistance so that it has a real impact and
takes into account the needs of opposition parties as well as
the GOE.

--------------
Consequences of Making Democracy a Priority
--------------


19. (C) The USG has a broad and strategic relationship with
Ethiopia. Our growing intelligence relationship with the GOE
contributes to our efforts to monitor Islamic extremist
activity in Somalia and Somali regions of Ethiopia. A
cut-off or serious reduction in military assistance and sales
would almost certainly have an impact on this valuable
relationship. How serious that impact would be would depend
on how definitely our relationship with the EPRDF government
is severed. The GOE might simply cease sharing information
for a time if it hopes the problem will blow over, or might
take action against the longer-term U.S. intelligence
presence in Ethiopia.


20. (C) The USG has also enjoyed a cooperative and relatively
successful relationship with the GOE on food security issues,
working together to provide humanitarian aid to millions of
Ethiopians vulnerable to drought and famine and to improve
their long-term ability to maintain their livelihoods. We
have a similarly positive working relationship with the GOE
on treating and stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS. In a region
of characterized by weak and failed states, the GOE has
demonstrated the ability to plan and implement development
policies (though not always optimal) in partnership with
international donors, maintain law and order effectively in
most areas and generally serve as a stabilizing influence on
the region. To the extent that tougher USG criticism or
reductions in assistance weaken the EPRDF politically, there
is a risk that public order could deteriorate, yield to civil
conflict and/or eventual fragmentation of the country. Of
course, there is also the possibility that the EPRDF
government would be replaced by a strong but more enlightened
regime composed of elements of the current opposition.


21. (C) Though PM Meles and his government have made clear
commitments to democratization and have taken a number of
important steps along this road, the GOE is likely to resent
and resist aggressive USG efforts to deepen democracy. Much
will depend, of course, on how we pursue our democratic
agenda. If the USG continues to approach democratization in
Ethiopia resolutely, but within the context of our valuable
overall relationship, tensions should be manageable. In the

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end, GOE officials need us even more than we need them, so
they are likely to burn bridges with the USG only if their
political survival demands it.


22. (C) What are our prospects for promoting democracy in
Ethiopia? The EPRDF has reached an important crossroads.
The current slippage in the ruling coalition's popular
support may convince many in the EPRDF that deepening
democracy and creating impartial institutions will spell doom
for their government. If the dominant group in EPRDF reaches
that conclusion, there is likely little that the U.S. or
broader international community can do to change their
approach. If, however, PM Meles' remains genuinely committed
to democracy -- whatever its outcome -- then a mixture of
engagement and assistance with calibrated international
pressure could help keep Ethiopia moving along the right
path.














HUDDLESTON