Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA897
2006-04-04 09:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

PM MELES TO DAS YAMAMOTO: STAY ENGAGED ON THE

Tags:  ER ET PGOV PREL 
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VZCZCXRO1434
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0897/01 0940958
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040958Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9820
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6850
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000897 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PM MELES TO DAS YAMAMOTO: STAY ENGAGED ON THE
BORDER


Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000897

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PM MELES TO DAS YAMAMOTO: STAY ENGAGED ON THE
BORDER


Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. DAS Yamamoto and party met with Prime
Minister Meles for over two hours on March 30. Meles asked
the U.S. to stay engaged on the border "for the long term;"
reiterated that dialogue is needed for lasting peace; and
said that Ethiopia is "uncomfortable" with the
Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC) as there is no
roadmap for demarcation. Ethiopia has not yet decided if it
will participate in April 29 EEBC meeting but remains engaged
in looking forward to a durable solution. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) DAS Yamamoto, accompanied by AF/E advisor Bill
Schofield, INR geographer Ray Milesky, Charge Huddleston and
DCM (notetaker) spent over two hours with Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi on March 30, primarily focusing on the
Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Acting
Director of Europe and America Almaz Amha also attended. DAS
Yamamoto commended Ethiopia for its participation in the
March 10 EEBC meeting, saying that it changed people's minds
about Ethiopia's commitment to resolve the border, energized
the EEBC commissioners and will help to leverage additional
resources for the EEBC to complete its work. The U.S.
recognizes that technical negotiations are part of the
process and that coherent, logical discussions are needed to
resolve issues of demarcation, to include such issues as
displaced persons. DAS Yamamoto said that demarcation must
result in durable peace and not plant the seeds of future
conflict. The U.S. wants to bring both sides together to
work on both the technical and human aspects of demarcation.
Gen. Fulford's role as a technical expert is to assist the
parties and to held them address specific land, water and
property rights issues as the border is demarcated. DAS
Yamamoto described U.S. engagement as a final chance to reach
durable peace along the border.


3. (C) INR geographer Milesky projected the flyover video
for PM Meles who pointed out some of the areas where the EEBC
made mistakes, such as at the confluence of two rivers or in
the location of a mountain, which led to further mistakes as

the delimitation line was drawn. The PM also commented on
villages that were Eritrean but had been given to Ethiopia
and vice versa, and stated that some areas were militarily
rather than socially significant for Ethiopia. According to
the PM, the EEBC decision exacerbated problems that already
existed and then seemed to blame Ethiopia for some of its
mistakes. The EEBC in making its delimitation decision
wanted both sides to win, the PM said, and so some land was
given to each party; however, they chose the wrong land in
some cases. The result was an "uninformed" decision that
mixed technical and political aspects, according to the PM.
Nevertheless, he said, any logical person could solve this in
24 hours; but a logical person is needed (referring to lack
of Eritrean engagement.)


4. (C) The PM said that the Ethiopian objective is to keep
the U.S. in play on the border issue, and this is why
Ethiopia participated in the March 10 EEBC meeting. However,
its silence at the meeting should not have been construed as
concurrence; rather, Ethiopia preferred to keep silent and
speak up only when useful to advance the process. Ethiopia
is not comfortable with the EEBC. According to Meles, the
"big hole" is Eritrea which is not present at the table and
is not likely to be present soon. What is the point of EEBC
meetings if there is no interlocutor, Meles asked. Political
will is needed to move forward, he said, as both parties have
the technical knowledge and know the terrain. But there are
risks for Ethiopia in moving forward, he added. We can't
trust the EEBC process without a roadmap and without a
commitment from the Eritrean side for dialogue. If Ethiopia
participates in the EEBC meeting at end of April, it will
make clear that demarcation is not possible without
commitment to dialogue, Meles said.


5. (C) Nevertheless, Meles said, no one can force the
parties to agree; even U.S. engagement does not guarantee
success. However, only the U.S. can provide Isaias with "a
ladder to climb down." Isaias can change, eventually, but he
can't be forced to do so. Thus, there is no short term fix,
Meles said, and we will go along with anything that might
lead to peace. We want the U.S. commitment to be engaged for
long term; and we want U.S. the commitment on dialogue for
normalization, Meles stated.

ADDIS ABAB 00000897 002 OF 003




6. (C) DAS Yamamoto underlined that the April 29 EEBC
meeting would be a political meeting and needs political
representation from both sides. This meeting is essential
before the team of surveyors begin their work, he said. Both
sides will need to discuss and resolve problem areas;
aircraft and especially helicopters must be allowed to fly
over the area in order to do the work; and the neutral zone
must be respected, with no military build up.


7. (C) PM Meles asked if, assuming that Gen. Fulford were to
facilitate a meaningful discussion, and the survey took
place based on the basis of a roadmap, would technical
discussions be deferred until the survey work is completed or
would issues be resolved as the work progressed? DAS
Yamamoto responded that at the April meeting the parties
themselves could decide on a common mechanism to use to
resolve such issues. Gen. Fulford assists by bringing the
weight of the U.S. and the international community to bear,
and the EEBC can provide adjudication. Schofield added that
Fulford can expand technical talks in order to resolve
issues. The challenge, Meles asserted, is to have technical
discussions that lead to the ultimate prize: lasting peace.
This cannot be imposed from the outside, he added; we (the
parties) have to want it. Technical decisions may be
perfect, he said, but may not lead to peace. The starting
point is political will. For Ethiopia there are risks: it
can't trust the EEBC as it has made mistakes in the past; the
entire process lacks a roadmap; and there is no commitment on
the Eritrean side for dialogue. It would seem that we will
"stumble into" talks. Meles said that Ethiopia would not go
into talks where the EEBC makes the ultimate decisions. If
there is no commitment to dialogue at the London talks, Meles
said, there is no point in doing a survey or discussing
technical issues. Ethiopia will have to say "no," and in
that case it is preferable to say so early on so as not to
raise unrealistic expectations, Meles said.


8. (C) DAS Yamamoto again stressed that demarcation must
lead to lasting peace. Neither the U.N. nor the
international community want another war. There must be a
permanent solution; fundamental causes must be addressed.
There is a commitment to find that sustainable peace by the
U.S., the EEBC, and the international community. It must
include discussions on technical issues and normalization.


9. (C) PM Meles stated that should Ethiopia go to London it
will make clear to the EEBC and to Eritrea that it is not
possible to go forward without a commitment to dialogue.
Ethiopia is committed to demarcation; it accepts delimitation
despite its problems; the way forward is based on dialogue.
This is the only reason to go to London, Meles said.
Otherwise the meeting will be "a blind alley" in which "we're
going to pay more."


10. (C) DAS Yamamoto assured PM Meles that the U.S. is
committed to assisting the parties to address the problems of
demarcation. It may be possible to define a clear roadmap
through private Ethiopia-Eritrea-U.S. talks. Meles responded
that the road map to peace is a "red line:" no one can force
us; real commitment is needed from both sides. Playing
chicken with Isaias doesn't work; don't anger or appease him.
He can't be punished or bribed. Don't use all your guns now;
sooner or later Isaias will make up his mind and then
everything can be done. Eritreans are not our enemies. We
are not out to get Isaias as we have no energy to spare on
this. The U.S. should not take his antagonisms personally;
he has nothing against the U.S. but wants to irritate you.
He has no influence on Ethiopia now; we will not respond in
kind to his game. When he gets down to his last card he will
come to his senses.


11. (C) Comment. Although Meles remains wary of the EEBC
process, he is engaged in looking forward to resolution of
the border. Meles indicated his willingness for Ethiopia to
attend the April 29 London meeting. The clear "roadmap" for
Ethiopia is "technical discussions" to resolve displaced
person issues and property/water rights, and "mornalization
talks" by the witnesses to resolve the causes of war and
build trust, the former led by General Fulford and the latter
by the U.S. Meles is still wary of the process and fears
that Ethiopia may lose more in an undefined process.
Nevertheless he will stay engaged with the U.S. as an

ADDIS ABAB 00000897 003 OF 003


interlocutor, at least for the time being.


12. (U) DAS Yamamoto cleared this cable.



HUDDLESTON