DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TEKEDA ASKS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000615

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TEKEDA ASKS FOR
CONSULTATION PRIOR TO EEBC

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 542


B. ADDIS ABABA 385

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. Ethiopia's State Minister
for Foreign Affairs Tekeda and Charge had a good exchange on
the question of Ethiopia's attendance at the March 10 EEBC
meeting with Tekeda promising to consider responding
favorably to the EEBC invitation but with a caveat that the
final decision would be made after consultations with
Washington. Tekeda asked that DAS Yamamoto or AS Frazer
visit prior to the EEBC and lay out a more detailed road map.
Tekeda accepted Charge's assurances that we understood and
intended to meet Prime Minister Meles' three bottom lines,
namely: technical discussion on border demarcation;
facilitation by General Fulford; and a dialogue on
normalization of relations. Charge argued that Ethiopia
should attend the EEBC because there the demarcation
discussions would be decided in accordance with international
practice, e.g. Nigeria/Cameroon and Fulford would become the
facilitator. We could not provide guarantees on a dialogue
on normalization, but our full intention was to ensure that
these talks occurred before final demarcation in order to
ensure a lasting peace. Although Tekeda raised first the
condition that Eritrea allow UNMEE to return to full
operations, Charge stated that this was not a precondition.
The UNMEE issue would be addressed in the context of the EEBC
meeting. Tekeda reviewed the history of the issue in detail.
His major concern is that the USG might not have the process
fully crafted and therefore there is room for failure, and
worse the possiblity of putting Meles and Ethiopia in an
untenable position. A visit by Yamamoto or Frazer is needed
to reassure Meles and to demonstrate USG good will and
commitment. A phone conversation between Meles and Dr.
Frazer might suffice also. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On February 28, Charge and deputy pol/econ counselor
met with Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr.
Tekeda Alemu. Advisor to the State Minister Gerehiwot Redai,
Acting Director General for Europe and North America Girum
Abay (ambassador-designate to Italy),and Counselor for
Europe and America Ayalew Mamo, accompanied Minister Tekeda.

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TEKEDA MAKES HIS CASE
--------------


3. (C) "We are not nervous; we are confused," he said.
Tekeda asserted that the current crisis had begun with
Eritrea's "heightening" of tensions, leading to the passage
of UNSCR 1640. Ethiopia had pursued a "rational response" by
"immediately" withdrawing its troops away from the border to
December 2004 positions, whereas Eritrea "took additional
steps and defied" the resolution. "Any logical person would
have expected steps to be taken against Eritrea," he said, as
it was "absolutely clear which party did not comply." The
USG's call to wait one month prior to making any changes to
the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea (UNMEE),while the United States sought to address
the impasse between Ethiopia and Eritrea, was "a relief," he
said, as UNSC members did not know how to respond to
Eritrea's violations. A request for the GOE to issue
permanent identification to 70-80 UNMEE staff members (who
had been expelled from Eritrea to Ethiopia) underscored
Eritrea's continued violation of the cease-fire agreement, he
said, adding that the GOE was concerned that issuing such
identification would be tacit recognition of "a fait
accompli." Such violations were "a gun pointed at our head
by Eritrea; that's where the confusion comes from."


4. (C) Continued Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE posed a
possible obstacle to Ethiopia's attendance of the next
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC),Tekeda said:
"Honestly speaking, it would be very difficult for us to go
while the cease-fire agreement is in tatters." He noted that
UNMEE was supposed to assist in demarcation, and that the two
Algiers accords included one on the boundary, and another on
the cease-fire. While UNSCR 1640 was supposed to "restore"
the inviolability of the Temporary Security Zone, "there is
no indication" that Eritrea intends to reverse its
restrictions on UNMEE. Eritrea was getting assurances that
it could continue to violate international agreements, he
said, as it was "being rewarded" for "insulting" the
international community and the UN SYG. "Ethiopia will not
move unless we see some indication that Eritrea will move
away from the precipice," Tekeda said. Tekeda expressed
concern about the GSE's February 27 public statement. (NOTE:
the Eritrean MFA statement at www.shabait.com states, inter

alia, that Eritrea "does not recognize or accept"
"deviations" from the EEBC's "final and binding" decision.
END NOTE.) Citing the February 22 Witnesses' statement,
Tekeda said that Ethiopia wanted to see concrete actions from
Eritrea to reverse restrictions on UNMEE, Tekeda said.
Charge responded that as much as the United States desired
this as well, this had never been a precondition to
participation in the EEBC, nor had it ever been raised by the
Prime Minister in previous discussions.


5. (C) Turning to a more serious concern, Tekeda recalled
that rather than provide the USG with a memorandum on its
views of the border, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had raised
Ethiopia's concern with A/S Frazer on January 20 (ref B) that
there was "absolutely no way the boundary commission can take
the lead" in addressing the disposition of disputed areas.
Instead, "the lead of the parties must be fulfilled," which
could only be done through dialogue. Tekeda agreed that
"technical discussions" could replace the GOE's insistence on
"dialogue," if it meant that both parties were meeting and
exchanging views. Demarcation and normalization of relations
"must go hand in hand," he said.


6. (C) Ethiopia needed assurances from the USG that the EEBC
would conform to Ethiopia's redlines, Tekeda said,
particularly as the peace process was now "completely in your
hands." "We are absolutely beholden to you, so we must be
clear where we are heading," he said. Tekeda noted that
prior to the February 22 meeting of the Witnesses to the 2000
Algiers accord, the GOE was concerned that "it might not be
in line with what we were hoping for." Indeed, he added, the
first draft of the February 22 Witnesses' statement was
"awful": "We came across it, and we were disappointed."
Saying that the level of trust between Ethiopia and the EEBC
was "extremely, extremely low," Tekeda complained that the
GOE had received an invitation to attend the March 10 EEBC
meeting even before the Witnesses had convened on February
22, and that the EEBC was demanding a reply within 5 days, at
the same time that Eritrea continued to violate the Algiers
accord. (NOTE: The EEBC's invitation to FM Seyoum, dated
February 24, requests that parties reply by March 2. END
NOTE.) Charge explained that the deadline was driven by the
UNSCR convening to assess progress in response to UNSCR 1640
on March 15.

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CHARGE MAKES THE CASE
--------------


7. (C) Charge responded that the Prime Minister had told Dr.
Frazer that the primary issue was not the demarcation of the
border but the overall peace settlement. Unfortunately, to
some degree this was the perception that much of the
international community had held until recently. For this
reason some had considered Ethiopia as going beyond final and
binding delimitation and demarcation by calling for
normalization of relations that was not contained in the
Algiers Agreement. Now, however, Ethiopia had taken a number
of steps that were causing the "tide to change". Foremost
among these steps was the decision to drop the words "in
principle" when referring to final and binding, the
redeployment of troops in response to UN Resolution 1640, and
the facilitation of Dr. Frazer's visit to the border. Now,
all that was needed to change perceptions was for Ethiopia to
attend the EEBC. Although the date might seem early, there
needed to be concrete progress prior to the March 15 date for
consideration by the UNSC of next steps on the border.


8. (C) Charge explained that the USG is well aware of
Ethiopia's bottom lines which are: technical discussions
(Meles refers to these talks as dialogue but that is
confusing as what is meant is technical discussions); the
facilitation of General Fulford; and a dialogue on
normalization. Like Ethiopia our objective was a lasting
peace. On the first bottom line issue: there will be
"technical discussions". It is our intention to proceed in
accordance with international practice, as PM Meles had
recommended. We were specifically looking at border
resolutions for Israel/Jordan and Nigeria/Cameroon, the later
which the PM himself had noted. In addition, we had a CD-ROM
that indicated where the delimited border divided houses and
towns; surely this condition must be addressed to ensure a
lasting peace. In our view, discussions should begin in the
eastern sector of the border, where delimitation divided more
than 30 villages; resolving this would certainly require
discussions. On the second bottom line: General Fulford
would be the facilitator, thereby addressing the Ethiopian
concern that the President of the EEBC was biased. However,
it is our opinion that he is not biased and truly wants to

resolve this issue as a legacy for his life's work. On the
third bottom line issue: We do not have guarantees on a
normalization dialogue, but we clearly understand that these
talks must take place if there is to be a lasting peace. The
Prime Minister had agreed that normalization was not in the
Algiers Accord but rather had been an idea that had in the
end not become a reality. The basic issue then was timing on
the normalization dialogue that would need getting agreement
from Isaias. We understood Ethiopia's position that dialogue
would have to take place before final demarcation.

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FURTHER BILATERAL CONSULTATION WITH USG NEEDED PRIOR TO EEBC
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Minister Tekeda expressed the GOE's strong desire to
hold discussions with a senior USG principal as a condition
to attending the EEBC. Hailing A/S Frazer's January 20
meeting with Prime Minister Meles, Tekeda asserted that the
only subsequent meeting to discuss such issues had been DAS
Yamamoto's recent meeting with Ethiopian Ambassador Kassahun
Ayele. "It would be difficult for Ethiopia to go to London"
without being clear about the roadmap that would reassure
them that the USG could resolve the border issue and not
return it to "square zero". Charge suggested that the GOE
could respond favorably to the EEBC's invitation, but note
that its final decision would depend on "pre-discussions"
with Washington. This would allow the GOE to remain a good
partner in this effort. Tekeda responded that "this is
something we can look at," and acknowledged the utility of
such an "ad referendum" acceptance to attend the next EEBC
meeting. Still Washington should be aware that Meles was
under enormous pressure to ensure that Ethiopia got an
equitable solution. Tekeda concluded by noting that as Meles
had told A/S Frazer, and as reiterated in its February 17
memorandum to the USG (faxed to AF/E; text follows below),
Ethiopia will "go the extra mile, but there are some things
that cannot be overlooked." Tekeda said that the GOE would
make no judgment now on EEBC attendance, and would have to
consult with Prime Minister Meles. As the border was an
issue over which thousands had died, Ethiopia had to proceed
carefully, he said.


10. (C) COMMENT: The meeting -- like that of February 22 --
was open and cordial. By the end Tekeda felt somewhat
reassured, but his bottom line is a visit from DAS Yamamoto
or Frazer to provide a more detained road map. This seems
reasonable to us, and it is unlikely that Ethiopia will
attend without a final reassurance. END COMMENT.

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TEXT OF FEBRUARY 17 MEMORANDUM TO THE USG
--------------


11. (C) BEGIN TEXT.

ETHIOPIA'S MEMORANDUM ON THE ALGIERS WITNESSES' PEACE
INITIATIVE

Ethiopia understands that the Witnesses to the Algiers
agreement will meet soon in support of the Eritrea-Ethiopia
peace process and the peace initiative currently spearheaded
by the US. Ethiopia also understands that the Witnesses will
issue a public statement regarding this initiative. In order
to maximize the initiative's chances of success, Ethiopia
considers it important that the following points be taken
into account concerning the Witnesses' meeting and statement:


1. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia has its origins
in Eritrea's bellicose behaviour and its unprovoked
aggression of Ethiopia in 1998. This central fact has been a
matter of common knowledge since the very beginning. This
common knowledge has been legally re-affirmed by the Decision
of the Claims Commission that Eritrea started the two year
armed conflict with Ethiopia in 1998 by invading Badme and
other areas of Ethiopia, without provocation, in violation of
Chapter 2(4) of the UN Charter. Eritrea's claim that it
acted to restore control over what it considers sovereign
territory occupied by Ethiopia was dismissed by the Claims
Commission which reiterated the fundamental principle of
international law that a sovereign may not settle territorial
claims through the threat or use of force.

In recent years Eritrea has used the same spurious argument
that it used to start the war in 1998 and has been
threatening again the use of force to settle the border
dispute. Ethiopia has rejected such a flagrant violation of
the principle of international law in 1998, and continues to
do so now. The key to the dispute has therefore been and

continues to be Eritrea's bellicose attitude to resolving
border disputes. Any attempt to resolve the dispute which
does not address the central cause of the dispute which is
Eritrea's past and present actions of resolving border
disputes through the use or threat of force would, in
Ethiopia's view, be misguided and unlikely to achieve
sustainable peace in the region.


2. Ethiopia has stated that the Boundary Commission's
delimitation decision are in part flawed. It has
nevertheless repeatedly declared its acceptance of the flawed
delimitation decision. Ethiopia has called for dialogue to
implement those decisions in a manner that addresses the
anomalies and impracticalities of the delimitation decision,
consistent with the object and purpose of the Algiers
Agreements which is sustainable peace. Ethiopia's call for
dialogue is consistent with the principles of international
law and established practice. One only needs to refer to the
dialogue between Nigeria and Cameroon to indicate that
Ethiopia's call for dialogue on the implementation of the
Boundary Commission's decision is consistent with the
principles of international law and established practice.

Eritrea cannot use Ethiopia's call for dialogue as an excuse
for resorting to its bellicose stance. In calling for
dialogue Ethiopia has done nothing that is contrary to the
principles of international law or established international
practice. Ethiopia has been and will continue to be part of
the solution not part of the problem. Eritrea's bellicose
stance has been and continues to be the source of the
problem.


3. Ethiopia understands that the objective of the initiative
is to achieve the object and purpose of the Algiers agreement
- sustainable peace and stability between the parties. This
can only be accomplished when Eritrea's threats and use of
force is replaced by peaceful, normal relation. If the
problem is to be addressed at its roots Eritrea must cease
and desist from the use and threat of force and engage
Ethiopia in dialogue to implement the Boundary Commission's
decision and to normalize relations between the two countries.


4. Ethiopia understands that the Witnesses' initiative will
call for two forums to address the ongoing disputes between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. The first forum would focus on
achieving normalization of relations, and the second on
demarcation of the border. Here, what is most vital for
Ethiopia is that the resulting normalization and demarcation
be consistent with the agreement's object and purpose which
is sustainable peace between the parties. Ethiopia is
prepared to go the extra mile in order to achieve sustainable
peace.


5. In order for demarcation of the border to commence under
the second forum, it is essential that Eritrea make a firm
commitment to participate in good faith in the forum on
normalization. Demarcation and normalization have to go
hand-in-hand if we are to achieve sustainable peace.


6. Ethiopia understands that the forum on demarcation will
be under the auspices of the Boundary Commission and with the
good offices of General Fulford. Ethiopia believes that the
Boundary Commission should be responsible for implementing
the delimitation decision with respect to those areas of the
boundary identified by the parties as no longer in dispute.
Demarcation of these areas could commence expeditiously.
With respect to the areas in dispute, the parties should
determine the proper implementation of the delimitation
decision through dialogue, with the mediation of General
Fulford. Resolution of areas in dispute should be the
product of the agreement of the parties. Once resolved,
demarcation of these areas could commence expeditiously.


7. The Boundary Commission's field staff, under the
supervision of the Boundary Commission's advisor, Mr.
Robertson, would work under the direction of the Commission
to complete the actual demarcation of areas no longer in
dispute. The field staff would also be available to work
with General Fulford to conduct fieldwork that would be
beneficial to the parties in resolving the areas in dispute.


8. Ethiopia strongly believes that it is Eritrea's
belligerent position which is at the root of the problem and
that in requesting dialogue on demarcation and normalization,
Ethiopia is not seeking any favours. It is simply requesting
what is the internationally established practice for
resolving border disputes. While Ethiopia is prepared to go
the extra mile to achieve sustainable peace, it cannot go
forward with an initiative which places the decision making

authority for implementing the delimitation decision
regarding areas in dispute with the Boundary Commission or
that does not include good faith dialogue to resolve
outstanding disputes and achieve normalization. If Eritrea
is not committed to these principles, then Ethiopia can only
conclude that Eritrea is not serious about restoring peace.

Ethiopia is willing to cooperate with the Witnesses. Despite
Eritrea's egregious behaviour, it is willing to work toward a
peaceful resolution of its dispute with Eritrea, and Ethiopia
cannot give in to demands of an aggressor nation which has
not yet accepted that dialogue is the only means of resolving
border disputes. Ethiopia cannot therefore be expected to go
beyond the initiative as understood above.


12. (U) END TEXT.
HUDDLESTON