Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA3411
2006-12-28 14:56:00
SECRET
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

SOMALIA: TFG AMBASSADOR REPORTS MILITARY CAMPAIGN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER MOPS KPKO KISL ET SO DJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 281456Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3888
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003411 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MOPS KPKO KISL ET SO DJ
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG AMBASSADOR REPORTS MILITARY CAMPAIGN
AT "END STAGE"

REF: ADDIS ABABA 3212 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. JANET WILGUS. REASON: 1.4 (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003411

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MOPS KPKO KISL ET SO DJ
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG AMBASSADOR REPORTS MILITARY CAMPAIGN
AT "END STAGE"

REF: ADDIS ABABA 3212 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. JANET WILGUS. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY. In a December 28 meeting with USAU Amb.
Courville and deputy pol-econ counselor (note-taker),the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia's (TFG) PermRep to
the AU and Ambassador to Ethiopia, Amb. Abdulkarim Farah,
responded to a series of questions asked by Amb. Courville on
the status of the military campaign launched by TFG and
Ethiopian forces (ENDF). Farah stated that the campaign was
now "at the end stage," following the capture of 21 cities
within the last 48-72 hours. The TFG troops and Ethiopian
forces currently have no plans to enter either Mogadishu or
Kismayo. Council of Islamic Court hard-liners have
reportedly fled December 27 from Mogadishu to Raas Kaamboni,
near the Kenya border. At Amb. Courville's request, Farah
outlined the TFG's political and diplomatic next steps.
Farah emphasized the main objective is to establish a stable
transitional government which necessitates building
grassroots support. Farah outlined TFG efforts to reach out
to three key constituencies: the academic/ intellectual
community, women, and business. Amb. Farah identified
possible key troop contributors for either an IGASOM or AU
peace building force: Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and South
Africa. END SUMMARY.

--------------
MILITARY SITUATION "AT END STAGE"
--------------


2. (S) On December 28, the Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia's (TFG) PermRep to the AU and Ambassador to Ethiopia,
Amb. Abdulkarim Farah, reported that the military campaign by
TFG and Ethiopian forces (ENDF) in Somalia was now "at the
end stage," following the capture of 21 cities within the
last 48-72 hours. Farah stated that the TFG does not plan to

enter Mogadishu, at least until "the hearts of the people are
known." Ethiopian forces had specific instructions not to
enter any cities; special TFG units were ensuring proper
security within cities, as part of a pre-arranged plan, he
said. While the TFG had announced a ceasefire four days ago,
the TFG had had to defend itself from Council of Islamic
Court (CIC) attacks on Baidoa. The TFG/ENDF had faced little
resistance, except in Dinsoor and Baidoa; the Somali populace
had actually welcomed Ethiopian forces, even inviting them to
share food (sacrificing camels) and water, Farah said. There
had been minimum casualties in four days of fighting.


3. (S) Farah said that CIC "extremists" fled Dec. 27 via boat
from Mogadishu to Raas Kaambooni (southernmost tip of
Somalia). They could shelter in place for nearly one month
while seeking to escape),due to the physical isolation of
the location. Farah said that foreign fighters were now
trapped within Somalia. He reported looting in Mogadishu,
where the CIC had stockpiled munitions, food stocks, as well
as cash revenue from the Mogadishu port.


4. (S) TFG forces' military rules of engagement were not to
punish any individuals who remained in Mogadishu, Farah said.
There were no plans for TFG troops to take over Kismayo, as
civil society (academic, women, business leaders) had taken
over there.

--------------
RESIGNATION OF ICU LEADERSHIP
--------------


5. (S) In a public statement issued at 8 p.m. local time on
Dec. 27, ICU leaders had announced their resignation, and the
return of control to the Somali people, Farah noted. Prior
to publicly announcing his resignation from the CIC, on Dec.
27 Sheikh Sharif Ahmed phoned PM Ghedi (a family member,
according to Farah),requesting assistance from TFG Prime
Minister Ghedi to save his life. Farah said PM Ghedi told
Ahmed to:

-- Call a ceasefire, if he still had the authority, in order
to save Mogadishu.


ADDIS ABAB 00003411 002 OF 003


-- Announce the handover of CIC forces to TFG troops:
declare willingness to be part of TFG security structure, and
to dialogue with TFG on political integration.

-- Speak to CIC supporters, and then to report their views.

Amb. Courville asked about the status and safety of Sheikh
Sharif Ahmed. The TFG believes that as a moderate Sheikh
Sharif Ahmed does not pose a real threat. Farah said Ahmed
faced danger from CIC hard-liners such as Sheikh Hassan Dahir
Aweys and Adan Hashi Ayro, but not from the TFG.

--------------
TFG NEXT STEPS
--------------


6. (C) Amb. Courville asked what was the primary objective of
the TFG following the military campaign, and underscored the
importance of outreach by the TFG to build grassroots support
among the Somali population, in order to overcome previous
challenges and to secure stability for the region.


7. (C) Farah responded that the TFG's primary political
objective was the formation of "a responsible government," as
the CIC had taken advantage of the TFG's weakness. He
acknowledged that the CIC's ability to promote public order
had helped foster support for their movement.


8. (C) Farah said that the TFG was now reaching out to the
Somali population to win popular support, as well seeking to
include the diaspora as stakeholders. PM Ghedi was
underscoring that the Somali people would choose another
government in 2009.


9. (C) TFG ministers and MPs were being sent to their
hometowns to work with local elders on the selection of
government representatives in a transition process that would
last 1-2 months; the TFG was guaranteeing security, Farah
said.

-- On Jan. 1, PM Ghedi would visit Beledweyne. PM Ghedi was
advised not to go to Mogadishu; the TFG interior minister may
go instead.

-- Within the last 10 days, the TFG had established the
country's largest radio transmitter in Baidoa, broadcasting
medium- and short-wave programs which could be heard as far
away as Bosasso. TFG radio now highlighted the TFG's
willingness to politically engage any moderate ICU remaining
in Mogadishu.


10. (C) Farah outlined TFG efforts to reach out to three key
constituencies: the academic/intellectual community, women's
groups, and the business community.

-- PM Ghedi and President Yusuf had publicly stated that
teachers of radical madrassas were not at fault, but had been
pushed by ICU extremists who fled.

-- Prof. Hussain Bodd was to issue a statement today on
behalf of intellectuals, rejecting the ICU in any form.

-- Farah recognized the need for more women in government,
noting that the TFG had one female minister among 260 TFG
representatives.

-- Farah noted that the TFG had announced that a chamber of
commerce would be established in Mogadishu, with composition
determined locally; the TFG would only set policy.

-- The TFG also recognized the need to engage "brainwashed"
youth who had supported the CIC, Farah added. They were now
being fed and held in special facilities, he said.

--------------
POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF A PEACE BUILDING FORCE
--------------


11. (C) Farah noted that due to the improved security
environment, deployment under IGAD and AU auspices (IGASOM)

ADDIS ABAB 00003411 003 OF 003


now called for a peace building or peace support operation,
rather than a peacekeeping force. Forces, not equipment,
were needed to deploy to Baidoa, so as not to lose momentum,
he said. Farah asserted that no other African
troop-contributing country (TCC) would be as effective as
Ethiopia. Amb. Courville asked Farah to identify what would
be acceptable African troop contributing countries. Farah
said that Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa were
possible TCCs, only awaiting a request from the AU. "Kenya
is ready," he added, while Djibouti and Eritrea would not
contribute troops. Contrary to the misconception that
regional actors could not assist Somalia, Farah noted that
the national stabilization plan passed by TFG parliament
provided for the possible role of Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti,
Sudan, and Uganda. Farah observed that under the concept of
operations for IGASOM, TCCs were to self-finance deployment
for an initial 90 days.


12. (C) Amb. Farah concluded by agreeing that Kenya, as
current chair of IGAD, was an appropriate choice to lead a
joint AU-IGAD political mission to Somalia. Farah said he
would contact Kenya's ambassador to Ethiopia, and coordinate
further with Amb. Courville.


13. (C) COMMENT: Amb. Farah's assessment that the military
campaign has reached an "end stage" echoes recent public
remarks by Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles that military
operations are half over, and that the duration and scope of
the conflict will be limited. Amb. Courville stressed the
need for the TFG to work with its neighbors in order to
promote regional stability. Farah acknowledged the
importance of strengthening ties with Djibouti, noting that
Djibouti and Somalia shared a common culture and language.
Amb. Farah's observation that CIC hard-liners have fled
Mogadishu and have sought refuge at Raas Kaambooni, near
Kenya, raises the possibility that a concentration of
high-level targets may be subject to apprehension or capture.
END COMMENT.

AUTHORIZED BY AMBASSADOR COURVILLE
WILGUS