SOMALIA: ETHIOPIA TAKING TIME TO CONSIDER NEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003289

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO KISL ET SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ETHIOPIA TAKING TIME TO CONSIDER NEXT
STEPS

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3240 (AND PREVIOUS)

B. ADDIS ABABA 2910

Classified By: POL-ECON COUNSELOR KEVIN SULLIVAN. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND
(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Ethiopia welcomed the UN Security Council's
authorization of an IGAD/AU mission for Somalia, but did not
foresee deployment until January 2007 or later, due to
uncertainty relating to funding and troop contributing
countries, according to Ethiopian MFA Somalia expert Fiseha
Shawel. Fiseha considered it unlikely that representatives
of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the
Council of Islamic Courts/Islamic Courts Union (ICU) would
engage in negotiations on December 15, but suggested that
talks could succeed with stronger U.S. engagement. Ethiopia
assessed that Somali opposition to the ICU was growing, due
partly to restrictions on cigarettes, liquor, and khat.
Eritrea sought to convene an IGAD ministerial to highlight
differences among IGAD members; Eritrea was also reinforcing
troops supporting the ICU north of Mogadishu, and could
reportedly mobilize 30,000 militia. While asserting there
was no detailed plan, Fiseha said Ethiopian engagement of the
ICU, if it were to occur, would be "swift and massive, and
from all directions." Militarily, Ethiopia's overall
strategy would be to "downsize" the ICU, in order to provide
"breathing space" to the TFG, then allow TFG militia to
replace Ethiopian troops. PM Meles would nevertheless "take
time" to consider next steps. Politically, Fiseha
highlighted the need for the TFG to accommodate the Ayr
subclan, the "backbone" of the ICU. According to Fiseha,
ex-TFG MP Yusuf Mire Serar was among the strongest of Ayr
leaders, and while allied with the ICU, could be turned as he
had no fixed allegiance. In contrast, former TNG president
Abdiqassun Salad Hassan was personally corrupt, having
amassed nearly USD 30 million from illegal activities, and
was sympathetic to radical Islamicists; Abdullahi Ahmed
Addow, a member of the Saad subclan, had little political
base within Somalia, but due to his diplomatic experience,
could help the TFG enhance relations with countries such as
Syria and Egypt. Fiseha acknowledged that Ethiopia was
enhancing security cooperation with Somaliland, and had
agreed to provide fuel and foodstuffs to the TFG. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a December 12 meeting with pol-econ counselor and
deputy, MFA Somalia desk officer Senior Second Secretary
Fiseha Shawel reviewed recent developments since the December
6 adoption of UNSCR 1725, authorizing IGAD and the African
Union to establish a protection and training mission in
Somalia (IGASOM). Fiseha hailed the adoption of UNSCR 1725,
but noted it was long overdue. Citing uncertainty regarding
funding and potential troop contributing countries, Fiseha
did not anticipate IGASOM deployment until January 2007 or
later. Funding, not commitment, was the principal challenge,
Fiseha said, predicting that Uganda was awaiting a more
stable military situation prior to deploying troops. Both
South African and Nigerian ambassadors had expressed support
for IGASOM when invited to participate in IGAD-led
discussions earlier this year, but had not elaborated on
possible support for IGASOM since then. Eritrea was lobbying
to convene a meeting of the IGAD Council of Ministers in
Nairobi, he said, which was intended to erode the perception
of unanimous support within IGAD for intervention in Somalia.
Such a meeting would pit Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya against
Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti. He thought it unlikely that
December 15 talks between the ICU and TFG would occur, but
noted that with engagement by the United States, peace talks
could succeed, as they had in Sudan.

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CIC AND ERITREA COULD MUSTER 50,000 MILITIA
--------------


3. (C) According to Fiseha, Eritrea was "fully engaged" in
seeking to provoke the ICU to launch war against Ethiopia,
and was reinforcing troops north of Mogadishu. Citing the
ICU's public ultimatum to Ethiopia to withdraw military
forces within a week, he noted that the ICU's call for
assistance from Muslims worldwide had resulted in an influx
of jihadists. Eritrea's assessment, he said, was that strong

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opposition within Somalia to Ethiopia provided an opportunity
to foster internal instability within Ethiopia itself.
Eritrea could mobilize 30,000 militia; with the ICU, the
total would be 50,000, he said. In contrast, Ethiopia's
assessment was that popular opposition to the ICU within
Somalia was growing: restrictions on cigarettes, liquor, and
khat had particularly fostered resentment among business
owners, many of whom were women, who constituted 55-60 per
cent of areas under ICU control, Fiseha said.

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MILITARY STRATEGY: SWIFTLY CUT OFF ICU'S SUPPLY ROUTES
-------------- --------------


4. (C) While asserting there was no detailed plan, Fiseha
said Ethiopian engagement of the ICU, if it were to occur,
would be "swift and massive, and from all directions."
Militarily, Ethiopia's overall strategy would be to
"downsize" the ICU, in order to provide "breathing space" to
the TFG. Fiseha predicted "fierce" resistance from foreign
Islamic "jihadists" supporting the ICU, who were assessed to
be more committed than Somali fighters and less likely to
surrender or retreat. An Ethiopian general, who had led the
Ethiopian attack on the Gedo region of Somali in 1996,
recalled that while Somalis quickly retreated, al-Ittihad
al-Islami (AIAI) jihadists fought for days and often to the
death. Asked whether ICU fighters would be difficult to
engage if they did not concentrate in large numbers, Fiseha
replied that current weather conditions (i.e., rain) and
desert terrain led ICU fighters to concentrate along main
roads and towns. As ICU supply routes stretched from the
Indian Ocean to Mogadishu to Jowhar, concentrations of ICU
fighters could not be supplied continuously; Ethiopia's
strategy would be to cut them off from each other, and attack
individual groups. Ethiopian forces could also engage the
ICU from multiple directions: including from Galcaiyo,
Burhakaba/Baidoa, and Gedo. Well-trained, specially screened
Somali fighters would then replace Ethiopia troops; "that is
our exit strategy," Fiseha said.

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PM MELES CONSIDERING OPTIONS
--------------


5. (C) Pol-econ counselor noted that USG interlocutors had
consistently underscored the need for dialogue and a
negotiated solution. Fiseha responded that how to pressure
the ICU remained the key challenge: the ICU was
"remote-controlled," receiving support from Egypt, Syria,
Libya, and Eritrea, who were not interested in dialogue.
Fiseha observed that while the GOE "establishment" in the
foreign and defense ministries, as well as the intelligence
services, were urging strong Ethiopian action against the
ICU, Prime Minister Meles would "take time" to consider next
steps.

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POLITICAL STRATEGY: POWER-SHARING FOR AYR SUB-CLAN
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Fiseha highlighted the need for the TFG to accommodate
the Ayr subclan of the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir: the Ayr of ICU
leaders such as Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Adan Hashi Ayro, not
all Hawiye, provided the principal support for the ICU. "The
backbone of the ICU is Ayr," he noted. Other Hawiye subclans
were either disinterested in the ICU (e.g., the
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Saad subclan) or supported the TFG.
Members of the Hawiye/Abgaal subclan largely resented being
controlled by the Ayr and thus were dissatisfied with the
ICU, Fiseha asserted. Fiseha provided the following comments
on possible Hawiye leaders whom the TFG could incorporate
into broader power-sharing:

Abdiqassun Salad Hassan: Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr, but he would
"not be helpful" due to personal corruption and sympathy to
"Islamicists".
-- According to Fiseha, during the three-and-half-years of
his presidency of the TNG (vice TFG),Hassan amassed a
personal fortune of USD 20-30 million, embezzling
contributions from Arab states. When the Government of Sudan
provided a delegation led by Hassan with commodities and a

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USD 1 million cash contribution, he reportedly kept the cash
and provided other delegation members with USD 5,000. Hassan
was close to Djibouti and involved in illegal business
activities, Fiseha added.
-- Hassan's "al Islah" organization, while considered
relatively moderate, may share the extremist views of the
ICU. Fiseha noted that Hassan's close ties to Islamicists
had prompted Siad Barre to keep Hassan under "intense
surveillance."
-- Fiseha assessed that Hassan was a poor politician and not
a committed leader: garnering only 20-30 votes in October
2004 TFG presidential elections, compared to 189 received by
Abdullahi Yusuf.

Abdullahi Ahmed Addow: Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Saad, so he would
not appeal to Ayr, but would be an effective representative
to the international community, drawing on his experience as
Siad Barre's ambassador to the U.S. in the 1980s.
-- Fiseha noted that Addow was considered a member of the
Diaspora, based in Dubai, Nairobi, or the United States, and
had no following on the ground. On the other hand, he could
play an effective role in a diplomatic posting, enhancing the
TFG's ties with countries such as Egypt and Syria.
-- Stronger political skills than Hassan: received 79 votes
in October 2004 as runner-up to Abdullahi Yusuf.

Yusuf Mire Serar: Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr; currently allied
with the ICU, but assessed as having no fixed allegiance.
-- Fiseha reported that Serar was an MP who had abandoned the
TFG, and now controlled the area from Mogadishu to Kismayo
for the ICU. Among Ayr, Serar was one of the strongest
leaders, Fiseha said, although he was not well educated,
chain smoked, and chewed khat.
-- Serar derived significant income from charcoal, livestock,
and khat, as well as from roadblocks and taxes.
-- Fiseha noted that Abdiqassim Salad Hassan had personally
insisted on the inclusion of Serar, when Serar did not appear
on the original list of MPs discussed at the TFG's formation
in Nairobi.


7. (C) Political divisions between Hawiye and Darod clan
members of the TFG, also needed to be addressed, Fiseha said.
While currently dominated by the Darod of President
Abdullahi Yusuf, the TFG was willing to cede leadership to
the Hawiye in 2008 or 2009, but no consensus existed among
Hawiye leadership. Experience showed that Hawiye/Habr-Gedir
subclan members preferred instability, Fiseha said. It was
thus necessary to hand-pick Hawiye ministers to serve under
President Yusuf.


8. (C) Fiseha highlighted the political vulnerability of both
TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi (a Hawiye) and TFG
Parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, should
negotiations occur on restructuring the TFG. Speaker Adan
had miscalculated by switching allegiance to the ICU for the
last two months; as he had previously been allied with the
warlords prior to the TFG, the Speaker was seen as an
opportunist whose allegiance had been purchased by Hawiye,
Fiseha said. Fiseha noted that the TFG Minister of Trade, a
Hawiye, had proposed holding a conference of traditional
Hawiye elders in Addis Ababa, to underscore that the Hawiye
did not uniformly support the ICU. While traditional elders
had long played an important role in Somali political
culture, Fiseha noted that Siad Barre had simply selected new
elders to suit his ambitions.

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ETHIOPIA ENHANCES SECURITY COOPERATION WITH SOMALILAND
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Fiseha reported that while the ICU threat to
Somaliland was not yet imminent, Somaliland had in the
previous week arrested ICU organizers for the first time,
after warning them not to continue seditious activities.
Fiseha noted that AIAI founder and ICU leader Sheikh Ali
Warsame was an Isaaq from Somaliland, and also brother-in-law
to ICU leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Warsame was
intensifying anti-government activities in Somaliland, Fiseha
said, organizing pro-ICU demonstrations as well as ICU cells.


10. (C) Fiseha confirmed recent state-run media reports that

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Ethiopia was strengthening cooperation with Somaliland to
enhance border security, following December 12 talks between
GOE Federal Affairs Minister Siraj Fegessa and a delegation
led by Somaliland Interior Affairs Minister Abdullahi Ismael
Ali. Ethiopia and Somaliland engaged in
intelligence-sharing, and cooperated to control activities of
Ethiopian insurgents in the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF),Fiseha said. Ethiopia was providing small arms and
uniforms to Somaliland security forces, he added. (NOTE:
Somaliland Foreign Minister Abdillahi M. Duale is currently
visiting Addis Ababa, although his presence has not been
publicly reported. Other Somaliland ministers participated
in a World Bank seminar in Addis Ababa, which concluded
December 12. END NOTE.)


11. (C) Ethiopia had also agreed to transport fuel and
foodstuffs duty-free to the TFG via the Ethiopian border town
of Dolo, Fiseha said, following a recent visit by the TFG
Minister of Trade. The ICU was blocking supplies to the TFG,
he said, whose only alternative had been to obtain them
through Bosasso.


12. (C) COMMENT: Fiseha's observations underscore Ethiopia's
strategic concerns with relation to Somalia. While his
remarks reflect that Ethiopia has developed a military
strategy to weaken the ICU, they also suggest that Ethiopia
may be considering other options. Fiseha's detailed analysis
of the TFG's need to accommodate Hawiye and Ayr subclans
indicates that much can be done on the political front: to
broaden the TFG's appeal and to gain support from moderates
whose allegiance to the ICU is rooted more in expediency than
Islamic jihadist ideology. END COMMENT.
WILGUS