ETHIOPIA GIRDS FOR HIGH-RISK IN SOMALIA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003211

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER
PARIS AND ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV PINS ET SO ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA GIRDS FOR HIGH-RISK IN SOMALIA

REF: A. ADDIS 3115

B. DJIBOUTI 1428

C. ADDIS 3175

Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Kevin Sullivan. Reason: 1.4 (A),(B)
and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Indications suggest that Ethiopia is
preparing to increase its military involvement in Somalia in
the coming weeks. The GOE feels ever more compelled to
intervene in southern Somalia to counter what it sees as the
growing threat of an extremist Islamic regime in Mogadishu
that is cooperating with Eritrea and other foreign elements
to undermine Ethiopian stability and territorial integrity.
PM Meles told Amb. Yamamoto on Nov. 29 that the GOE would
return to its guerrilla roots to prosecute a brief,
multi-pronged military campaign against the Council of
Islamic Courts (CIC),rather than a sustained conventional
offensive. The GOE has been steadily building up its
military forces around its southern border with Somalia and
has intensified its military cooperation with the government
of Puntland. While Ethiopia and its allies in Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Puntland should be
able to muster a significantly larger (perhaps 15-20,000) and
better-trained fighting force than the CIC, the CIC appears
to be marshalling a credible force of at least 5,000 fighters
operating hundreds of "technicals" on their home ground.
Recent arms shipments from Eritrea, Libya and Gulf state
extremist organizations like Hizbollah have equipped the CIC
to offer at least some resistance to Ethiopia's tanks, planes
and helicopters. The CIC may also enjoy an advantage in
terms of the motivation of its fighting force, which will
likely be led by radical figures from "al Shebaab." The
Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF),for its part, are
still coping with recent purges and morale problems. PM
Meles has gone to unusual lengths to unite Ethiopia's major
political parties behind him as he prepares for battle, but
tensions and distrust lingering from 2005 elections and
crackdown on internal opposition ultimately undermined this
effort. The bottom line is that the ENDF could enter into
limited military engagements in Somalia in the coming weeks
which may prove more difficult for Ethiopia than many now
imagine. End Summary.

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INDICATORS ALL POINT TO AN ETHIOPIAN OFFENSIVE
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2. (S) The signals became unmistakable in late November that
the GOE is preparing for increased military involvement in
Somalia. PM Meles' speech to Parliament November 23 (ref A)
laid out the GOE's justification for action to counter the
"clear and present danger" posed by the CIC. Meles'
contentions that 1) the CIC had already declared war (jihad)
on Ethiopia; and 2) the CIC had already violated Ethiopian
sovereignty by arming and transporting OLF and ONLF fighters
across the border formed the heart of this justification. In
private, Meles has referred consistently to the end of the
rains in Somalia as the trigger for Ethiopian limited
military operations against the CIC. Weather forecasts
suggest that the rain may taper off beginning the week of
Dec. 4, allowing ground-based operations to begin once the
terrain dries. DATT believes that the ENDF, which is just
emerging from a 10-days commanders conference, is prepared to
launch operations roughly one week after rains have ended, if
the order is given. All source intelligence has shown a
steady build-up of Ethiopian military assets, including
tanks, artillery, troop transport and other heavy equipment
on both sides of Ethiopia's border with southern Somalia.
Air assets including attack helicopters have not yet moved
within range of their likely targets, but appear poised for
action just outside the immediate theater, ready to move when
the signal is given. Post's best estimate is that the ENDF
will be poised to launch their offensive approximately in the
latter part of December. Scheduled CIC-TFG talks in Nairobi
and Khartoum mid-month might prompt the GOE to delay if there
is reason to believe that the CIC might change and engage
more seriously in such talks. Deputy Foreign Minister
Tekeda's Dec. 1 talks with CIC representatives in Djibouti
(ref B) represent a last-ditch effort to change CIC behavior
without resorting to war.

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SEVEN DAY WAR?
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3. (S) ENDF assets currently positioned near southern Somalia
suggest an attack prosecuted by roughly 10,000 ENDF troops,
36 artillery pieces and 40-50 T-54/55 tanks. The ENDF will
likely support the TFG militia numbering 8,000-10,000 as well
as Puntland defense forces numbering 3-4,000. The twin
objectives of the operation will be to drive CIC forces away
from the seat of Somalia's TFG in Baidoa, as well as destroy
those CIC forces that threaten Puntland. The ENDF is likely
to utilize limited aerial bombing and attack helicopters
against CIC forces, training camps and other key facilities.
There are also indications that the ENDF commandos will
conduct quick strikes against CIC targets. The lack of
forward positioning of large logistical fuel and lubricant
bladders and other supplies suggests that the ENDF does not
expect the potential engagement to last longer than seven
days and does not plan to attack Mogadishu.


4. (C) PM Meles told Amb. Yamamoto Nov. 29 that Ethiopian
measures against the CIC would not be limited to conventional
warfare. He talked of the ruling EPRDF returning to
"guerilla mode" against its Islamist opponents, (note:
probably referring to planned commando raids. End note.)
Meles told Sen. Feingold Nov. 30 (ref C) that the GOE
intended to 1) reduce the CIC's military capacity; and 2)
send a message to the Somali public and moderate CIC members
that Ethiopia would not permit the consolidation of a
fundamentalist regime in Somalia. In the GOE's view, a
successful offensive will create incentives for more moderate
leadership in the CIC and for more sincere and pragmatic
negotiations between the CIC and the TFG. The PM stated that
the ENDF did not plan on remaining in Somalia in large
numbers longer than 5-7 days.

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WHO IS THE REAL UNDERDOG?
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5. (C) Most analysts believe that Ethiopia possesses clear
military superiority over the CIC in terms of overall
manpower, equipment, training and experience in battle.
While this may be true in general, the battle that is shaping
up in southern Somalia may pit a relatively modest ENDF
contingent against a more motivated, highly mobile and
relatively well equipped CIC force. Current estimates
suggest that Ethiopian troops will not enjoy an overwhelming
superiority in numbers in the theatre of battle. Long supply
lines stretching through hostile territory in Ethiopia's
Somali region will place additional strain on the GOE's
ability to wage war. Moreover, the ENDF has recently begun
undergone a series of purges theoretically designed to weed
out poor performing officers from its ranks, but which in
fact appeared to have an anti-Oromo and anti-Amhara character
meant to reduce the danger of OLF infiltration.

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HOME FRONT SHAKY, BUT HOLDING
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6. (C) PM Meles' effort to obtain a consensus authorization
from Parliament to employ "all means necessary" to counter
the threat in Somalia was rebuffed Nov. 30 by the majority of
opposition MPs. While the EPRDF passed the resolution by a
comfortable margin, 99 MPs from the CUDP, UEDF and OFDM blocs
(or roughly one-fourth of the House of People's
Representatives' 426 members) voted against the resolution.
While initially pleased about being consulted, Opposition
leaders later criticized the GOE's insistence on mentioning
both Eritrea and internal insurgency groups the OLF and ONLF
in its draft resolution. The opposition argued that the
claims of internal groups should be addressed through
negotiations, rather than lumping them together with external
threats. UEDF leader Beyene Petros indicated privately to
Pol/Econ Counselor that pressure from Oromo constituents of
his ally, the Oromo National Congress (ONC) prevented him
from accepting this point. The OLF, for its part, issued a
statement Dec. 4 criticizing Parliament's approval of the

ADDIS ABAB 00003211 003 OF 003


authorization measure and praising opposition leaders for
opposing it. Ruling party press outlets, on the other hand,
severely criticized the opposition's "lukewarm" support for
Ethiopian sovereignty.


7. (C) While a significant portion of the population in
Ethiopia may oppose Ethiopian military intervention in
Somalia, many Ethiopians are concerned about the threat of
Islamic extremism and are likely to back -- or at least not
actively oppose -- the strong measures the GOE is pursuing.
There is also a risk, however, that some Ethiopian Muslims
will sympathize with the CIC. Nonetheless, the GOE appears
fully capable of containing opposition to its policy on
Somalia and of maintaining order during the potential
military operations. Internal stability remains the
paramount concern of the ruling party, which worries that the
CIC, in cooperation with Eritrea, will send terrorist agents
to Ethiopia and support internal rebel groups like the OLF
and ONLF. The EPRDF has not betrayed significant concerns
about a CIC counter-offensive against Ethiopia's Somali
Region.
YAMAMOTO