DARFUR: UN A/SYG FOR PEACE-KEEPING DISCUSSES UN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003011

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AF/SE, AND IO/PSC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU CD AU UN
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN A/SYG FOR PEACE-KEEPING DISCUSSES UN
ASSISTANCE TO AMIS WITH SUDAN AND AU



1. (SBU) SUMMARY. UN A/SYG for Peace-keeping Operations
Annabi said November 11-12 meetings with President Bashir, FM
Lam Akol and other GOS principals resulted in an affirmation
that the GOS would accept UN packages of "light" and "heavy"
assistance to the AU Mission in Sudan, despite Sudan's
continued rejection of UNSCR 1706 and its call for UN
transition as infringement on Sudanese sovereignty. The GOS
also reversed its previous insistence on the establishment of
a tripartite (UN-AU-GOS) committee that would review AU
needs. Bashir and other GOS principals continued to reject
UN personnel wearing UN insignia (i.e., blue berets or
helmets),while Annabi underscored the need to distinguish UN
from AU peace-keepers in order to promote transparency. In
tripartite discussions on November 13, the GOS reiterated its
rejection of UN transition, but not of UN support to AMIS.
The UN and AU expect to conclude a MOU on technical aspects
of how to account for UN personnel and equipment provided to
assist AMIS. UN U/SYG Guehenno will participate in November
16 ministerial-level talks in Addis Ababa, which he expects
will allow the UN to strengthen AMIS while promoting
confidence-building with the GOS in the long term. END
SUMMARY.


2. (U) On November 14, DCM and deputy pol-econ counselor
attended briefing of P-5 representatives given by UN
Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations Hedi
Annabi and UNMIS Officer-in-Charge Taye-Brook Zerihoun.
Annabi provided a readout of November 11 and 12 meetings with
Government of Sudan officials in Khartoum, and of November 13
tripartite talks in Addis among the UN, AU, and the GOS.

--------------
SUDAN'S FM ACCEPTS UN ASSISTANCE TO AMIS
--------------


3. (SBU) Annabi explained said his visit to Khartoum was
intended to dissuade the GOS from requiring the adoption of a
draft tripartite (UN-AU-GOS) protocol that placed "a number
of caveats" and restrictions on the status of UN forces in
Sudan, and that proposed establishing a tripartite committee
to determine the AU's needs. Sudan had sought to embroil the
UN deployment in bureaucracy, Annabi said, by proposing such
a protocol on November 3, six weeks after September 22
correspondence from the UN and the AU had provided details of
the package of "light" UN assistance (i.e., comprising 105 UN
military officers, 33 police, 48 international staff, and
equipment) to Sudan's President Bashir. The GOS had accepted
the "light" package of assistance and proposed a protocol on
modalities on October 3; on October 7, UN SYG Annan replied
that the existing status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) between
the GOS and UNMIS should apply.


4. (SBU) Annabi said Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol
ultimately agreed to a tripartite mechanism that would
facilitate the implementation of the UN's support package to
the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS),and that would promote
transparency through the exchange of information. The FM
also agreed that the current SOFA between the GOS and UNMIS
would apply to incoming UN personnel assisting AMIS. Annabi
said that when MFA advisors objected, the FM said he had
discussed these issues with President Bashir.


5. (SBU) FM Lam Akol reiterated GOS opposition to AMIS
transitioning to a UN peace-keeping operation, but welcomed
both the "light" and "heavy" support packages described in
the UN SYG's July 28 report (S/2006/591),Annabi said. The
GOS said it would accept UN "enabling units" (logistics,
communications, etc.) to help strengthen AMIS operations and
effectiveness, Annabi added, so long as they were under the
AU's command and control. Annabi said he underscored that UN
military forces deployed through the assistance packages
would fall under the operational control of the AU, but not
UN police or civilian staff (such as administration or
finance). The UN affirmed its commitment to deploying with
"full transparency," he said.

-------------- --
WEARING BLUE BERETS REMAINS POINT OF CONTENTION
-------------- --


6. (SBU) Whether UN peace-keepers would wear UN insignia

ADDIS ABAB 00003011 002 OF 003


(i.e., blue berets or blue helmets) remains a key point of
contention for GOS and some AU officials. Working-level AU
officials oppose the wearing of UN insignia, believing it
would signal a separate chain of command, Annabi said.
Annabi said he told Sudanese Defense Minister Abdul-Rahim
Mohammed that UN personnel would be embedded within the AU,
have no parallel agenda, but be administered (recruited,
paid, and disciplined, if necessary) by the UN. As UN
personnel, they would wear UN insignia. The defense minister
said this was "unacceptable," and that the UN's 105 officers
would metamorphose into 300, then 3,000 -- marking the
"beginning of the UN invasion." Annabi said he responded
that the UN's blue beret was a symbol of peace, having
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, and was needed for
full transparency: to distinguish UN from AU personnel. MFA
advisors sought to calm the defense minister down, Annabi
noted.


7. (SBU) President Bashir also objected to the wearing of UN
insignia, but reiterated GOS acceptance of the UN light and
heavy support packages, Annabi said. The GOS was "painting
itself into a corner" with "irrational concerns," Annabi
said. Annabi cited propaganda statements, including from
Bashir himself, that there would never be UN blue berets in
Sudan, and that, if they appeared, Bashir would be the first
to oppose such "invaders." Annabi said that when Sudanese
intelligence chief Salah Abdallah Gosh threatened to expel
any individuals with blue berets, Annabi responded that it
would be difficult to continue working with the GOS if they
continued to expulsions. Presidential advisor and former FM
Mustapha Ismail offered to help address the insignia issue,
Annabi said.


8. (SBU) While Annabi deferred to UN member states to decide
the issue, his comments suggested opposition to abandoning UN
insignia: Annabi raised concern about legal liability, and
said he lacked the authority to let this principle "go down
the drain." He noted that the UN's humanitarian operation in
Sudan was the world's largest; UN staff in Sudan were already
wearing blue berets, but faced harassment.

-------------- --------------
SUDANESE FM REJECTS UNSCR 1706 AS INFRINGEMENT ON SOVEREIGNTY
-------------- --------------


9. (SBU) Annabi said November 13 tripartite talks in Addis
Ababa, which the September 20 AU PSC communique had called
for, had been productive. Participants included Republic of
Congo FM Rodolphe Adada (November chair of the AU PSC); AU
Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit, officials from
AMIS and the AU Darfur Integrated Task Force; FM Lam Akol and
Sudan's new permrep to the UN.
-- According to Annabi, Adada reviewed PSC communiques and
the history of the conflict. Adada noted that the UNSC
Presidency (Peru) had not accepted the invitation to
participate in the meeting, but "did not make an issue of it."
-- Djinnit discussed how issues raised by the AU PSC in its
communiques, such as retaining the "African character" of the
mission, had not been fully incorporated into UNSCR 1706.
Annabi said he also discussed with Djinnit "hesitation, if
not resentment" by some AU officials of accepting embedded UN
personnel. AU Commission, AMIS, and AU DITF officials
required a day of internal consultations to harmonize their
own varying positions, Annabi said.
-- Nevertheless, Djinnit and Annabi expected to conclude a
bilateral UN-AU MOU that would address technical aspects of
how to handle UN personnel and equipment assigned to AMIS.
While the GOS may have some concerns about the MOU, "the UN
can't write off 50 years of rules and regulations just
because the GOS doesn't like it," Annabi said.
-- FM Lam Akol confirmed GOS agreement that the UN provide
assistance to AMIS, but said that UNSCR 1706 was "yesterday's
story," as it was unacceptable and infringed on Sudan's
sovereignty. Annabi said he responded that UNSCR 1706 made
clear that deployment was subject to GOS consent; while
others imposed peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, a UN force would conduct peace-keeping. Annabi said
that over three visits to Sudan, the UN had consistently
stated, both publicly and privately, that it would not impose
itself. Annabi said he refrained from a detailed discussion
of UNSCR 1706 with the GOS, as it would not be productive to

ADDIS ABAB 00003011 003 OF 003


debate the GOS's rejection.

-------------- --
UN SYG CONSIDERING POSSIBLE UN FUNDING FOR AMIS
-------------- --


10. (SBU) Annabi reported that he informed the AU and GOS
that the UN SYG was prepared to go before the UN General
Assembly to request funding by the UN for AMIS. While the
cost of light and heavy support packages was USD 21-22
million and at least USD 55 million respectively, this
assistance would not solve "fundamental logistical and
financial problems of the African Union." Annabi noted,
however, that UN funding of AMIS would require the deployment
of a civilian UN element to control and disperse funds. He
added that the UN would also expect to play a stronger
political role in Sudan: "Peace-keeping can never be a
substitute for a political process."

--------------
UN ASSESSMENT TEAM TO VISIT CHAD AND C.A.R.
--------------


11. (SBU) Annabi said he informed GOS interlocutors in
Khartoum, and others at the November 13 tripartite meeting,
that the UN would send an assessment mission to Chad and the
Central African Republic to determine what could be done to
improve security in border areas and IDP camps. The UNSC had
been briefed on light and heavy options for UN deployment,
which could occur soon, subject to security conditions.

-------------- --------------
NOV. 16 MINISTERIAL TO DISCUSS STRENGTHENING AMIS
-------------- --------------


12. (SBU) UN U/SYG for Peace-keeping Operations Jean Marie
Guehenno would brief the UNSC today on these meetings, as
well as discuss the UN's non-paper on options for AMIS:
ranging from light and heavy support packages, to "hybrid"
deployment with "various degrees of integration," Annabi
said. The non-paper also highlighted the issue of funding.


13. (SBU) While Annabi would return to UNHQ, Guehenno would
attend the November 16 AU-EU-UN-League of Arab States meeting
in Addis with P-5 representatives. Guehenno expected the
meeting to discuss with stakeholders, "in the presence of
Sudan, possible steps to make the AU mission more effective,
as we continue to work with the GOS to get them to agree to a
UN operation," Annabi said. In the long-term, such
consultations could serve as a confidence-building measure,
while strengthening AMIS in the short-term. Annabi noted
that there was currently no alternative to AMIS, and that its
withdrawal would precipitate a humanitarian disaster. The
November 16 meeting was also expected to help shape
consultations leading up to the November 24 summit-level AU
PSC, which was expected to extend the mandate of AMIS beyond
December 31 to at least July 2007, Annabi said.


14. (SBU) The AU sought to discuss the proposed "heavy"
assistance to AMIS, Annabi said, which would comprise at
least 1,000 additional UN military personnel, 700 police,
support units, more significant equipment, and some
navigation assets. Annabi expressed concern about force
generation: "We can only deploy the people we get."
Concerns about force protection and the conditions of
deployment had deterred potential troop-contributing
countries from offering many personnel; even the light
package required some positions to be filled by recruitment,
he said.
HUDDLESTON