THE ISLAMISTS BATTLE FOR BAIDOA AND BEYOND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002914

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR A/S FRAZER AND DAS YAMAMOTO
NAIROBI FOR SOMALIA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINR PREF PTER SO ET
SUBJECT: THE ISLAMISTS BATTLE FOR BAIDOA AND BEYOND

Classified By: CHARGE VICKI HUDDLESTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Meles met with Admiral Rick
Hunt, DATT Don Zedler and Charge at our request October 30.
We were particularly concerned by reports of the Council of
Islamic Courts' (CIC) military preparations for an attack on
Baidoa, and the possibility that even with Ethiopian military
assistance, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in
Baidoa might fall when faced with the CIC's Al Qaeda-linked
and Jihad-motivated troops known as the al Shebab. Meles
reasoned that while the CIC is now stronger than the TFG, the
balance can be corrected. By stopping the CIC before its
ideology becomes entrenched outside Mogadishu, Somalis who
are not driven by the austere ideology of fundamentalism will
be ready to dialogue with the TFG and become part of the
Transitional Federal Institutions. Meles' fear is that the
CIC is being pushed by al Shebab to attack Baidoa in the
coming days. If this occurs, the GOE will not yet be ready
to push the CIC back. Rather, they will defend Baidoa to the
end. When the rains end by mid-November, Ethiopia will be
ready for a second phase of operations, which would use the
Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) as the cutting edge
to go after al Shebab and push the CIC back to Mogadishu.
Meles hopes that a UNSC resolution lifting the arms embargo
on the TFG and authorizing IGASOM will be forthcoming before
mid-November so that the TFG can protect itself with
international backing and Ethiopia can reinforce them. Meles
pointed out that there are many friendly southern Somalis, as
well as Puntland and Somaliland, that welcome Ethiopia's
commitment. We are watching with considerable concern as the
CIC surround Baidoa. This concern is only enhanced by the
growing recruitment and strength of the militant al Shebab
and its close ties to the East African al Qaeda branch. We
find it difficult not to agree with Meles that the CIC has no
interest in dialogue with the TFG when they see a complete
victory at hand. Even more worrisome is the fact that
Ethiopia, while committed to defending Baidoa, is not as well
positioned to do so. In fact, as Meles pointed out,
Ethiopia's advantage lies in its mobility but its tanks are
hampered not only by the rainy season but by lack of
information about where al Shebab (the real enemy),its
technicals, and its missiles are located. We were not
reassured to hear Meles say that Ethiopia does not yet have a
concept of operations. If Ethiopia and the TFG lose Baidoa,
the CIC, and especially al Shebab, will be empowered and will
attract more domestic and foreign fighters, as well as more
arms and resources. Puntland will be its next target,
followed by Somaliland. As al Shebab fighters move forward,
so too will militant Islam. Meles asked if we can help.
Hopefully we can do so in discrete but meaningful ways,
because in the end this is our battle as well. End Summary


2. (C) On October 30 CJTF-HOA Commander Admiral Hunt
presented to Prime Minister Meles his thoughts about the
Somalia situation, including the need for an exit strategy
and a clear idea of the desired end state that Ethiopia, the
Horn and the African Union would find satisfactory. He asked
what would happen next if Baidoa were to fall to the Islamic
Courts, and queried the PM about ways in which Puntland and
Somaliland could withstand both the ideological and military
thrust of the CIC. He urged Ethiopia to review its strategic
considerations and move cautiously as the CIC, especially the
al Qaeda-linked al Shebab are a determined enemy. Hunt asked
whether there were ways in which the USG might promote an
improved environment that would result in negotiations and
avoid conflict, perhaps by encouraging the Mogadishu business
community to play a moderating role.

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NEED TO SHIFT THE BALANCE OF POWER TO BACK TO TFG
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3. (C) Meles thanked Hunt for his observations, and then
pointed to the structural imbalance between the TFG and the
CIC. He said the TFG is disadvantaged by the lack of a
motivating force because it is not clan based. This means
that TFG President Youseff must negotiate everything among
the clans, thus there is little cohesion. Worse, without the
motivation of clan or ideology the TFG will remain weak in
the face of its enemies. Permanently shifting clan alliances

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also weaken the TFG. The Rahanwein -- who are the majority in
Baidoa shift alliances because historically they have been
maltreated by other clans. As a result, their political
antenna is highly attuned to who holds the money and arms
that can assure them of ending up on the winning side. An
additional weakness for the TFG is that the Hawiye are
displeased that the Darood hold the presidency, possibly
explaining the logic of Hawiye involvement in the
assassination attempt on Youseff. According to Meles, a
close relative of an important Hawiye was the suicide bomber.
The CIC motivation being both clan and ideology is only
somewhat weakened by the fact that Somalis are not naturally
attracted to the strict ideology of radical Islam. The
majority of the CIC is driven by clan loyalty, but the
expanding Al Shebab militants linked with Al Qaeda are driven
by radical Muslim ideology.


4. (C) Meles complained that the TFG was sapped from inside
by these conflicting loyalties and lack of strong outside
support. At the same time, Meles said that the TFG remains
critical because it provides the long-term answer for Somalia
-- the transitional federal institutions serve as the basis
for building domestic and international legitimacy.
"Politically, the TFG is not mobilized," Meles emphasized.
The job of the international community -- and Ethiopia -- is
to compensate for the imbalance between the TFG and the CIC.
The advantage of Puntland and Somaliland, which Meles sees as
the last line of defense against the CIC, is their clan
affiliations and their common history of success and failures
around which they can rally. At this point, Meles said, it
is critical to "beef-up" Somaliland and Puntland economically
so that they can withstand the coming attack from the CIC.
Meles said the USG could be instrumental in providing
humanitarian (and developmental) support that would reinforce
these independent regions. The TFG could also be
strengthened for the long term if it has access to resources,
the PM claimed. Therefore the USG might encourage the
Europeans to make available the fifteen million euros given
to the African Union for Somalia.


5. (C) More critically, the gains of the CIC must be
reversed. According to Meles, the CIC's strength has been
reinforced by disarming of the militias of the businessmen,
undercutting the potential for opposition in southern
Somalia. "The CIC is fired up by its victories and the
difficulties the USG faces in Iraq and Afghanistan," Meles
said. The CIC hard-liner leaders understand that clans
cannot form the base of their movement and are being replaced
by the ideology-based al Shebab. (Comment: Post understands
that there is an effort by al Shebab to recruit clan militias
to radical Islam. We also understand that some clans are
asking foreign donors to send arms directly to them so as to
avoid becoming subservient to a radical ideology or al
Shebab. End comment.)

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CIC WILL NOT NEGOTIATE UNTIL STOPPED MILITARILY
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6. (C) Meles said that the Ethiopian National Defense Forces
(ENDF) strategy would be to push the CIC back to Mogadishu,
the only place where the radical Islamic ideology is
entrenched. The longer the delay in pushing back the CIC,
the greater the range of conversion. For now, however, the
only area where they are entrenched is Mogadishu. The best
case scenario, according to Meles, is that the businessmen
and other pragmatic elements in Mogadishu would split if the
CIC were bottled up in Mogadishu. This would allow dialogue
with the TFG and moderate CIC elements to move forward.
"Right now, the Jihadists would have to be stupid to dialogue
with a weakened and surrounded TFG. Their objective is only
to legitimize themselves so they can take power," Meles
stated. Meles recalled that although the TPLF and other
rebels wanted the USG on their side when they were about to
defeat Ethiopia's former Derg regime, they saw no reason to
negotiate power sharing when it was evident to the rebels
that they could completely defeat the Derg. Meles warned that
the international community should not bank on dialogue at
this point when the CIC is sure that victory is at hand. One
of the reasons the Arab League is biased toward the CIC is

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because of the imbalance between the CIC and the TFG.
Therefore the balance of power must change to favor the TFG
if the TFG is to succeed.

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KEY TO VICTORY: FINDING AL SHEBAB UNITS
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7. (C) At the end of the rainy season -- mid-November or a
bit later, as rains have been unusually heavy -- Ethiopia can
move to redress the military balance between the TFG and the
CIC, Meles said. Meles said that an attack on Baidoa by the
CIC could come at any moment given that they have troops only
a few miles away from the city; however, the rains may
prevent the attack. Meles stated strongly that if the CIC
does attack Baidoa, Ethiopia would be acting legally to help
the TFG confront the attack and push the CIC back to
Mogadishu. Meles plans to use the ENDF as "the cutting edge"
fighting with al Shebab and the Islamists, not the clans.
The Somalis could then "pick up the pieces," and liberate
southern Somalia Meles said. Outside humanitarian and
developmental resources could then build up the transitional
federal institutions, making them more capable and
representative. Radical Islam would be marginalized, but not
ousted. "That will be a matter of years," Meles warned.


8. (C) When Charge asked the Prime Minister if he were sure
that Ethiopia could win, Meles replied that defeat was
unlikely but there are always imponderables. The strength of
the ENDF rests on its mobility; therefore its success may
well be linked to whether it can determine the location of
the al Shebab Islamist forces, explosives, shoulder held
missiles, Eritrean "egla" missiles, technicals and the
ability of CIC to mine areas of operation. Meles concluded
by saying that "we can manage, but if the CIC has Eritrea
"egla" missiles, it could have a major influence on our
helos." Most importantly, Meles emphasized, would be to know
where the hard core elements are located. "If we know this,
we can fight in specific areas and the local militias can
disperse. We should not fight these groups, but to ensure
that we do not we will have to know where the al Shebab is
located," Meles explained.


9. (C) Meles said that given these factors it is difficult to
come up with a concept of operations. If the USG can assist
in any way - specifically intelligence - to counter the
growing al Shebab terrorist influence, Ethiopia would be
grateful. Meles also asked if the USG would discretely talk
with the Europeans and the UN so that they would not condemn
Ethiopia's actions. If they condemn Ethiopia, Meles said,
"it will stiffen the Jihadists." He added, "we will protect
Baidoa to the very last - there will be no retreat from
Baidoa." In response to the Charge's query, Meles said that
if the CIC attacked before ENDF troops could respond with a
push out of Baidoa, it would likely result in a two-phase
action. First would come the battle for Baidoa, which would
begin with a CIC attack; then this would be followed by a
wider campaign led by the TFG and ENDF -- if no diplomatic
solution is found -- in mid- to late November. Once the CIC
was bottled up in Mogadishu, perhaps US pressure might help
shut off the money coming in to the CIC from Dubai, he added.

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CIC COUNTING ON INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF ETHIOPIA
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10. (C) When Charge asked why the CIC would attack Baidoa if
it meant an Ethiopia/TFG response, Meles said that the CIC
wants to provoke Ethiopia into a war in Somalia so the EU and
the US will pressure Ethiopia to stop. But some in the CIC
are not so sure that the US and EU will make that
recommendation, and others doubt Ethiopia will bend to
pressure. In response to the Charge's urging, Meles
reiterated his previous statements that Ethiopia wants to
wait for the UNSC to lift the embargo on the TFG and
authorize IGASOM. Although this allows the CIC to acquire
more arms and expertise, Ethiopia also needs to prepare its
logistics in any case. A greater danger than an arms
build-up in the CIC is the spread of Islamist Jihad ideology,
Meles argued. For now, Ethiopia has friends in Somalia as

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well as in Puntland and Somaliland that are determined not to
fall to that ideology. Meles concluded that he looks forward
to many more conversations and communications on this topic.
HUDDLESTON