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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA2775
2006-10-13 15:42:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

AFRICAN UNION DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON SUPPORTS

Tags:   PREL  KPKO  MASS  AU  SO  SU  ET  ER 
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VZCZCXRO8947
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2775/01 2861542
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131542Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2879
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
						UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002775 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO, AF/E, AF/RSA, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPKO MASS AU SO SU ET ER
SUBJECT: AFRICAN UNION DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON SUPPORTS
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS FOR DARFUR AND SOMALIA




1. (SBU) SUMMARY. African Union Commission Deputy
Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka underscored the need for a
robust U.N. mandate for peacekeeping in Sudan, noting that
the AU lacked the resources to sustain an operation in Darfur
and therefore sought to transfer responsibility to the
international community. The AU recognized that "heinous
crimes" had occurred in Darfur, and that those responsible
should be held accountable. In addition to Darfur,
implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace
Agreement remained a concern. On Somalia, Mazimhaka and
other senior AU officials urged the immediate lifting of the
UN Security Council arms embargo on Somalia, to allow
assistance to be provided to the Transitional Federal
Government. Deployment of an IGAD peace support mission to
support the legitimacy of the TFG and its institutions should
not require the consent of the ICU, and would be the only way
to ensure that TFG-ICU tensions do not engulf neighboring
countries in a regional war, Mazimhaka said. END SUMMARY.



2. (U) On October 13, Charge, DCM, and CJTF-HOA Commander
Rear Admiral Richard Hunt led Amcit delegation from the NGO,
"Business Executives for National Security" (BENS), in a
meeting at African Union Headquarters with AU Deputy
Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka, AU Conflict Management
Director El-Ghassim Wane, and other AU Commission officials
responsible for peace and security issues. Deputy pol-econ
counselor and CJTF-HOA officers accompanied the U.S.
delegation.



--------------------------


"ROBUST U.N. MANDATE" NEEDED FOR SUDAN


--------------------------





3. (SBU) Sudan's refusal to allow transition to a UN mission
in Darfur created a dilemma for the international community,
and set a "very bad precedent" that "needs to be addressed
firmly," Mazimhaka said. The only option had been to extend
the current mandate of the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur
(AMIS). However, the AU could no longer sustain the mission
in Sudan, as the AU lacked the resources and capacity to
conduct an operation envisaged at more than 20,000 troops.
(NOTE: Current AMIS force strength is approximately 7,000;
the AU Peace and Security Council has authorized enhancing
AMIS by adding two additional battalions. END NOTE.) AU
withdrawal would result in a "free-for-all" between rebels
and armed groups, further suffering for the population of
Darfur, and deterioration of relations between Sudan and its
neighbors. The AU therefore needed to transfer
responsibility for the peacekeeping mission to the
international community. A "robust UN mandate" was needed in
Sudan, Mazimhaka said, to ensure that all parties observed

the Darfur Peace Agreement. The AU's intervention in Darfur
was not intended to be peace enforcement, as the AU lacked
the capacity to enforce peace in Sudan "or anywhere else."



4. (SBU) Darfur was a "tragedy for Africa and humanity,"
Mazimhaka said. The situation in Kordofan, not Darfur,
initially drew international attention; conflicts over
resources in western and southern Sudan, "exacerbated by
ideology," had led to the current crisis. AU intervention
came when rebels openly attacked the government. Rapes,
destruction, and the systematic displacement of civilians led
some to characterize the situation as "genocide." While the
AU had cooperated with the UN commission of inquiry that
could not conclusively define the situation as genocide, the
AU nevertheless recognized that "heinous crimes" had
occurred: those responsible should be investigated and held
before international justice, Mazimhaka said. Numerous UNSC
resolutions had been adopted holding individuals responsible
for international crimes. As Sudan was an AU member state,
the AU had the right to intervene when the population faced
danger, "but it is extremely difficult when a member state
refuses to cooperate with us." The AU had little leverage on
Sudan, other than suspending Sudan's membership in the AU or
endorsing UN sanctions on the Government of Sudan (GOS) or on
Sudanese individuals. The international community needed
deeper engagement with Sudan, Mazimhaka said.



5. (SBU) Asked whether China was obstructing international

ADDIS ABAB 00002775 002 OF 004


pressure on Sudan, Mazimhaka noted that both Russia and China
had abstained on UNSCR 1706. He said the Russian foreign
minister had explained to AU principals that Russia's
abstention had been intended to give Sudan an opportunity to
accept UN deployment. China derived economic benefits from
both Sudan and Chad, Mazimhaka said, noting that Chad now
recognized China rather than Taiwan.



--------------------------


DON'T FORGET ABOUT NORTH-SOUTH CPA


--------------------------





6. (SBU) Questioned about North-South relations in Sudan,
Mazimhaka said enthusiasm for the Government of Southern
Sudan (GoSS) had waned over recent years. The GoSS had
strayed from the vision of John Garang, he said, by
disagreeing on the implementation of the North-South
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), establishing a parallel
cabinet rather than accept the structure of the national
government, and by disagreeing on Darfur. Salva Kiir spent
most of his time in Juba as GoSS President, rather than as
vice president of the government of national unity, Mazimhaka
noted. Integration of armed forces had slowed, and
resolution of border conflicts remained dormant. The GoSS
was preparing to consolidate its gains and ultimately to
secede, he said.



7. (SBU) AU Commission Conflict Management Director
El-Ghassim Wane underscored that while the international
community focused on Darfur, the CPA still needed to be
implemented. Unresolved North-south issues included those
related to oil, as well as the GOS rejection of the July 2005
Abyei Boundary Commission's ruling. Different positions on
Darfur further strained relations between the GOS and the
SPLM. Southern Sudan endorsing independence through a
referendum would not be good for either Sudan or Africa, Wane
said.



--------------------------



--------------------------


SOMALIA: SUPPORT TFG IMMEDIATELY OR RISK REGIONAL WAR


--------------------------



--------------------------





8. (SBU) The situation in Somalia requires immediate, urgent
attention, Mazimhaka said. He affirmed the legitimacy of
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which
resulted from international negotiations, and noted that the
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) had not been party to those
talks. The African Union recognized the Transitional Federal
Institutions (TFIs) as a step toward representational
government, he said. Mazimhaka warned that failure to
resolve conflict between the TFG and the ICU would inevitably
result in a regional war, with a projected 75,000 refugees
fleeing to Kenya, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Mazimhaka said
the AU believed that the ICU not only sought the military
overthrow of the TFG, but also espoused Somali dictator Siad
Barre's concept of a "Greater Somalia." "Somalia's
neighbors--Kenya, Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Djibouti--would
get not only refugees, but war as well," Mazimhaka said. A
further concern, he said, was that while Siad Barre had
espoused a secular revolutionary government, the ICU sought a
religious revolutionary government.



9. (SBU) Observing that failure to act now could lead to
possible war in the Horn of Africa, Charge asked what
immediate steps could be taken to stop conflict in Ethiopia,
Somalia, and Kenya. AU Commission Peace and Security
Director Geoffrey Mugumya responded that while some nations
had a strategic interest in Somalia's stability, others
sought Somalia's instability. Charge observed that
instability served no country's interests: stability in
Somalia would better enable Ethiopia to address its internal
situation, but now OLF and ONLF insurgents used Somalia for
operations against Ethiopia.



--------------------------



--------------------------


ERITREA SHIPPING ARMS; EMBARGO SHOULD BE LIFTED TO HELP TFG


--------------------------



--------------------------





10. (SBU) Continuing contacts between the TFG and ICU was

ADDIS ABAB 00002775 003 OF 004


important, Mazimhaka said, but one needed the will and
resources to resist the advance of the Islamic Courts. If
the ICU believed it enjoyed greater popular support, it
should compete against the TFG in popular elections, he said.
Rear Admiral Hunt noted that a third round of Khartoum talks
between the TFG and ICU may not yield satisfactory results,
if appropriate leaders did not attend. Mazimhaka noted that
the ICU had immediately dismissed its representative after
the first round of talks. Hawiye supporters of the ICU
strongly resented TFG President Yusuf; so long as the ICU
believed it could achieve its aims through war, it would not
negotiate in good faith, he added.



11. (SBU) Questioned about reported arms shipments to the ICU
from jihadists in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran, Mazimhaka
said that while the source of such arms was unknown, the AU
had evidence of arms "coming through one of our member
states." "We know that most of the arms here come through
Eritrea," he declared. Director Wane observed that the UN
monitoring group's report highlighted violations of the arms
embargo by several countries, including Eritrea.
Wane appealed for the UN Security Council to lift the arms
embargo imposed on Somalia since January 1992, or at least
provide an exemption for those assisting the TFG. By failing
to distinguish between those supporting legitimate authority
and those supporting the ICU, the arms embargo was
"counter-productive to our efforts to establish a
transitional government," he said. Mazimhaka observed that
the arms embargo was intended for Somali warlords, not
international peacekeepers. As the ICU already controlled
all the ports of Somalia, one could not limit arms shipments,
especially through Eritrea, Yemen, or the Indian Ocean.



--------------------------

-
ICU'S CONSENT NOT NEEDED FOR IGASOM DEPLOYMENT


--------------------------

-



12. (SBU) IGAD's proposal to deploy a peace support mission
in Somalia (IGASOM) was "the only way to prevent the spread
of war to neighbors," Mazimhaka said. If the UN Security
Council endorsed such a mission, then the arms embargo would
not apply, he added, as it would be an UNSC-mandated
peacekeeping operation. In addition to IGAD member states,
the AU needed to consider other potential troop contributing
countries, in order to generate "more capable forces,"
Mazimhaka said. A peacekeeping operation did not require the
consent of all parties, Mazimhaka observed, and it was "not
an acceptable position" for "a belligerent" like the ICU to
require consent. International law required only the
consensus of the TFG, he said, whose legitimacy was
recognized by both the AU and the international community.



13. (SBU) Somalia's transitional federal institutions
resulted from the Somali national reconciliation conference
in Kenya, but faced both regional and internal obstacles,
according to AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Secretary
Dr. A.M. Kambudzi. At the international level, failure to
resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute exacerbated
tensions within Somalia, he said, as did indeterminate
borders between Ethiopia and Somalia, and between Somalia and
Kenya. Within the region, there was also "no spirit of good
neighborliness" in the Horn of Africa. Internally, domestic
Somali political culture was one of clans, rather than
political groups and parties.



14. (SBU) Conflict Management Director Wane underscored the
need to promote regional integration, as well as a regional
approach to conflict resolution, involving the AU, EU, and
IGAD. International efforts to address localized conflicts
(Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, North-South Sudan, Darfur) often
considered such conflicts in isolation from others. For
example, while the United States focused on addressing the
Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, he said, Eritrea was
supporting rebels in Darfur. Ensuring that landlocked
Ethiopia had access to the sea would resolve many security
issues, Wane said. Asked whether greater U.S. engagement in
Somalia could have the unwanted effect of attracting
additional negative elements, Mazimhaka noted the importance
of U.S. supporting regional efforts by the AU and EU, and

ADDIS ABAB 00002775 004 OF 004


building consensus with actors ranging from Horn of Africa
countries to China. Mazimhaka decried the "high level of
intimidation" by countries in the Horn of Africa, intended to
block such consensus. The U.S. could also use its influence
among League of Arab States members.



15. (SBU) COMMENT: Mazimhaka, the second-highest ranking
official in the AU Commission, has previously expressed
strong support for UN and even NATO involvement in Darfur,
but his observations do not necessarily reflect the consensus
of AU member states or members of the AU Peace and Security
Council. As for Somalia, his comments reflect a consensus
among several senior AU officials responsible for
international security issues that immediate action is needed
to prevent the Somalia conflict from engulfing its neighbors
in a regional war. END COMMENT.
HUDDLESTON