ETHIOPIA: GENERALS' DEFECTION MAY SIGNAL DEEPER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002572

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM MOPS ASEC ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: GENERALS' DEFECTION MAY SIGNAL DEEPER
RIFT


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON REASON: 1.4(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent defections of senior Oromo military
officers have shaken the Ethiopian military establishment.
Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu of the Ethiopian National
Defense Forces (ENDF) defected to Eritrea on Aug 8, taking as
many as two hundred soldiers and lower level officers with
him. General Kemal was in charge of the 18th division,
stationed near the Ethiopian - Eritrean border, before his
defection. General Kemal, who is an ethnic Oromo,
subsequently pledged his allegiance to the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF). Kemal was joined a month later by the Oromo
head of the Eighth Mechanized Division, Brig. General Hailu
Gonfa, as well as some lower ranking officials, who also
defected and announced their support for the OLF and the
multi-ethnic Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD). Oromo
National Congress (ONC) leader Merera Gudina told post in
mid-August that the defection of Kemal might signal the
beginning of a crack in the ENDF,s unified support for the
EPRDF. Clandestine reporting and opposition-oriented
websites have indicated that the ENDF arrested a number of
Oromo officers in response to the defection, increased
surveillance of others and held a number of gatherings with
military personnel to discuss the defections and the
conditions that prompted them. A retired senior ENDF
commander told Pol/Econ Counselor that morale within the ENDF
is poor and readiness significantly lower than in previous
years. Comment: The ruling EPRDF's control over the
military was put to the test in 2005 when the armed forces
were called upon to put down massive, violent demonstrations
against the regime. The firm and disciplined response of the
ENDF was crucial to the EPRDF's survival. The Tigrayan-
dominated ENDF leadership continues to face a restive
population, internal insurgencies and growing external
threats from Somalia and Eritrea; it can ill afford the
ethnic divisions that recent defections suggest. END SUMMARY.

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TWO OROMO GENERALS BOLT FROM TIGRAYAN-DOMINATED MILITARY
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2. (U) Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu of the Ethiopian
National Defense Forces (ENDF) defected to Eritrea on Aug 8,
taking as many as two hundred soldiers and lower level
officers with him. General Kemal was in charge of the 18th
division, stationed near the Ethiopian - Eritrean border,
before his defection. General Kemal, who is an ethnic Oromo,
subsequently pledged his allegiance to the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF). Kemal was joined a month later by the Oromo
head of the Eighth Mechanized Division, Brig. General Hailu
Gonfa, as well as some lower ranking officials, who also
defected and publicly announced their support for the OLF and
the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD),a multi-ethnic
opposition coalition.

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DEFECTIONS HIGHLIGHT EXISTING TENSIONS WITHIN ENDF
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3. (C) According to former Ethiopian President Negaso Gidada,
Kemal and Hailu are two of only 7 Oromo generals out of a
total of 60-70 general officers in the ENDF. Tigrayans hold
about 70 percent of the senior positions, and officers from
other ethnic groups report that even if they get senior
spots, Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) "commissars"
are usually assigned to their staffs to make most of the real
decisions. Oromos, who are reportedly the largest ethnic
group in Ethiopia, are much better represented in the rank
and file of the ENDF, probably comprising 25-35 percent of
the force. Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM)
leader Bulcha Demeksa told post that Kemal was the first
Oromo general to rebel against the government since Gen.
Tadesse Birru, who took on Emperor Haile Selassie in the
early 1970's. Bulcha noted that Tadesse survived and went
on to found the Mecha-Tulema Society, the premier Oromo civil
society organization whose leaders were arrested in 2004.
ONC chairman Merera Gudina told the Charge that he had spoken
with a number of rank and file Oromo ENDF soldiers during his
mid-August trip to Oromiya. They told him that Kemal,s
defection had prompted much discussion amongst Oromos in the
ENDF.


4. (S) Another senior Oromo officer still on duty told DATT

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Sept. 20 (septel) that he feels he is under greater suspicion
since the defection of Kemal. He confirmed that Tigrayan
staff were assigned to monitor his actions. The officer
expressed annoyance that he would be suspected of disloyalty
after many years of faithful service, but professed his
continuing allegiance to the ENDF command structure. The
officer indicated that arrests of mid-ranking Oromo officers
in the ENDF were fairly widespread, with those arrested being
charged in many cases with trumped-up corruption charges or
disloyalty. The officer also discussed with the DATT an
imminent plan for "down-sizing" the ENDF officer ranks that
would involve dismissing thousands of mostly ethnic Oromo and
Amhara officers, with a small number of Tigrayans thrown in
for the sake of appearances. According to this senior
officer, these developments were deepening the climate of
tension within the ENDF, but most military personnel were
focused on their own economic survival, rather than on
resistance. He added, however, that 3-5 Oromo officers of
various ranks were deserting almost every day.


5. (S) Retired Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae (protect),the
former Chief of Staff of the ENDF, told Pol/Econ Counselor
Sept 18 that the DATT's contact was indeed being closely
watched since the defections, and that Eastern Region
Commander Gen. Bacha, also an Oromo, had come under suspicion
as well. (DATT's contact believes Bacha is safe for the
moment.) Bacha is also known as an intimate of Tsadkan, who
was reportedly relieved of command in 2001 after he refused
an order to deploy ENDF troops to influence internal TPFL
debates. Bacha currently plays an especially key role as the
commander of ENDF operations against the ONLF insurgency as
well as operations to counter the growing influence of the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC).

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TSADKAN: ENDF MORALE AND READINESS LOW

SIPDIS
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6. (S) Gen. Tsadkan, a Tigrayan, called recent defections
"extremely serious." He said they indicated that the armed
forces were no longer as disciplined or motivated as they had
once been. He also claimed that the EPRDF's willingness to
use the ENDF for political purposes had sapped morale in the
organization. He said the deployment of ENDF units to quell
protests in June and November 2005 had taken a toll on the
organization. Although relatively few officers had defected
to date, many -- especially Oromos -- had checked out
mentally and were focused on their own personal well-being,
and enrichment in some cases, rather than on the mission of
defending the country. Asked what GOE leaders could do to
remedy this situation, Tsadkan replied that no solution for
the ENDF was possible in isolation. Only a broader solution
to Ethiopia's political problems would reinvigorate troops'
commitment to the ENDF. The General cautioned that while
ongoing purges and arrests within the ENDF might intimidate
potential troublemakers and reduce instability temporarily,
they would ultimately worsen the situation.


7. (S) Tsadkan remarked that while the ENDF should still be
capable of mounting targeted military operations to influence
the situation in Somalia, a full-scale invasion of Somalia
would likely reveal the low morale and lack of readiness that
now plagued the institution. Tsadkan claimed that the GOE
was still trading on the reputation that the ENDF had earned
in the late 1990's, when it had gone into Somalia and dealt a
decisive military defeat to Al-Itihad Al-Islami (AIAI). It
would be better, said the General, if that reputation were
not put to the test today. (NOTE: As the commander of the
ENDF during the late 1990's, Tsadkan's views of readiness
then and now may be somewhat biased.) Asked about the
potential for Eritrean adventurism given the weakened state
of Ethiopian readiness, Tsadkan replied that President Isaias
was more likely to wait for his strategy of undermining
Ethiopia from within to work.

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COMMENT: BAD TIME FOR INTERNAL DIVISIONS
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7. (S) It is too early to conclude that discipline and
loyalty to the EPRDF in the armed forces are breaking down
generally. There are some indications, however, that the
defections of Generals Kemal and Hailu may prompt others,

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especially Oromos, to examine more intensely their continuing
support for the EPRDF. The defection and its potential
ripple effects poses a serious dilemma for the EPRDF and ENDF
leadership: taking measures to increase control over Oromo
officers and minimize the risks of additional desertions will
only exacerbate feelings among Oromo military personnel that
they are neither trusted nor truly represented by the GOE.
This dilemma comes at a time when the GOE is already
grappling with how to confront the threat of Islamic
fundamentalists in Somalia while not neglecting the defense
of its long border with Eritrea. The ENDF also faces several
internal insurgencies; the battle with the ONLF in the Somali
region remains particularly fierce. Firm control over the
armed forces has been the bulwark of the EPRDF since the May
2005 election laid bare the GoEQuced popular support
and November unrest further damaged its image. If further
developments demonstrate broader erosion of support in the
armed forces, the structural weaknesses of Ethiopia's tough
but minority-led ruling coalition may finally manifest
themselves.
HUDDLESTON