Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA2525
2006-09-16 13:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA: DAS YAMAMOTO DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM ER SO SU 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2482
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 002525 

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AF FOR A/S JENDAYI FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ER SO SU
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DAS YAMAMOTO DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES
AND INTERNAL POLITICS WITH PM MELES


Classified By: CHARGE JANET WILGUS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 002525

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S JENDAYI FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ER SO SU
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DAS YAMAMOTO DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES
AND INTERNAL POLITICS WITH PM MELES


Classified By: CHARGE JANET WILGUS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told visiting AF
DAS Yamamoto Sept. 12 that his ruling coalition was
developing a new strategy to deal with Eritrea's "proxy war"
with Ethiopioa in Somalia. He also suggested that the
Government of Sudan was reluctant to allow a transition to a
UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur because it did not want to
"freeze" the status quo there. Meles said that his recent
trip to Libya did not involve negotiations with the Union of
Islamic Courts (UIC) in Mogadishu, but was rather focused on
defusing pressure to join President Qaddafi's Sept 9th
organization. DAS Yamamoto asked about the health conditions
of detained opposition leaders from the Coalition for Unity
and Democracy (CUD); the PM responded that none was in grave
condition and all were receiving adequate medical treatment.
Meles also renewed complaints about pending U.S.
congressional legislation on Ethiopia. END SUMMARY


2. (U) AF DAS Don Yamamoto called on PM Meles Sept. 12,
accompanied by Charge Wilgus and Pol/Econ Counselor
(notetaker). The PM was joined by his personal assistant,
Gebretensai.

--------------
NORTH AFRICAN STATES' VIEWS OF SOMALIA
--------------


3. (C) PM Meles told DAS Yamamoto that he and Libyan leader
Mohammar Gaddafi had not discussed Somalia during Meles'
recent one-day visit to Tripoli, contradicting press reports.
The real purpose of the trip had been for Meles to explain
to Gaddafi Ethiopia's reluctance to join the Libyan leader's
Association of Sahelian and Saharan States (CEN-SAD). In
fact, Meles said, he had been reluctant to discuss with
Gaddafi Somalia or Sudan, since Meles said he knew where the
Libyan leader stood on those issues. The PM added that he
had been particularly determined not to broach Ethiopia's
internal political issues so as not to "whet Gaddafi's
appetite." Meles added that the CIC was also appealing
directly to Gaddafi, as was Transitional Federal Government

(TFG) President Abdullai Yusuf. The PM recalled what he
termed Gaddafi's "visceral hatred" of Wahhabism and asked
rhetorically why the Libyan leader would support the CIC.
Meles then claimed that Eritrean President Isaias had been
trying to convince Gaddafi that the Council of Islamic Courts
(CIC) was on its way to reestablishing a unified and
functional state in Somalia and therefore deserved support.


4. (C) Meles went on to say that Egypt was feeling
marginalized by IGAD's role in Somalia, which Egypt still
considered part of its sphere of influence. Egypt also had a
longstanding strategy of "keeping Ethiopia busy," to which
the CIC contributed. Sudan, on the other hand, had taken a
measured approach to Somalia. It had not opposed IGAD
efforts, even including the deployment of an IGASOM
peacekeeping mission there. Meles said he didn't know what
Sudanese leaders felt in their "heart of hearts", but had
tried to express on CIC leaders the importance of accepting
at least the Transitional Federal Charter. Meles noted that
many CIC leaders had been trained in the "Turabi School" of
Islamic politics and undoubtedly enjoyed some support among
those circles in Khartoum. Meles called Yemen's position on
Somalia "cautious, and helpful on the whole."

--------------
SUDANESE STRATEGY IN DARFUR
--------------


5. (C) After receiving an update on US views of Darfur from
DAS Yamamoto, Meles shared his own perspective on GOS
strategy in the area. The PM suggested that the GOS had
recently decided to end its "proxy" approach to dealing with
non-signatory rebel groups in Darfur and were now committed
to taking direct military action against the rebels. The GOS
had also determined that it must deal directly with Eritrean
President Isaias' role in Darfur as well. Meles thought that
the GOS would seek an end to Isaias' support for rebels in
return for opening the Sudanese border with Eritrea.
Finally, the GOS now intended to "work the JEM problem
through Turabi." The reason for GOS reluctance to tolerate
the blue-hatting of the current African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) was a fear that UN presence in Darfur would
"freeze the status quo." Under these circumstances, Meles

ADDIS ABAB 00002525 002 OF 002


suggested to DAS Yamamoto that confrontation with the GOS
might not be the right tactic.

--------------
A NEW GOE APPROACH TOWARD ERITREA
--------------


6. (C) The PM told Yamamoto that the EPRDF's upcoming annual
conference would consider a "slightly modified" policy toward
Eritrea. The leadership of the EPRDF had already agreed to
the new strategy, which essentially declared Ethiopian
peacemaking efforts to date unsuccessful. Under its previous
approach, the ruling party had hoped that if it deterred a
direct attack by Eritrea, then it would open a door to
dialogue with Asmara. In fact, however, Eritrea had simply
chosen to pursue a proxy war against Ethiopia. Meles
suggested that Isaias had been persuaded by his experience in
Darfur and elseswhere in Sudan that supporting the enemies of
his neighbors could help him achieve his goals. In addition,
Isaias appeared to believe that Ethiopia's post-election
problems would make it vulnerable to such tactics. Meles
claimed that the GOE had until recently pursued any contact
that it believed could effectively communicate with the
Eritrean leadership, but said that his own party had now
labeled such efforts "a waste of time."


7. (C) Meles indicated that the EPRDF's new approach would
not be to respond in kind to Eritrea's tactics, but rather to
"address the vulnerabilities" that Eritrea was seeking to
exploit. He assured DAS Yamamoto that Ethiopia was not going
back on "the fundamentals of the peace package," but said
that the GOE's new focus would be to protect against
Eritrean-backed disturbances.

--------------
CUD TRIAL TO FINISH BY YEAR END
--------------


8. (C) DAS Yamamoto inquired about the health of imprisoned
CUD leaders, including Hailu Shawel and Mesfin Woldemariam.
Meles replied that the two were not in grave condition and
receive medical care when they need it. In fact, he added,
they received "better medical care than 95 percent of
population." Yamamoto asked the CUD trial would likely
conclude; Meles said he hoped it would finish before the end
of the year. The DAS asked to see the detainees, but the PM
indicated that he saw nothing to gain by providing further
access to them.

--------------
COMMENT: NEW POLICY ON ERITREA UNCLEAR
--------------


9. (C) Meles' suggestion that Ethiopia is revising its policy
toward Eritrea is potentially very significant, but it
remains unclear precisely what the new policy means. Post
will seek to gain a better understanding of where the GOE is
headed in this area.
WILGUS