Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA2178
2006-08-09 15:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIAN MILITARY ASSESSES BORDER SITUATION WITH

Tags:  PREL PINS MOPS ET SO ER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5709
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2178/01 2211551
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091551Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1983
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002178 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS ET SO ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN MILITARY ASSESSES BORDER SITUATION WITH
ERITREA AND SOMALIA

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2170

B. ADDIS ABABA 2093

C. ADDIS ABABA 2041

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002178

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS ET SO ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN MILITARY ASSESSES BORDER SITUATION WITH
ERITREA AND SOMALIA

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2170

B. ADDIS ABABA 2093

C. ADDIS ABABA 2041

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY. Ethiopia's senior military officer, Chief of
General Staff Lieutenant General Samora Yonus, expressed
concern that Eritrea, Somalia's Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC),and Ethiopian insurgent groups are collaborating to
destabilize Ethiopia. Ethiopia plans to train troops for
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG),and
continues to advocate the modification of the UNSC arms
embargo on Somalia, in order to allow the immediate
deployment of a peacekeeping mission (likely with Ugandan
troops) to Baidoa. Having warned the UIC of retaliation if
it did not end attacks on the TFG, the Ethiopia assesses that
the TFG now controls more troops than the UIC and no longer
faces immediate danger of military defeat. According to
Samora, while the TFG appears to have reconciled its internal
differences, the UIC remains divided between moderates and
Islamic extremists. Samora also noted reduced tensions along
the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, as adverse weather will render
any military operations difficult through September, and
Eritrean troops are now preoccupied with agricultural
activities. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On August 9, visiting Congressman Donald Payne and
House International Relations Committee staff Ted Dagne met
with Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Samora Yonus
and Samora's aide-de-camp Major Yeshiwas, deputy head of the
Ministry of Defense's foreign affairs department. Acting
DATT, deputy pol-econ counselor, and Pickering Fellow,
accompanied CODEL Payne.

--------------
ERITREA SUPPORTS SOMALIA'S ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS
--------------


3. (C) General Samora said that military activity by
Somalia's Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) now focused more on
activities within Ethiopia's Somali Region than within
Somalia itself, and were intended to destabilize Ethiopia.

In contrast, Samora said, the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) was a broad-based government comprised of members of
all clans, who sought to stabilize Somalia. As Ethiopia
shared a 1,600 km-long border with Somalia, Somali
instability had a direct effect on Ethiopian security, Samora
explained. Samora asserted that the UIC, Al-Ittihad
al-Islami (AIAI),and the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF) shared objectives: Islamicists in the UIC had as
their political goal the formation of a "greater Somalia"
that included parts of Kenya and Ethiopia. According to
Samora, AIAI comprised the largest force within the UIC.
Eritrea was also supporting the UIC, he said, just as it had
supported other opposition forces to destabilize Ethiopia.
For several years, ONLF fighters had infiltrated Ethiopia via
Sudan and Kenya. According to Samora, some 1,000 Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) fighters had been based in Kiloma (50
km from Assab),Eritrea, 600 of whom were now in Mogadishu
preparing for military operations. In the past week alone,
Samora said, some 350 OLF fighters had entered Ethiopia.
Foreign assistance had helped rehabilitate Mogadishu's
airport and seaport, and large quantities of armaments were
arriving, including from Eritrea, he added.

--------------
ETHIOPIA TO TRAIN SOMALI TFG FORCES
--------------


4. (C) There was no need for Ethiopia to send troops into
Somalia now, Samora said, as Ethiopian intelligence units
monitored the situation. However, "if there is a problem, we
will enter," he declared. Samora explained that Ethiopia
would train Somali troops for the TFG, once an international
peacekeeping operation was approved. The TFG's forces were
comprised of members of all clans, and included officers
trained in the Soviet Union, he noted. Ethiopia would
participate in discussions to be held in the following week
on the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to Baidoa, Samora
said, adding that troops would likely hail from Uganda if the

ADDIS ABAB 00002178 002 OF 003


UNSC modified the arms embargo on Somalia.


5. (C) Questioned by CODEL Payne about Sudan's involvement
with the UIC, Samora said there was no conflict of interests
between Ethiopia and Sudan, a fellow member of IGAD and the
African Union. Commercial ties between Ethiopia and Sudan
were growing, he said, including road linkages and petroleum
sales. He noted that Sudan, under the auspices of the League
of Arab States, sought to mediate between the TFG and the
UIC. While observing that OLF fighters had previously been
sent from Eritrea to western Ethiopia via "Russian" flights
through Sudan, Samora said that Ethiopia acknowledged that
Sudan lacked the capability to control its entire border.
While Ethiopia monitored the situation, it had no information
on Government of Sudan support to the UIC, he said.

--------------
TFG CAN NOW HOLD ITS OWN AGAINST UIC
--------------


6. (C) While the UIC sought to expand its reach to Puntland,
Samora assessed that the TFG now no longer faced imminent
danger. Ethiopia had warned the UIC to stop attacking the
TFG or face retaliation: "if they (the UIC) attack, we will
attack them," Samora said. The UIC was now active only in
propaganda, not in fighting the TFG, he added. Samora
attributed the UIC's popular support to its success in
displacing warlords who previously collected taxes from the
areas under their respective control, but noted that some
forces loyal to Hussain Aideed (son of Mohammed Farah Aideed)
still remained in Mogadishu. BBC reports asserting that UIC
forces were stronger than the TFG were misleading: with
control of Baidoa, Puntland and the Kismayo region, the TFG
had more troops than the UIC, he said. Samora noted that
lack of economic opportunities in Somalia made serving as a
militia member an attractive option, as each clan paid its
fighters through taxes; UIC forces were largely comprised of
such fighters, he said. Samora dismissed military operations
by the UIC during the previous week as "propaganda" intended
solely to bolster the UIC's image in the media: UIC fighters
were not organized as cohesive units but only along clan
lines, which made them reluctant to engage other clan-based
militia, he said. Fighting between the UIC and Somali
militias had erupted August 8 in Galcaiyo, he said, after the
UIC had sent letters to all Somali clans directing them to
accept the UIC or face punishment. UIC forces had also
clashed amongst themselves near the border with Ethiopia on
August 8, he said, as a result of disagreement over the
establishment of an Islamic court.


7. (C) The UIC was divided between moderates advocating peace
talks with the TFG and Islamic extremists who did not, Samora
said. On the other hand, the TFG had now resolved its own
internal differences between the president and the prime
minister (ref A). Samora noted that UIC head Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys, a member of the Ayr clan rather than the Hawiye
clan which was predominant in Mogadishu, was no longer in
Mogadishu. CODEL Payne noted that the difficulty of Darod
clan members, such as TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf,
establishing a foothold in Hawiye territory. Samora said he
personally saw no difference, apart from clan identity, among
Somalis, as they all shared the same language and culture,
and were all Muslims; Somalia's internal problems had created
divisions among Somali clans, he said.

-------------- --------------
RAIN MAKES ERITREA-ETHIOPIA BORDER CLASH UNLIKELY NOW
-------------- --------------


8. (C) General Samora downplayed the risk of hostilities
along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, citing adverse weather
conditions at least through September, and Eritrean troops'
current pre-occupation with the agricultural harvest. On the
one hand, he said, the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) no
longer existed, he said, due to the presence within the TSZ
of Eritrean troops and militia. Eritrea also continued to
impose restrictions within Eritrea on the movement of United
Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) observers:
forbidding helicopter flights and night patrols, and
restricting ground patrols to specific areas. As a result,
UNMEE had no control over Eritrean troop movements, either
within the TSZ or elsewhere. On the other hand, Samora said,

ADDIS ABAB 00002178 003 OF 003


the current rainy season was not conducive to military
operations, which would require support by trucks. "The
weather itself doesn't help anyone; we both fight with old
technology," he noted. Moreover, according to Samora, the
Eritrean military was now busy with the agricultural harvest:
whereas the Ethiopian government believed development should
come from the people, Eritrea's government focused on
economic activity by the army, he said.


9. (C) Samora assessed that Eritrea sought to exploit any
perceived weakness of Ethiopia, even if it did not lead to
military victory. Thus, he said, Ethiopia tried to "make it
impossible" for Eritrean forces to attack along their common
border, and had conducted exercises on this scenario last
year. For this reason, Samora explained, Eritrea was now
focusing on destabilizing Ethiopia by intervention in Somalia.


10. (C) COMMENT: Samora's comments come only days after
Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum successfully mediated among
TFG leaders, resulting in an agreement to engage the UIC in
dialogue (ref A). Samora's assessment that the UIC now no
longer threatens to obliterate Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government is consistent with recent observations by TFG
officials (refs B-C) that it now has "breathing room" to
develop its capacity and build popular support, rather than
fear military defeat by the UIC. In the meantime, Post
continues to recommend UNSC action to modify the existing
arms embargo on Somalia, in order to facilitate the immediate
deployment of an IGAD peace support mission to ensure
Somalia's stability. END COMMENT.
HUDDLESTON