ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINES ETHIOPIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002170

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ET SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINES ETHIOPIAN
INTERESTS IN A STABLE SOMALIA

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY. Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin
briefed Charge and CODEL Payne on his recent trip to Baidoa
to mediate among the president, prime minister, and
parliamentary speaker of Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government (TFG),who had been divided over whether to engage
in dialogue with the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).
According to Seyoum, the TFG has now agreed to a dialogue
with the UIC. TFG leaders also announced to parliament their
agreement to reduce the size of its cabinet by two-thirds, to
recruit additional civil servants so that government
ministries can function, and to present a three-month plan of
action for parliamentary review. Ethiopia continues to
advocate for an IGAD peace support mission to intervene in
Somalia, citing the need to strengthen the capacity of the
TFG. FM Seyoum and his deputy highlighted Ethiopia's
strategic interest in promoting stability in its eastern
neighbor, particularly as Ethiopia was home to more than 3
million Somalis. Seyoum said Eritrean support for the Union
of Islamic Courts was consistent with Eritrea's support for
Ethiopian insurgent groups, and was intended to destabilize
Ethiopia. Seyoum urged the international community to
support the immediate deployment to Baidoa of an IGAD peace
support mission. FM Seyoum's comments on the current state
of U.S.-Ethiopian bilateral relations will be reported
septel. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On August 7, Charge, deputy pol-econ counselor, and
Pickering Fellow accompanied Congressman Donald Payne and
House International Relations Committee staff Ted Dagne to a
dinner meeting with Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, State
Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu, MFA Director
General for Europe and America Ms. Almaz Ameha, and MFA
Counsellor for Legal Affairs Dr. Menelik Alemu.

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DISAGREEMENT OVER UNION OF ISLAMIC COURTS DIVIDES TFG
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3. (C) FM Seyoum said he tried to find the Kenyan foreign
minister, currently chair of IGAD, to lead the mediation
effort between Transitional Federal Government of Somalia
President Abdullahi Yusuf and Parliamentary Speaker Sharif
Hassan Sheikh Adan, on the one hand, and Prime Minister Ali
Mohamed Ghedi, on the other, but that the Kenyan FM had not
been available, due to preoccupation with domestic issues.
Seyoum discussed how leaders in the TFG had mutually agreed
to reconcile their differences and to appoint new government
ministers, following his August 5 visit to Baidoa to mediate
among them. Seyoum said that the governor of Baidoa had
sought his intervention, as frustrated residents feared
insecurity were the TFG to collapse.


4. (C) According to Seyoum, PM Gedi had been "at odds" with
President Yusuf and Speaker Adan's support for engaging in
dialogue with the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC),avoiding
both for the last three weeks in an attempt to ostracize
them. Now, there was agreement to talk with the UIC.
Parliament and cabinet had been split over whether to engage
in talks with the UIC, Seyoum said. Seyoum said the mass
resignation of approximately 40 ministers from a total
cabinet of nearly 105 had been intended to cripple the PM,
while PM Ghedi, in turn, had sought to have his supporters
resign from standing committees in parliament in order to
undermine the speaker. PM Ghedi had tried to replace
ministers who had resigned, but had failed to follow
procedure, by not seeking approval from either President
Yusuf or parliament for new appointees. Payne noted that in
the past, the TFG President had sought to appoint ministers
unilaterally. Undermining the Transitional Charter
threatened to lead to the collapse of the Transitional
Federal Institutions, Seyoum said. Following 13 hours of
negotiations, the three leaders had joined hands and
addressed parliament on August 7, receiving a standing
ovation while urging their respective supports to put aside
their differences. Only four of 250 parliamentarians had
abstained, Seyoum said.


5. (C) The TFG had now agreed to reduce its cabinet to only
31 ministers, Seyoum said, and would present a plan of action

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to parliament which called for concrete tasks to be completed
within the next three months. In three months, parliament
would decide whether to extend the TFG for another three
months, he said, noting that PM Ghedi had offered to resign
if parliament found the TFG wanting. Seyoum said that
despite his personal involvement in the talks, he was
cautiously optimistic: Somalis never failed to sign an
agreement, he said; the problem was implementation.

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CONCERN ABOUT TFG'S LACK OF CAPACITY
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6. (C) FM Seyoum complained of the "inefficiency" of the TFG.
"They have done nothing," he said, except remain in Baidoa
or tour foreign capitals, while, in contrast, the Union of
Islamic Courts was "highly motivated" and actively mobilized
people. Authorities in both the strategically important Juba
valley region (Kismayo) and Puntland had pledged their
support for the TFG but had received little assistance in
return, he said. The TFG previously had 103 cabinet
ministers, but none had any staff. "The TFG needs to think
seriously about functioning," he said, "but there is not
bureaucracy to function, so they have to create it." The
recent agreement called for the TFG to recruit at least 15
civil servants for each ministry, he said. Charge noted the
need to win hearts and minds among the Somali people, not
just to look at Somalia solely in terms of combating
terrorism.


7. (C) In response to Charge's observation that IGAD's August
1 ministerial communique on Somalia (forwarded to AF/E) did
not publicly acknowledge differences among IGAD members on
whether to deploy a peace support operation in Somalia
(IGASOM),FM Seyoum underscored the urgency of deploying such
a mission. While some argued that foreign troops in Somalia
could unite forces opposed to the TFG, what forces in Somalia
were not already united, he asked rhetorically. Seyoum
stressed the need to convince the UIC of the necessity of
negotiation, rather than using military means to change the
political situation. Negotiation would help rid Somalia of
hard-liners, he said, both within the UIC itself as well as
UIC supporters in Somalia's transitional parliament. Seyoum
noted that commercial traffic between the UIC's base in
Mogadishu and the TFG in Baidoa continued unabated; Speaker
Adan was a Hawiye Habr-Gedir from north Mogadishu who visited
often, he said.


8. (C) The recent assessment mission to Somalia organized by
the African Union, IGAD, UN, and the League of Arab States
had found that only the UIC and its leaders in Mogadishu
opposed Ethiopian participation in a potential peace support
operation, Seyoum said. "People insisted, 'we want
Ethiopia,'" Seyoum asserted, adding that a previous
assessment conducted in late 2004 had reached the same
conclusion.

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SOMALIA'S STABILITY OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO ETHIOPIA
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9. (C) State Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu
(Seyoum's deputy) underscored the strategic importance of
Somalia to Ethiopia. Drawing a parallel between Eritrean and
Ethiopian interests in Somalia was "unfair," as was talk of a
"proxy way," he said, particularly as only Ethiopia shared a
common border with Somalia. Given threats made by UIC head
Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, "Addis Ababa's engagement should
be given the benefit of the doubt," Tekeda said. Alluding to
Djibouti's opposition to the deployment of foreign
peacekeepers in Somalia, Tekeda noted that Djibouti remained
sheltered from 12 years of instability in Somalia, as it
shared a common border only with Somaliland.


10. (C) CODEL Payne noted that Ethiopian relations with
Somalia predated the UIC. Asked to elaborate on Ethiopia's
strategic interests in Somalia, FM Seyoum responded that
Ethiopia wanted to see "a friendly government, not a puppet
government." A regime that provided national security and
stability "is good enough," Seyoum said. In contrast, the
status quo (i.e., a nation with no authority) was a
"worst-case scenario." Ethiopia's borders with Somalia were

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more porous than those of Kenya or Djibouti; Ethiopia was
also home to more than 3 million Somalis, who had been
welcomed and never put into camps, Seyoum added. After
Somalia itself, Ethiopia stood to gain the most from Somali
stability, Seyoum said.

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ETHIOPIA FEARS ERITREA BECOMING "ROGUE STATE"
--------------


11. (C) FM Seyoum questioned why the Government of the State
of Eritrea (GSE) had decided to ally itself with the UIC,
given the Union's Islamic extremism. Ethiopia had a genuine
concern about Eritrea becoming "a rogue state," Seyoum said.
The GSE's decision to do so "showed the frustration of the
regime in Asmara," he said, and highlighted the GSE's desire
to draw Ethiopia into war. Seyoum said it was the GSE's
strategy to "destroy the EPRDF" (Ethiopia's ruling party) by
working with its enemies. Eritrea was supporting not only
the UIC, he said, but also the opposition Coalition for Unity
and Democracy (CUD) party in the United States and the
Netherlands, as well as the insurgent Ogaden National
Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
Eritrean support of the UIC had to drain the GSE's
resources, and Ethiopia suspected other countries were
providing the GSE with external aid, he said.

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U.S. PARTLY TO BLAME FOR CURRENT SITUATION IN SOMALIA
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12. (C) State Minister Tekeda lamented that the United States
had not supported the consensus among IGAD countries in March
2005, which at that time included even Eritrea, to support
the TFG. Instead, the United States had backed warlords who
contributed to "the mess" that might have been avoided,
Tekeda said. Noting that he had personally participated in
numerous meetings on Somalia in 1992-1993 with U.S. Special
Envoy Robert Oakley, Tekeda asserted that the United States
did not take Ethiopian positions on Somalia seriously. In 15
years as an Ethiopian diplomat, Tekeda said he had "never
seen effective cooperation" between Ethiopia and the United
States on Somalia. A former MFA director for Africa during
the previous Derg regime, Tekeda said there was no comparison
between the former military government's policy toward
Somalia and that of the current GOE. Internal factors within
Somalia were to blame for previous instability, he said,
whether in 1964 or 1977.


13. (C) COMMENT: FM Seyoum's apparent success in mending
rifts among the TFG's leadership highlights the important
diplomatic role that Ethiopia can play in bringing stability
to its eastern neighbor. Seyoum's comments on the need for
stability in Somalia underscore Ethiopia's perception that it
must remain a bulwark against Islamic extremism in the Horn
of Africa. END COMMENT.
HUDDLESTON