SOMALIA: TFG REPORTS ICU FORCES' ADVANCE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002041

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO AU SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG REPORTS ICU FORCES' ADVANCE ON
BAIDOA HALTED

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2013 (NOTAL)


B. ADDIS ABABA 1998 (NOTAL)

C. ADDIS ABABA 1952 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY. Somalia's ambassador to Ethiopia and permrep
to the AU, Abdulkarim Farah, expects IGAD foreign ministers
to endorse a detailed plan early next week for a peace
support operation (IGASOM) to Somalia, following which the AU
Peace and Security Council (PSC) may take further action.
Meeting on July 24, several PSC members (Algeria, Nigeria,
South Africa) are reportedly furious that the AU must wait
for the UNSC to modify its arms embargo on Somalia, two years
after originally calling for IGASOM to deploy. Potential
troop-contributing countries include Kenya, which has already
provided training and logistical support to TFG troops, and
South Africa, which reportedly is ready to dispatch a
battalion. Amb. Farah questioned whether the deployment of a
single Ugandan battalion (as suggested by PM Meles) would be
sufficient, citing concerns about supplies and
reinforcements. Funding for IGASOM could be drawn from EU
African Peace Facility funds previously earmarked for an AU
operation in Somalia. Amb. Farah explained that while the
TFG boycotted last week's peace talks in Khartoum to avoid
legitimizing Islamic Courts Union (ICU) leader Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys, it is engaged in secret talks with ICU moderates
to continue dialogue. (NOTE: This may be a meeting with the
Ayr in Addis Ababa organized by Ethiopia. END NOTE.) Farah
declined to confirm Ethiopian intervention explicitly, but
said ICU forces withdrew "when our brothers came over."
According to Farah, some 7,000 TFG troops oppose an estimated
5,000-8,000 ICU fighters allied with foreign fighters,
including approximately 2,000 Eritrean-backed Ethiopian
insurgents from the OLF and ONLF. Egypt, a member of the AU
PSC, opposes Ethiopian intervention and is reportedly
collaborating with Eritrea, Farah said. Farah questions
popular support for the ICU, which he asserts is limited to
Mogadishu. In response to Charge's observation that the TFG
needed to be seen making concrete achievements in order to
garner public support, Farah appealed for USG assistance to
provide broadcasting equipment for a TFG radio staion to
counter the media bulletins being carried out by pro-ICU
radio stations in Mogadishu. Farah also requested other
capacity-building to the Transitional Federal Government to
sustain it until elections are held in 2009. END SUMMARY.

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IGAD MINISTERIAL TO MEET NEXT WEEK TO ENDORSE PKO PLAN
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2. (C) On July 24, Ambassador Abdulkarim Farah, the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia's Ambassador
to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the African
Union, briefed Charge, DCM, and poloffs on his presentation
earlier in the day to the AU PSC (septel). Farah said that
although the TFG had asked for the PSC to reaffirm its
previous decisions on Somalia, the PSC would issue only a
press statement, rather than a formal communique, because it
would await an IGAD ministerial meeting the following week.
Several PSC members (notably Algeria, Nigeria, and South
Africa) questioned the need to wait for the UN Security
Council (UNSC) to lift or modify the arms embargo on Somalia.
Algeria and South African permreps had been furious that an
IGAD-led peacekeeping operation had been proposed since May
2005; many lives had been unnecessarily lost while the
international community waited, Farah said. He noted that
that the PSC had already previously decided to support an
IGAD peace support operation (IGASOM) in Somalia; the
Declaration on Somalia issued by heads of state at the July 2
AU Summit should be "sufficient for individual countries to
support Somalia," Farah explained.


3. (C) Further action by the AU PSC would have to follow
action by IGAD, Farah explained. Kenya's permrep to the AU
had announced that an extraordinary ministerial session of
IGAD would convene "early next week" in Nairobi, in order to
endorse a detailed plan for a proposed IGASOM peace support
operation. AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit
observed at the PSC that such a plan had been requested by

ADDIS ABAB 00002041 002.3 OF 004


both the UNSC and the International Somalia Contact Group, in
a July 13 PRST and July 17 communique respectively.
Following IGAD's endorsement, the AU PSC would likely meet
again to discuss and make a public statement on Somalia.
Farah predicted further engagement by both IGAD and the AU on
Somalia.

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POTENTIAL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS INCLUDE KENYA, SOUTH AFRICA
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4. (C) Farah agreed with Charge that Djibouti had concerns
about military intervention in Somalia. While not expecting
support from Eritrea or Djibouti, Farah hoped that other IGAD
members (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan) would provide troops.
Kenya was already providing significant logistical support
and training for Somalia's former military and militia forces
that had undergone disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR). The TFG would not pursue territorial
disputes with Kenya, Ethiopia, or Djibouti, Farah said.
Somalia had "no other interests than to have our own peaceful
government; whoever helps us is our friend," he added. Asked
by Charge whether the deployment of a Ugandan battalion, as
suggested by PM Meles (ref A),would be sufficient, Farah
said that the ability to provide such forces with supplies
and reinforcements was key. Every Somali home was well
armed, he said, as individuals took law and order into their
own hands; any intervening force would therefore have to be
comprised of "strong and serious government troops" or risk
being "seen as a joke." Farah said he had requested that the
PSC not limit potential troop contributing countries to IGAD:
it should call for IGAD to take the initiative but allow
other African countries to participate. If allowed by the
AU, South Africa sought to contribute a battalion, he noted.


5. (SBU) Deployment of IGASOM could draw on the EU's African
Peace Facility and Peace Support Funds, he said; if
successful, the AU could even deploy its African Standby
Force, he added. DCM noted relative weakness of the ASF's
Eastern Brigade. (NOTE: EC POLAD confirmed earlier in the
day that through its African Peace Facility, the EU has
earmarked 15 million Euros each for possible AU operations in
the DRC and Somalia, as well as an additional 28 million
Euros for general capacity-building of the AU's peace and
security programs. These funds remain available, if not
reprogrammed to meet funding gaps for the AU Mission in
Sudan. END NOTE.)

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TFG BOYCOTTED TALKS SO AS NOT TO LEGITIMIZE ICU LEADER
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6. (C) The TFG had reached a ceasefire agreement with the
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) on June 22, but Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys had taken over and removed ICU moderates who
negotiated the agreement, Farah said. In violation of the
June 22 agreement, ICU forces had continued to take over
territory, including Mogadishu's airport, seaport, and key
compounds. The "war for Mogadishu" had begun 10 days ago,
claiming 100 lives and wounding 500; the ICU had thus
initiated hostilities while waiting to negotiate in Khartoum,
Farah said. As a result, the TFG decided not to participate
in talks with the ICU that were to be held by the League of
Arab States, so as not to "legitimize" Hassan Dahir Aweys,
who was a "killer."


7. (C) Farah said that the TFG was engaged in secret contacts
with ICU moderates, and expected a development within the
next few weeks; the TFG could not abandon dialogue, he added.
The TFG was underscoring to moderates that the TFG charter
called for shariah law to be the basis of government, he
said. Noting that Somalia joined Djibouti, Ethiopia, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen in providing names of suspected terrorists
to the UN, Farah said that the TFG was "making a deal" with
moderates, but declined to elaborate.

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INTERVENTION HALTED ICU'S ADVANCE ON BAIDOA
--------------


8. (C) When the ICU realized the TFG was not going to

ADDIS ABAB 00002041 003 OF 004


Khartoum, ICU forces advanced 170 km from Mogadishu to within
20 km from Baidoa, Farah said. Before, the TFG had been
"frightened that Baidoa would fall into the hands of
Islamicists," but now the ICU "will never even try" to
advance on Baidoa. "When our brothers came over," the ICU
withdrew, he said. "We are very safe now; we are very
lucky," Farah declared. The TFG was now mobilizing its
troops, with 500 reinforcements who had recently completed
training in Kenya joining 7,000 others. While acknowledging
that the TFG was "getting some support from friends," Farah
declined to confirm specific military assistance from
Ethiopia, but only noted that "they are very helpful." The
TFG "has breathing room now," he added. With 70 per cent of
the ICU's militia withdrawn from Jowhar back to Mogadishu,
"they have lost their momentum now," he declared.

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FOREIGN FIGHTERS ASSISTING ISLAMICIST FORCES
--------------


9. (C) While difficult to calculate the strength of ICU
forces, as they massed and then quickly dispersed, Farah
estimated ICU totaled approximately 5,000-8,000. In
addition, numerous foreign fighters had joined them:
Ethiopian insurgents in Mogadishu included 800-1,500 fighters
from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and a
greater number from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF),who had
pledged support to the ICU in return for assistance in waging
insurgency in Ethiopia. Eritrea was sending "huge shipments"
to them, he said. The TFG was considering holding a press
conference to highlight captured foreign fighters who had
been conducting intelligence operations near Baidoa,
including at least one Iraqi. Farah was not aware of any
Hezbollah presence among the ICU, but said it could not be
ruled out. (COMMENT: Farah is clearly exaggerting the number
of foreign fighters. END COMMENT.)


10. (C) Whereas Somalia had previously viewed Egypt as a
close friend and ally due to its sponsorship of teachers and
scholarships for many TFG officials, there were now strains
between Egypt and the TFG, Farah said. "It is always
difficult for me to convince the Egyptians," Farah observed.
(NOTE: Egypt, a member of the AU PSC, opposes Ethiopia's
"unilateral" intervention; see ref B. END NOTE.) Egypt and
Ethiopia had a long history of tensions due to disputes over
the Nile, Farah noted. Egypt was now collaborating closely
with Eritrea and Libya, he said, and Libya was financing
Eritrea.


11. (C) Farah questioned the level of popular support for the
ICU. Somalis were Muslim but moderates, he said; in
contrast, the ICU was "terrorizing" the people by
confiscating televisions and videos, and threatening to
impose the death penalty against those who did not pray five
times daily. Whereas most residents of Mogadishu were either
Abgal or Benadiri descended from Arab settlers, "these people
are neither." Farah noted that numerous ICU leaders belonged
to the same sub-clan of the Habr-Gedir/Ayr, including warlord
Yusuf Indha-Ade, governor for the last 12 years of Lower
Shabelle Region. Local residents of Qoryoley, 150 km south
of Mogadishu, who had clashed with ICU forces and destroyed
two ICU armed trucks, had done so declaring loyalty to the
TFG, even though no TFG troops were among them, Farah said.


12. (C) Farah said that UN SRSG for Somalia Amb. Francois
Lonseny Fall had briefed the PSC on a joint AU, IGAD, League
of Arab States mission that had visited Mogadishu, Kismayo,
and Galcaiyo in early July to assess popular acceptance of
the possible deployment of foreign peacekeeping troops.
According to Farah, Fall had earlier told the AU Commission
that only Mogadishu showed resistance to the idea of foreign
troops, and that other regions welcomed intervention. The
only "problem area" was Mogadishu, he said, particularly
areas 90 km north and south of the city. "We should leave
Mogadishu (alone) for the time being," Farah said, and
establish schools and health care systems elsewhere. On the
other hand, one would never see ICU supporters in peaceful
Kismayo, 500 km from Baidoa and Mogadishu. Similarly, Beled
Weyne, which had been captured for several months by the ICU,
did not accept the ICU, Farah said.


ADDIS ABAB 00002041 004 OF 004


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APPEAL FOR USG ASSISTANCE WITH RADIO BROADCASTING
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13. (SBU) The TFG was supported by 70 per cent of the
populace but needed assistance to reach the remainder, Farah
said. Charge highlighted the need for the TFG to garner
public support through concrete achievements, and also urged
the TFG to identify specific areas where international
partners could provide assistance in order to build the TFG's
capacity. Amb. Farah agreed that the TFG needed to "win
hearts and minds" and requested that the USG the means for
the TFG to broadcast to the entire Somali populace and combat
extremism. Such radio broadcasts could even be transmitted
from Addis Ababa, he said; the TFG would ask Ethiopia if it
could use the GOE's satellite TV facilities to reach its
constituents. The three leading radio broadcasts (BBC Somali
Service, Horn Afrique, and Shebelle) were all run by Ayr
families, he said. Farah said he had told the UK ambassador
that the head of the BBC Somali Service was the cousin of
Hassan Dahir Aweys, who had interviewed Hassan five times in
the last month without giving similar exposure to TFG
President Abdullahi Yusuf.


14. (SBU) Farah expressed gratitude for the support of the
international community, hailing the UNSC's willingness to
revise the arms embargo on Somalia, and its recognition of
the TFG as the legitimate government. Farah sought
information on the sale of Somalia's embassy in Washington,
D.C., and whether it could be recovered. Farah also appealed
for assistance for capacity-building of the TFG, prior to
elections in 2009. The TFG lacked revenue; UNDP provided
salaries for parliament, he explained. Some 7,000 militia
and police, trained in Baidoa for the last six months, now
needed proper equipment; guaranteeing security was key to
convincing skilled workers from the diaspora to return to
Somalia, he said. Farah noted that the TFG had asked the EU
to provide experts to travel to Baidoa to conduct a joint
needs assessment, in preparation for a future donors'
conference.


15. (C) Farah also sought information about warlord General
Kanyere, whom he said had fled from Mogadishu.


16. (C) COMMENT: Ambassador Farah's remarks highlight the
TFG's view that Ethiopian intervention has succeeded in
deterring ICU forces from advancing on Baidoa, giving the TFG
a much needed respite as it awaits further action by IGAD and
the international community. Post strongly supports the
TFG's request for assistance with radio broadcasting and
capacity-building; providing such assistance would be a
tangible reflection of USG support for the TFG, and
consistent with President Yusuf's appeal for greater material
assistance (ref C) to sustain a bulwark against Islamic
extremism in the Horn of Africa. END COMMENT.
HUDDLESTON