A/S FRAZER AND PM MELES TALK ERITREAN/ETHIOPIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001784

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: MARR PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER AND PM MELES TALK ERITREAN/ETHIOPIAN
BORDER AND SUDAN

Classified By: Classified By: A/S Jendayi Frazer for reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).



1. (C) Summary: On June 25, Prime Minister Meles and Dr.
Frazer along with Charge and Admiral Hunt reviewed the
Eritrean/Ethiopian talks and the road ahead. Frazer argued
that progress had been made and that Ethiopia had been more
flexible than Eritrea. Although the initial proposal to
involve General Fulford in EEBC demarcation discussion had
been rejected by the EEBC, there is still the possibility of
parallel talks on normalization while the EEBC demarcation
process proceeds. Meles said that he preferred to quickly
close this chapter and move on. He would like the US to
remain engaged for the day when Isaias was ready to climb
down. Frazer said that could illicit sanctions from the UN
on both parties and it would be better to proceed by having
the UN call for normalization talks. Meles said he would
attend normalization talks but doubted that Isaias would do
so. Frazer encouraged Ethiopian cooperation on the AMIS
transition to UN and on opening political space domestically.
End Summary.


2. (C) Dr. Frazer opened her remarks by pointed out that the
USG is concerned about Eritrea arming the Islamic Courts. In
fact, the USG is surprised that Eritrea would arm Islamists.
"Perhaps this is an example of the enemy of my enemy is my
friend." she said. "What does the alignment of Eritrea and
Sudan mean?" Frazer asked Meles. Frazer said that she wanted
to raise these issues because it impacts whether the border
dispute can be settled. In her view, Ethiopia doesn't like
the decision of the EEBC and Eritrea is unwilling to deal
with the people on the border. Frazer said that she had
hoped to encourage dialogue and build confidence between the
two parties in technical talks to resolve issues from the
impact of demarcation on the physical and human geography.
However, Meles had warned her in their previous meeting that
resolution of the dispute would not work that way;, since
both Isaias and Meles will make a strategic decision and all
will flow from that, not confidence building. Nevertheless,
there have been two EEBC meetings and some progress.
Although the USG was not supportive of holding the June 15
meeting the EEBC had insisted. Frazer said that Eritrea had
become increasingly concerned about the role of General
Fulford. Unfortunately, the Eritrean legal counsel had spun
up the EEBC commissioners by turning over a private e-mail
between herself and General Fulford and this had contributed
to the EEBC backing away from a role for Fulford. We did not
envision changing the delimitation line rather we wanted to
talk about how the people involved would be impacted by it.
Currently, Eritrea was using this excuse to refuse to be
party to seeking a solution because they claimed that the
terms of reference had changed.


3. (C) Frazer then outlined how she envisioned we might move
forward saying, "My team wants to go forward." The USG could
appoint a DOS geographer to the EEBC to look at the border
who could probably talk about the physical geography and
manifest impracticality. At the same time the USG through the
UN would seek parallel talks on the impact of demarcation on
human geography and broader normalization issues. Frazer said
that although this solution appears to offer a possible road
forward, she doubted that Isaias would accept parallel
talks. However, if Isaias refuses the normalization talks
then the USG would have done its best and at that point
return the border issue to the UNSYG. Frazer told Meles that
he had asked her for a special condition in order to move the
process forward, but that she never saw Isaias. Rather
Isaias was increasingly abusive of our ambassador and our
policies. Frazer said that at this point she doubted that
Isaias wants the border demarcated as it would take away a
weapon to use against Ethiopia. Ethiopia had been flexible.
It had attended the EEBC meetings sending a representative
from the capital rather than just sending its legal counsel
as Eritrea had done. Ethiopia had also dropped publicly the
insistence on saying that delimitation and demarcation were
final and binding "in principle". But still that was not far
enough, both sides were culpable, but Eritrea more so than
Ethiopia in this phase of seeking a solution to the impasse.


4. (C) Meles responded that he considers it
counter-productive to proceed with the EEBC. He believes
that it would be better to close this chapter quickly. Still
Ethiopia is concerned about what might replace the EEBC as
Isaias at some point may need a ladder to climb down. Meles
said that he did not want a Somalia-like situation in which
the USG left for good. Rather he preferred that the USG
would make a policy choice that allowed it to close this

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chapter but return if needed. The USG should not be
concerned because Ethiopia will not be provoked into a war
with Eritrea, Meles said. Frazer replied, that while she was
inclined to believe that there would not be a war, the fact
is that the international community would likely want to
sanction both countries for failure to demarcate the border.
Meles countered that sanctions that bite would not be an arms
embargo as both countries have sufficient arms. Rather
sanctions would create irritation and divert energy. In any
case, in Meles' view, "If the Americans don't take the
initiative this won't happen."


5. (C) Dr. Frazer said that both parties are responsible for
the EEBC's failure. Ethiopia because it disagrees with the
decision and Eritrea because of its maximal position. But
still we need a process that builds peace. Frazer pointed
out that although Isaias was unlikely to agree to the
parallel talks her proposal envisions that talks on border
demarcation would not be completed prior to the beginning of
talks sponsored by the UN on normalization. Meles responded
that Ethiopia is prepared to permit demarcation to begin on
the Eastern border but there could not be preparations for
demarcation on the disputed border because the EEBC President
had stated that the demarcation line was the same as the
delimitation line. Although it might be possible to start
with the Eastern boundary with the expectation that
normalization talks would be finished before arriving at the
disputed area. But Isaias will not agree to this publicly,
but Meles would attend normalization talks if asked. Frazer
pointed out that in Ethiopia's favor is the decision of the
EEBC that nothing is final until everything is decided.



6. (C) Dr. Frazer reviewed the USG and international
communities' efforts to stabilize Sudan and the critical
importance of an AMIS transition to a UN Peace Force. She
explained that the U.S. will help build up AMIS and provide
assistance to improve its capacity and ability to protect the
civilian population. AMIS lacks the capacity and resources to
complete the task, she said. She asked that Ethiopia support
the UN transition. Meles replied that there is no way around
a UN operation. Bashir is objecting to a UN force because
deep down he is worried about the ICC. I don't think the
legal approach is compatible to convince the Sudanese, he
advised. We need to think in terms of the bottom line as
Sudan will only respond if their concerns are addressed.
More worrisome to Sudan than UN are NATO troops due to
historical reasons. The issue of NATO is particularly
sensitive in North Africa. The AU does not want a
North-South, Muslim-Non-Muslim divide. Ethiopia would remain
true to its principles. It had always supported the SPLA
even when Ethiopia reconciled with Sudan. Eritrea, however,
would remain true to its tactic and not to principles and
engage in side deals with Sudan. Frazer said that the US
considers Ethiopia a strategic partner and that she is
concerned by the new relationship between Eritrea and Sudan.



7. (C) Although Eritrea plays a spoiler role it is seen
more favorably in the U.S. Congress than Ethiopia because the
diaspora keeps the focus on the many Ethiopians in
detention. The whole region could be destabilized by
insurgencies and interests supported by Eritrea in Sudan,
Somalia, and Ethiopia, Frazer pointed out. At the same time
it is important for Ethiopia as a stabilizing force to open
political space at home. Meles responded that the pressure
would not build up and cork pop out of the bottle as Frazer
feared. Rather he claimed that pressure is not building up
in Ethiopia There is no fundamental threat to Ethiopia's
stability as the basis of EPRDF's support is in the rural
areas. Isaias won't be successful in his support to
insurgencies in Ethiopia.


8. (U) This cable has been cleared by AF Assistant
Secretary Jendayi Frazer.

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