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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA1737
2006-06-25 06:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

A/S FRAZER TALKS SUDAN AND SOMALIA WITH AU

Tags:   PREL  KPKO  AU  UN  SU  SO  ET 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9680
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1737/01 1760651
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250651Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1281
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2354
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001737 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO AU UN SU SO ET
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER TALKS SUDAN AND SOMALIA WITH AU
COMMISSIONER DJINNIT


Classified By: A/S JENDAYI FRAZER FOR REASONS 1.4. (B) AND (D)



1. (C) SUMMARY: AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said
Djinnit called Sudan's recent refusal to accept a UN Mission
in Darfur a "big problem," but ultimately agreed with A/S
Frazer that the GOS was simply delaying the inevitable UN
deployment as long as possible. Frazer and Djinnit agreed
that another effort should be made to bring SLM leader
Abdulwahid into the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), perhaps
through a greater contribution to the compensation fund
negotiated through the SPLM. Djinnit told A/S Frazer that it
would be easier for the AU and Sudan to accept international
assistance in establishing a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for
Darfur if the help came in the form of a direct offer from
the U.S. and Canada, rather than from NATO. Regarding
Somalia, Djinnit emphasized the nervousness within IGAD
countries about the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), and said
that Ethiopia would likely act unilaterally if the AU and
international community failed to back rapid deployment of a
peacekeeping force. Djinnit expected that an initial IGAD
force would eventually be replaced by an AU mission once the
latter could be organized. He welcomed the peace deal
brokered between the UIC and Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) on June 22 by the Arab League, which he said
was "based on principles." He wondered whether the UIC was
prepared to publicly reject terrorism, however. The best way
to address the terrorist threat in Somalia, he added, was
through effective government authorities in the country. A/S
Frazer told Djinnit that the recent international Somalia
Contact Group had expressed strong support for the TFG and
had decided to include IGAD and the Arab League in future
meetings. She also indicated that the USG, along with other
UNSC members, were considering the AU request to lift
partially the arms embargo on Somalia to facilitate a peace
support mission. Djinnit invited U.S. participation in the
June 28-29 AU/IGAD meeting in Nairobi, and Frazer accepted.
END SUMMARY.



2. (SBU) A/S Frazer called on AU Peace and Security
Commissioner Djinnit June 23, accompanied by CJTF-HOA
Commander RADM Hunt, Pol/Econ Counselor, AF/E Somalia deskoff
Nole Garey and HOA MilAid Mike Sowa. AU Peace and Security
Director Geoffrey Mugumya joined Djinnit.



--------------------------



--------------------------


NATO ASSISTANCE IN DARFUR; STILL SENSITIVE; BILATERAL HELP
EASIER


--------------------------



--------------------------





3. (C) A/S Frazer thanked Djinnit for the recent AU letter
requesting assistance from NATO in support of AMIS. This
would allow NATO to provide help including 1)

training/mentoring teams of 3 to 4 officers in each sector to
provide training in-theatre, on the ground; 2) staff for a
Joint Operations Center; and 3) a Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
in each sector that would use existing helicopters to improve
monitoring, reaction and DPA verification. Frazer noted that
this assistance would fit within AMIS's updated concept of
operations (CONOPS), which called for shifting from an
observation mission to a more robust peacekeeping profile.
Djinnit replied by underscoring continuing sensitivities
about NATO troops on the ground in Sudan. Frazer made the
case that several African states, including troop
contributing countries like Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal had
asked for more NATO assistance to strengthen AMIS' capacity.
These countries had suggested that the AU Commission was in
fact the stumbling block. Djinnit rejected the claims and
challenged those countries to make the same statements in AU
Peace and Security Council (PSC) meetings that they made to
U.S. officials in private. He told Frazer that there had
been "no decision in the PSC yet to deploying NATO troops."
The A/S replied that the USG interpreted "international
organization" language in the recent PSC resolution on AMIS
to cover NATO. Djinnit told A/S Frazer that it would be
easier for the AU and Sudan to accept international
assistance in establishing a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for
Darfur if the help came in the form of a direct offer from
the U.S. and Canada, rather than from NATO. He agreed,
however, that beginning work on an broad MOU between NATO and
the AU would be a positive step. A/S Frazer accepted this
two-track approach.



--------------------------


FRAZER: TEST SUDAN THROUGH VISA PROCESS


--------------------------





4. (C) The A/S expressed concern both about the recent
rejection of the planned transition from AMIS to a UN mission
by Sudanese President Al-Bashir, as well as about recent
projections from UN SRSG Guehenno that the transition could
only be finalized in January 2007. Djinnit replied that the

ADDIS ABAB 00001737 002 OF 003


UN could be prevailed upon to speed up the transition if
preparations on the ground moved forward fast enough. He
called Sudan's recent refusal to accept a UN Mission in
Darfur a "big problem," but ultimately agreed with A/S Frazer
that the GOS was simply delaying the inevitable UN deployment
as long as possible. He also reiterated his request that
permission for deployment of US and NATO personnel be wrapped
in a larger package of support presented by a broad range of
partners. This would make it easier for the AU and Sudanese
Government to digest. A/S Frazer pressed Djinnit to test
Sudanese cooperation with AMIS assistance through the visa
process piecemeal, rather than waiting for the ideal scenario
negotiated as a whole. The AU Commissioner agreed, although
he urged that partner visa requests for AMIS be made through
the AU, rather than bilaterally. Djinnit called for
immediately integrating as many UN personnel as possible into
AMIS; technical discussions would be needed to flesh out how
this would take place. Frazer and Djinnit agreed to let the
existing Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) process resolve
how to deploy the minimum number of NATO and US personnel for
maximum impact.



--------------------------

--
EXTRA EFFORT TO BRING SLM'S ABDULWAHID ON BOARD


--------------------------

--



5. (C) Djinnit offered A/S Frazer a brief readout on his trip
to Sudan with the Joint UN/AU assessment mission. The PSC
Commissioner indicated that the DPA had not improved security
in all areas. Fighting between rebel movements continued.
The GOS believed things were improving, however. Djinnit
noted that many in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps
were against the DPA because of continuing security concerns
and dissatisfaction with the terms of compensation. Frazer
replied that Abdulwahid of the SLM continued to argue for a
$100-150 million compensation fund, as well as to be part of
the security arrangements for people returning home. She
added that Abdulwahid was critical to the success of the DPA,
so it was important to find a face-saving way for him to get
on board. The A/S suggested moving an extra $70 million from
the current fund for reconstruction and back-filling the
reconstruction fund with additional international
contributions. Djinnit agreed, but wondered whether
Abdulwahid, who was inherently unstable, would settle in the
end for anything less than a vice-presidency. Frazer said
that the SLM leader had of late consistently focused on the
issue of compensation. Djinnit argued that the SPLM and its
leader, Salva Kirr, were well positioned to negotiated such a
deal with Abdulwahid. Frazer agreed that it would be better
if the U.S. did not take charge of the effort. The PSC
Commissioner added that "everyone here objects to labeling
DPA hold-outs as terrorists."



--------------------------


SOMALIA: STEPS TOWARD PEACE SUPPORT MISSION


--------------------------





6. (C) Djinnit said the AU had been disappointed with the
international community's weak support for the TFG so far,
but recent developments gave everyone a golden opportunity to
revisit the issue. Djinnit emphasized the nervousness
within IGAD countries about the UIC, and said that Ethiopia
would likely act unilaterally if the AU and international
community failed to back rapid deployment of a peacekeeping
force. Djinnit expected that an initial IGAD force would
eventually be replaced by an AU mission once the latter could
be organized. He welcomed the peace deal brokered between
the UIC and TFG on June 22 by the Arab League, which he said
was "based on principles." He wondered whether the UIC was
prepared to publicly reject terrorism, however. The best way
to address the terrorist threat in Somalia, he added, was
through effective government authorities in the country.
Djinnit invited U.S. participation in the June 28-29 AU/IGAD
meeting in Nairobi, and Frazer accepted. It was critical
that AU, IGAD and partners be realistic in planning such a
Somalia mission, Djinnit said.



7. (C) A/S Frazer told Djinnit that she had heard the
region's message on stronger support for the TFG. She noted
that she had met with a number of TFG leaders in Nairobi,
that the recently-formed International Somalia Contact Group
had convened in large part to galvanize international support
for the TFG. Frazer said that Contact Group (CG) members
were also concerned about the UIC, but wanted to encourage
moderate members of the UIC. She explained the process of
selecting CG participants and indicated that the group had
decided at its recent meeting to invite both IGAD and the
Arab League to participate at the next session. The CG did
not want to bring either the TFG nor front-line states into
the group, which was in any case simply a mechanism for
sharing information and coordinating policy, not an executive

ADDIS ABAB 00001737 003 OF 003


body. The A/S told Djinnit that the CG discussed how to
handle the UNSC arms embargo on Somalia. The UK had proposed
a UNSC Presidential Statement partially lifting the embargo
as soon as IGAD and the AU presented a detailed plan for a
peace support mission. "Detailed," she added, was a relative
term. Djinnit noted that the June 28 IGAD/AU meeting in
Nairobi would likely appoint a mission to Somalia to assess
needs of a peace support mission. All agreed that a positive
UNSC statement prior to that meeting might be helpful.
HUDDLESTON