Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA1708
2006-06-21 15:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA: SAMORA REITERATES GOE POLICY ON SOMALIA

Tags:  PREL PTER MOPS ET SO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001708 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E
DJIBOUTI FOR A/S DR. FRAZER
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS ET SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: SAMORA REITERATES GOE POLICY ON SOMALIA
TO GENERAL ABIZAID

REF: IIR 6 830 0174 06

Classified By: CHARGE VICKI HUDDLESTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001708

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E
DJIBOUTI FOR A/S DR. FRAZER
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS ET SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: SAMORA REITERATES GOE POLICY ON SOMALIA
TO GENERAL ABIZAID

REF: IIR 6 830 0174 06

Classified By: CHARGE VICKI HUDDLESTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. LTG Samora Yonus, Chief of General Staff,
Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) met with Commander,
U.S. Central Command General John Abizaid and the Charge June

19. Topics of discussion included CJTF-HOA presence in
Ethiopia, the Somalia situation, Ethiopian military
intentions, and the Ethiopia/Eritrea border situation. Yonus
said Ethiopia will not accept an attack on the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) and if Ethiopia intervenes it will
only be to do "good" to break the momentum of the United
Islamic Courts (UIC). He added that CJTF-HOA must leave the
Ogaden until the ENDF destroys the ONLF. End Summary.


2. (C) Samora reiterated his previously stated position that
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) troops
must depart the Ogaden. He said there is nothing to
coordinate as the ENDF does not do civil affairs and
humanitarian assistance projects. He likes the fact the
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) does not attack U.S.
forces. However, the last thing he wants is for the ONLF or
al ittihad al islamiya (AIAI) to kill an American in the
Ogaden. He said CJTF-HOA forces could return once the ENDF
clears the ONLF and AIAI in three to four months time. The
ONLF and AIAI are destabilizing the region. Samora said the
ENDF is having success in its operations. He said the
situation in the Ogaden is more delicate now because of the
situation in Somalia. Samora said Bilate and Hurso training
could continue and it was only the U.S. that raised these
locations. He added he alone made the decision concerning the
Ogaden due operational considerations. Samora would not
consider the long term benefit of keeping U.S. personnel in
Gode.


3. (C) Shifting to the situation in Somalia, Samora began by
stating the United Islamic Courts (UIC) are not that big or
well organized and uses religion. (DATT comment: The

Ethiopian head of military intelligence said the opposite
that the UIC is well organized with a command and control
structure see IIR 6 830 0175 06 Ethiopian intelligence head
views on the United Islamic Courts. End Comment.) He said
they are not comprised of regular soldiers and clerics
comprise the main force. When pressed several times Samora
never gave a precise number of UIC fighters. He added warlord
Ganyare is selling his arms and ammunition and the funds are
deposited in banks in Djibouti.


4. (C) Samora said the Ethiopia has directed the UIC to pull
back from Beledweyne. If they do not pull back the ENDF will
go in and attack. He noted only 70 UIC fighters took over
Beledweyne without a fight. Samora said the ONLF and AIAI use
this area to stage their movements into Ethiopia. He added
about 640 ONLF and AIAI fighters, the last of the group
training in Eritrea, recently arrived in an area outside of
Beledweyne.


5. (C) Samora said Ethiopia would not accept an attack on the
TFG, referring to Baidoa. He said the UIC does not accept the
TFG. He stressed the ENDF had not entered Somalia, but is
following the situation seriously. The ENDF continues its
preparations and planning for a mission in Somalia. He said
attacking in Somalia makes the ENDF Ogaden operations easier.
(DATT comment: This would allow the ENDF to eliminate the
training and logistics bases the ONLF and AIAI have in
Somalia. End Comment.)


6. (C) Samora said the UIC does not have big armaments. They
have technicals and perhaps a few armored personnel carriers
(APCS). He said they get their funding from Arab countries
and weapons and ammunition from Yemen. He said the ENDF knows
exactly where the UIC are. He added Ethiopia knows the
location of the Eritrean officer who is the coordinating
commander.


7. (C) Samora said Ethiopia has two objectives if it
intervenes in Somalia -- national security and the more
difficult and complex mission per the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) decision to protect and
defend the TFG. He added the TFG has little military
capability and its number of effective fighters fluctuates.

ADDIS ABAB 00001708 002 OF 002




8. (C) Samora responded to a question concerning any
requirements the ENDF might have for operations in Somalia.
He said the ENDF did not need much more equipment. It would
need infantry and helicopters. It would keep its forces on
the border. The ENDF over the weekend moved three companies
of aghazi commandos to Ferfer and Geladi. He said the U.S.
and Ethiopia need to work to coordinate activities,
especially concerning peacekeeping forces.


9. (C) Samora said there are foreign fighters in Mogadishu,
but not on the front line with the UIC.


10. (C) The chief of general staff is not worried that ENDF
inside Somalia would strengthen the UIC. He said it would not
strengthen the UIC but it would strengthen the TFG.


11. (C) Samora responded to the question concerning the
Ethiopia/Eritrea border situation. He said it was okay with
no change in attitude and the issue remains. He said
Eritrea's capability to start a war is changing. He added the
rainy season in Eritrea has made the rivers full and that
this would be a concern in September. He noted Eritrea wants
instability in Ethiopia, hence its training and organizing of
various Ethiopian opposition forces. He said Eritrea wants a
weak Ethiopia. Samora said the ENDF would not pull forces off
the northern front to support its operations in Somalia. He
noted that while Ethiopia fought Eritrea previously it had
forces in Baidoa. (DATT Comment: He made this point again on
20 June when DATT spoke alone with Samora. End Comment.)


12. (c) On 20 June 2006 DATT had an impromptu ten minute
meeting with Samora. Samora believed the meeting on 19 June
with General Abizaid been confrontational. DATT said it was a
good meeting and Abizaid understood Samora's position, though
there were some differences. He asked how the meeting with
Prime Minister Meles had gone. Samora then expressed his
personnel view that U.S. policy supporting the warlords had
failed. He criticized the U.S. for not consulting with
Ethiopia before embarking on this path. He questioned U.S.
intentions in Somalia and whether or not senior policy
understood Eritrea's role in the current situation.


13. (c) Samora criticized the U.S. for not supporting the
TFG, especially after IGAD had decided to support it. He said
the U.S. did not support the IGAD decision to send
peacekeepers to Somalia. The first force would have consisted
of Kenyans, Ethiopians, Djiboutian, Sudanese and Ugandans. He
added that even after IGAD modified the force, removing the
front line states, to consist only of Sudanese and Ugandans,
the U.S. would not support the plan. He stressed the
importance of U.S. working together with Ethiopia to resolve
the current problem.
HUDDLESTON