Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA1634
2006-06-15 08:56:00
SECRET
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA: PM MELES ON SOMALIA, ERITREA BORDER AND

Tags:  PREL ASEC MARR KPKO ET ER SO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1116
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1200
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001634 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S FRAZER
THE HAGUE FOR A/DAS REDDICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2016
TAGS: PREL ASEC MARR KPKO ET ER SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: PM MELES ON SOMALIA, ERITREA BORDER AND
CJTF-HOA

Classified By: CHARGE VICKI HUDDLESTON FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001634

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S FRAZER
THE HAGUE FOR A/DAS REDDICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2016
TAGS: PREL ASEC MARR KPKO ET ER SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: PM MELES ON SOMALIA, ERITREA BORDER AND
CJTF-HOA

Classified By: CHARGE VICKI HUDDLESTON FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Meles told the Charge and
CJTF-HOA Commander Rear Admiral Hunt June 13 that Ethiopia
would not take military action against the Islamic Courts
Union (ICU) in Somalia unless the ICU moved against Baidoa,
which the PM did not expect them to do. Meles said the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) remained an ally of
Ethiopia. On the border dispute with Eritrea, the PM said
the GOE would attend the June 15 EEBC meeting in the Hague,
but believed the process was a dead end and would soon break
down because Eritrean Isaias had not yet committed to peace.
Isaias, he said, remained focused on undermining the GOE
through providing arms and cash to all of the GOE's enemies.
Adm. Hunt pitched his plans for CJTF-HOA in the region and
asked for the PM's help in sorting out recent restrictions
imposed by ENDF Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Samora.
Meles expressed strong support for the CJTF-HOA operation and
suggested re-locating some HOA activities until current
military operations in the Ogaden are completed. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The Charge called on PM Meles June 13, accompanied by
Rear Admiral Rick Hunt, Commander of the Combined Joint Task
Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and Pol/Econ Counselor.
Meles was joined by his special assistant, Amb. Gebretensai.
Charge requested the meeting primarily to discuss new
restrictions on CJTF-HOA operations in the Ogaden, but took
advantage of the opportunity to discuss plans for the June 15
meeting of the Ethiopia-Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC)
as well as the developing situation in Somalia.

--------------
EEBC: WE'LL GO, BUT THE PROCESS IS DEAD
--------------


3. (C) The Charge reiterated to the Prime Minister the USG's
desire that the GOE send representatives to the June 15 EEBC
meeting in the Hague. She acknowledged that the Eritrean
Government (GSE) had indicated earlier in the day that it

would not attend the meeting. Meles indicated that the GOE
would attend the meeting, but only to minimize "collateral
damage" to Ethiopia from the inevitable failure of the
current diplomatic initiative. "We don't want to prolong the
agony, but we don't want to be blamed for the demise" of the
process, he said. Meles added that he was not sure whether
the GSE would attend the meeting in the end. If they don't,
he concluded, the GSE would indirectly announce the end of
the process.


4. (C) The PM also stated that the GOE would not offer a
security plan for the demarcation process. To do so would be
"wrong for all sorts of reasons." One reason was that a
security plan would "perpetuate the agony" of the doomed
diplomatic process. Another was that any plan would be
hypothetical while restrictions on UNMEE continued. The
Charge argued that the USG still believed that the current
EEBC process could work. It was essential that the GOE
provide the EEBC with a security plan; it could be
conditional upon the lifting of UNMEE restrictions if
necessary. She also indicated that the USG was trying to lay
the groundwork for talks on the normalization of relations
under the auspices of the UN to run in parallel to technical
discussions on demarcation at the EEBC.


5. (C) Meles said that Ethiopia's bottom line was that there
had to be discussions on problem areas of the border. The
EEBC, he claimed, was eating away at that bottom line a
little bit at a time. The PM recalled that the EEBC had said
that the boundary had already been demarcated -- a position
Ethiopia could not accept. "If we go ahead with demarcation
without any commitment to dialogue, we will have given away
everything that we have been working for over the last
several years." He added that Ethiopia could not sign on to
some consultant's view of anomalies in the EEBC line.


6. (C) The Charge asked the PM about the implications of a
total breakdown in talks. What if UNMEE left? What about
the possibility of renewed conflict? Meles reiterated his
oft-stated view that there would be no peace until President
Isaias abandoned his strategy of undermining the GOE and

ADDIS ABAB 00001634 002 OF 003


arming its opponents, and instead made a strategic commitment
to peace. Isaias had already concluded that there was no way
he could defeat Ethiopia through direct military action; for
that reason, there was no danger of a military confrontation
even if UNMEE departed. There will be no war, even by
accident, Meles assured the Charge. Isaias would eventually
realize that indirect military action through proxies would
not work either. Until he did, there was no technical means
of solving this basic problem, the PM said. The current EEBC
process would have been a useful ladder for Isaias to climb
down, but the time was not right. To push the process beyond
its limits would simply create more problems. In fact, Meles
said, the real ladder for climbing down would always be the
influence and engagement of the USG. The Eritrean leader
would reach for it when he was ready. It was already clear,
Meles added, that "the USG will not do Isaias' police work
for him." For that reason, the PM said, continuing USG
contact with Asmara was essential even if the current
diplomatic process broke down. At the same time, the USG
should simply ignore Eritrean outbursts such as the recent
media attacks against DAS Yamamoto.

-------------- --------------
SOMALIA: ICU ATTACKS ON BAIDOA OR TFG WOULD TRIGGER ENDF
RESPONSE
-------------- --------------


7. (S) When Charge asked about Meles' view of developments in
Somalia, the PM replied that the GOE did not plan to take
"precipitous action." At the same time, "if Baidoa was
threatened, we will act." The GOE would not make this threat
public, he said, and didn't expect that the ICU would move
against Baidoa. The PM added that his government did not
want to go into Baidoa because it had too many other things
to do. (NOTE: In a subsequent phone conversation with Charge
on June 14, Meles clarified that ICU moves against the border
town of Belet Weyne would also trigger a military response
from the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). The GOE
was not eager to fight Somali technicals in the desert and
knew that there would be political consequences for Ethiopia
if it engaged militarily, but the ENDF would do what it had
to do to prevent ICU "expansion." END NOTE.)


8. (S) Meles told the Charge and Adm. Hunt in their meeting
on June 13 that the best approach to Somalia in the long run
would be to lift the arms embargo and allow IGAD members like
Rwanda to strengthen the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG). As things were, the ICU was receiving support from
Eritrea while regional partners could not build the capacity
of the TFG. Meles added that it would be too obvious for the
GOE to smuggle weapons to the TFG; a UNSC decision to lift
the arms embargo would be necessary. When Charge noted that
at least one major regional country opposed lifting the arms
embargo, Meles replied that maintaining this strategy would
ultimately draw the USG into Mogadishu, and Ethiopia as well.
Worse still, such an intervention would have to proceed
"without the TFG" (NOTE: Meles' implication was that the TFG
would be defeated by the ICU in the interim. END NOTE.) At
the moment, the "fundamentalists" had money to buy the
services of the technicals, which was making all the
difference. The TFG could also buy the loyalty of the
technicals is they had financial support.


9. (S) Another central element of Meles' view was that the
ICU would likely splinter if bottled up in Mogadishu. For
that reason it was essential to key them from moving into
"expansion mode." The GOE's approach, therefore, was not to
seek the ICU's elimination, but rather prevent them from
gathering steam if they approached the Ethiopian Somali
region or sought to eliminate the TFG.

--------------
CJTF-HOA: GOE STILL COMMITTED TO PARTNERSHIP
--------------


10. (C) Adm. Hunt explained to PM Meles his vision for
CJTF-HOA's continuing operations in the Horn, which included
a stronger emphasis on counter-terrorism training, closer
cooperation between the ENDF and HOA and a stronger maritime
component to battle illegal activities in the Gulf of Aden

ADDIS ABAB 00001634 003 OF 003


and along the East African coast. Hunt emphasized that
Ethiopia was the main focus of his mission and that he hoped
to build long-term, solid relationships here. He also wanted
to continue the work that had begun recently to partner with
USAID, Embassy Addis and civilian GOE officials to make HOA
civil affairs projects more sustainable. For instance, HOA
was bringing U.S. expertise to bear on better utilizing
underground water resources in the parched Somali region and
sharing what it learned with Ethiopian authorities.


11. (C) Hunt asked for the PM's assistance in working around
recent restrictions imposed by ENDF Chief of General Staff
Lt. Gen. Samora on HOA operations. In particular, he hoped
to avoid a complete pull-out of HOA's operations in Gode. He
also hoped to usefully employ a new contingent of civil
engineers in areas which would not interfere in ENDF
operations in the Ogaden. Hunt indicated that HOA had
already pulled out of Jijiga and would soon pull out of Kebri
Dehar.


12. (C) PM Meles replied that HOA's civil affairs work in the
past had been very positive. Training had also been
valuable. The GOE remained eager to expand these activities.
Civil affairs had been useful in changing people's
attitudes. Meles also welcomed Hunt's increased focus on
maritime operations, and noted that these efforts would
complement Ethiopia's desire to make better use of
Somaliland's Berbera port. He was particularly interested in
hydrological work in the Ogaden, which could help overcome
technical and financial limitations in the GOE's own work in
this area.


13. (C) Meles shared USG concerns about extremist elements
entering the region through Somaliland, Puntland and other
areas of Somalia. He explained that the GOE's approach to
the region had included an effort to reach out to Somali
region elders to assist in resolving the conflict with the
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The ONLF had not
been receptive, but the GOE had noted a positive shift in
attitudes among the ethnic Somali Diaspora. In the absence
of negotiations with the ONLF, the GOE's approach was now to
drive the ONLF underground to open up space for more
constructive politics in the region. The GOE was planning a
major conference in July to bring together elders, regional
officials and others to consolidate this approach. In the
meantime, coming period represented the best time to operate
militarily against the ONLF and the ENDF intended to pursue
its campaign vigorously.


14. (C) The GOE's operations the Ogaden put a great deal of
pressure on LTG Samora, Meles told Hunt and the Charge. U.S.
lives could be at risk if HOA personnel found themselves in
the middle of the combat zone. Tensions in the area would
rise as military operations intensified. In addition, the
GOE wanted the local population to understand that ongoing
efforts were a purely Ethiopian affair, without the
involvement of the USG. For these reasons, LTG. Samora and
others were less comfortable with HOA operations in Ogaden
recently. Meles indicated that he wanted HOA to work with
LTG. Samora to identify areas outside the theater of ENDF
operations where HOA could continue its civil affairs work
and training. The PM said that the area around Hurso, where
training was already taking place, would be suitable for
civil affairs projects. The Shinale and East Hararge Zones
might also offer opportunities, along with some areas of the
Wabe Shebelle Valley. The PM did not give a definite
response on a HOA "care-taker" unit for Gode, saying that he
would have to raise the issue with LTG. Samora, since he did
not want to tie the latter's hands. He did undertake to
intercede with Samora on HOA's behalf, however.
HUDDLESTON