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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA1568
2006-06-09 07:11:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

UNSC MISSION REPORTS TO AU THAT SUDAN HAS NOT

Tags:   PREL  MOPS  KPKO  SU  AU  UN 
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VZCZCXRO3103
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1568/01 1600711
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090711Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6926
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0992
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0057
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0415
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0017
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0412
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0380
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0060
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2815
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1716
						UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001568 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, IO/PSC, D:T.SMITH

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU UN
SUBJECT: UNSC MISSION REPORTS TO AU THAT SUDAN HAS NOT
APPROVED UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION




1. (SBU). SUMMARY. On June 7, the visiting UN Security
Council delegation visiting Addis Ababa, Chad, and Sudan,
briefed representatives of the 15-member African Union Peace
and Security Council (AU PSC) and AU partners (i.e.,
non-member states) on its June 6 meetings in Khartoum with
Sudanese President Bashir, parliamentarians, opposition
parties, and NGOs. UNSC PermReps outlined continued Sudanese
reservations about an UN operation, including a Chapter VII
mandate under the UN Charter, but stressed the necessity of
continued engagement. France and China underscored the need
for the consent of the Government of Sudan before a UN
operation could be deployed. Speakers hailed the June 7
meeting as the first ever between the UN Security Council and
the three-year-old AU Peace and Security Council. END
SUMMARY.



--------------------------



--------------------------


NEXT STEPS: STRENGTHENING AMIS AND TRANSITION TO UN


--------------------------



--------------------------





2. (SBU) According to UKUN PermRep Sir Emyr Jones Parry,
while the UNSC mission urged both Sudan's Government of
National Unity (GNU) and other parties to comply with
commitments "on the UN taking over AMIS II" (i.e., the
enhanced African Union Mission in Sudan), "we did not get
agreement on that transfer, nor did we expect to get that."
The UN was "further forward, but not there yet." On the
other hand, the UNSC did receive confirmation that a joint
UN-AU technical assessment mission would be permitted to
visit Darfur and Khartoum, beginning June 9. Such a mission
was crucial, not only for strengthening AMIS, but also for
developing its new mandate. While a transfer was "probable,"
the UNSC had not expected to obtain the GNU's full approval,
he said.



3. (SBU) Jones Parry underscored the necessity to strengthen
AMIS, and to provide it with the resources necessary to
fulfill an enhanced mandate that included the protection of
civilians, rather than focusing only on monitoring. As five
to eight additional battalions required training, equipment,
transportation, and sustenance, there was a risk the
international community was not taking sufficient steps soon
enough; even President Bashir has stressed the urgency of
action, he said. Jones Parry highlighted the need for
adequate security as AMIS draws down and the UN builds up.
He also recommended that the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (UN DPKO) develop two concepts of operations: one
for the transition of AMIS to a UN-led mission, and another
for the UN operation itself.



4. (SBU) Jones Parry outlined a roadmap for transition, which

he said was shared by both the UNSC and the AU Commission,
and would be discussed with UN Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno:
-- continued implementation of current AMIS operations;
-- agreement on a new concept of operations (CONOPS), based
on the May 5 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), placing greater
emphasis on protection of civilians;
-- AMIS securing personnel and resources for AMIS expansion
(which would require bilateral aid and a pledging conference
before July);
-- identification by the assessment mission of the scope for
transition;
-- production by UN DPKO of a CONOPS for the UN mission, for
consideration by the UNSC;
-- identification of troop contributing countries for the UN
mission, "with a strong African character;"
-- transition to the UN, with full operational capacity
likely not to occur until January 2007.

Jones Parry noted that these steps needed to be done with the
consent of Sudan.



--------------------------



--------------------------


SUDANESE CONCERNS ABOUT UN, CHAPTER VII, AND CHAD


--------------------------



--------------------------





5. (SBU) Peru UN PermRep De Rivero observed that Sudanese

ADDIS ABAB 00001568 002 OF 003


parliamentarians, with whom the mission had met, expressed
dissatisfaction with the prospect of a UN force coming to
Sudan. The UNSC representatives sought to defend UNSCR
1679's references to a UN operation in Darfur operating under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and to explain that the UN's
threats to use force were directed against armed groups,
rather than Sudan, a UN member state. "They are not too
convinced about that," he remarked, adding that the UN
required a strong mandate to protect civilians and comply
with the DPA. Greek UN PermRep Vassilakis questioned whether
President Bashir "has the necessary support from inside" to
accept a Chapter VII UN operation. Argentina PermRep Mayoral
said the view of parliamentarians was clearer than that of
central government officials, but noted that parliament
included representatives of the north and south, but not of
Darfur.



6. (SBU) Danish UN PermRep Andersen noted that President
Bashir sought to blame the Government of Chad, while
exonerating the GNU. According to Andersen, Bashir said that
the Janjaweed was only "partially" a Sudanese problem, as 40
per cent of the Janjaweed came from Chad. By focusing on the
technical nature of the joint UN-AU assessment mission, the
GNU sought to depoliticize issues too sensitive to handle
otherwise, Andersen said. He noted that the GNU was now
pursuing a "negotiations strategy" with the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) in southern Sudan, and had asked Uganda to mediate.



7. (SBU) Slovak UN PermRep Burian said that Government of
Southern Sudan (GOSS) ministers had cited "many failures"
along with many successes, particularly the failure of donors
to deliver on pledges made in Oslo for the reconstruction of
the south. They also called for greater attention to be paid
to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), between north and south, not just the DPA. The LRA
posed a serious problem for southern Sudan, he said, and was
reportedly recruiting as well as targeting internally
displaced persons.



8. (SBU) Asked about future steps the AU might take, Congo UN
PermRep Biabaroh-Iboro observed that while AMIS transition to
the UN would be on the agenda of the upcoming July 1-2 AU
Summit in Banjul, the AU would likely await conclusions of
the UN-AU joint assessment mission. AU Commission
Chairperson Konare would travel to Sudan, he said;
furthermore, a committee of African heads of state, as noted
in the March 10 AU PSC decision, could go to Khartoum to meet
with President Bashir. Biabaroh-Iboro said the UNSC and the
AU could coordinate quickly with each other, citing the May
16 UNSCR, which immediately followed the May 15 AU PSC
decision.



9. (SBU) In response to Greek Ambassador to Ethiopia's
observation that public outreach activities were needed to
reach civil society in Darfur, Greek UN PermRep Vassilakis
agreed that the AU and UNMIS could develop and disseminate
information materials, but not the UNSC itself.



10. (SBU) Responding to Norwegian Charge's inquiry about
whether the UN could intervene earlier to strengthen AMIS,
French UN PermRep De La Sabliere expressed skepticism, noting
that intervention required sufficient preparation. In an
emergency, a single nation state could intervene, he said,
citing France's intervention in Bunia in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, under UNSC auspices. While the period
prior to the deployment of UN forces needed to be as short as
possible, UN forces could not be deployed without Sudan's
consent; the UN needed to develop a mandate that protected
civilians, in consultation with Sudanese authorities, he said.



11. (SBU) Jones-Parry said difficulties with simultaneously
deploying AU and UN troops include concerns about conflicting
command and control, headquarters, lack of parity of pay and
financing, and the dearth of troop contributing countries.



12. (SBU) Chinese UN PermRep Wang concluded the presentation
by UNSC members by remarking that UNSC members had different
views of the causes and situation of conflict in Darfur, but

ADDIS ABAB 00001568 003 OF 003


should unite behind the Abuja talks "to help Africans help
Sudanese help themselves." Ongoing discussions between the
Sudan and the UN had developed trust, he said; "our common
objective is peace." Wang called for continued support for
strengthening AMIS over the next few months, and asserted
that continued engagement by partners could lead to Sudan's
approval of a UN operation. "The door for the UN taking over
is open; the (UNSC) mission has not closed the door."
HUDDLESTON